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
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BEAUTIES

SELECTED FROM THE WRITINGS

OF THE LATE

WILLIAM PALEY, D. D.

Archdeacon of Carlisle:

ALPHABETICALLY ARRANGED.

WITH

AN ACCOUNT OF HIS LIFE,

AND

CRITICAL REMARKS UPON SOME OF HIS
PECULIAR OPINIONS.

BY W. HAMILTON REID.

LONDON:

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REVIEWS

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PREFACE.

It is presumed that those who are acquainted with the *voluminous* writings of Dr. Paley, will approve of an endeavour to compress and arrange their most luminous and prominent points. From such a diversity as has been produced by his pen, the facility at least must be admitted of conveying a more expeditious conception, and more agreeable ideas of the Author's views and manner, than might otherwise have been obtained from a laborious perusal of the whole, or from any of the parts disunited.

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The works of Dr. Paley have long been allowed to contain an uncommon portion of shrewdness and information, natural, political, moral, and religious; therefore a selection from such materials can scarcely fail affording a compendium of knowledge, equal in value to its utility, the worth of which must be enhanced by the known integrity and independent character of the author, forming a complete portraiture, at once engaging, amusing, interesting and instructive.

For the biography in general, the compiler is indebted to Mr. Meadley's Memoirs of Dr. Paley; other sources however have not been neglected, and while some passages in his works before unnoticed, are recommended, particularly his thoughts on the millenium, proper attention has been paid to some judicious objections against other sentiments of his supposed to stand in need of correction or censure. Upon the whole, the samples here produced sufficiently prove the rich-

ness and value of the ore at large, and evince, that regardless either of pompous or polished periods, Dr. Paley continually administers *matter for thinking*: consequently it is not too much to expect that the estimation of Paley among divines should bear some proportion to that of the celebrated John Locke among the philosophers of his day.

The political sentiments of Dr. Paley, are generally expressed with a boldness and perspicuity which give them the usual force of reason and argument without its formality: and he occasionally exhibits more correct and comprehensive ideas of the British constitution than are to be found in many works written professedly on the subject, not excepting De Lolme.

Lastly, as the Archdeacon's politics are founded upon the unchangeable principles of right and wrong; and of course upon the bases of religion, morality and *utility*, we have not thought it necessary to separate them from the others. The Index,

however, will assist the reader in finding out such passages and particulars as were not convenient to enumerate in the heads of the articles, which are, notwithstanding, alphabetically arranged.

Upon the whole, a complete epitome of the works of Paley is not to be expected in this compilation ; for exclusive of a large portion of religion and excellent morality contained in these extracts, the writings of the archdeacon at large, will nevertheless continue to merit a distinguished place in the libraries of the learned and the opulent. In fact, Paley's Natural Theology, and his Moral and Political Philosophy, alone, are to the philosopher and the civilian, a library of themselves.

THE
LIFE
OF
WILLIAM PALEY, D. D.

Since it is beyond a doubt that the late Archdeacon *Paley* was one of the brightest ornaments of the Church of England, there are very few events which in the end contributed to the formation of so great a mind, that will not be found worthy the attention of posterity.

It has been said, with some degree of confidence, that Dr. Paley was a Socinian or Unitarian; but this appears to have been an assertion hasty or unfounded—however, that he was no bigot; that he did not approve of fire or faggot; that he did not even treat those with contempt

who conscientiously differed from him in opinion, is undeniable. His conduct, and his stability in the church, ought also to convince those persons who have endeavoured to represent him as one of their party, that, (as most discerning men will do in the end,) Dr. Paley considered the Establishment of the Church of England, the best calculated for the advancement of learning and piety of any, even upon its present footing.

And though the Archdeacon did not pretend to conceal its defects among those to which all human institutions are subject, he seemed to have perceived pretty early that a fierce contention for certain opinions arose from a disposition destructive of real Christianity; hence he endeavoured to enforce "the disposition which Christianity labours above all things to inculcate;" with this he was convinced, "differences of opinion would do little harm." "If that disposition be wanting," he observed, "other causes, even were these absent, would continually rise up to call forth the malevolent passions into action."

But to show that by this disposition he did not mean any thing like that blind confidence, which has been recommended by the advocates

for implicit faith of all denominations, he further observes,

“Differences of opinion when accompanied by mutual charity, which Christianity forbids them to violate, are for the most part innocent, and for some purposes useful. They promote inquiry, discussion, and knowledge. They help to keep up an attention to religious subjects, and a concern about them which might be apt to die away in the calm and silence of universal agreement.” Now though the latter of these assertions, in particular, may be subject to considerable modification, here is sufficient to shew that the conciliating spirit of Archdeacon Paley has never, in the least degree, betrayed or compromised the true interests of the Church of England. Having presumed thus much, we may proceed to describe the habits and pursuits of that intellect which ultimately produced a character so truly worthy of the Christian clergyman and the friend to his country.

William Paley, D. D. as it appears from the register of the cathedral of Peterborough, was born in that city in July, and baptized on the 30th of August, 1743. His family, originally of Craven in the West Riding of Yorkshire, was ancient and respectable. There his great-grand-

father, John, and his grandfather, Thomas Paley were successively the occupants of a small patrimonial estate at Langcliffe in the parish of Giggleswick. This estate is still in possession of the family of the Paleys. The father of the Archdeacon was head-master of the free grammar school at Giggleswick, but being instituted to the vicarage of Helpstone in Northamptonshire, in 1735, worth no more than thirty-five pounds a year, he afterwards fixed his residence at Peterborough, on being appointed a minor canon of the Cathedral. Mr. Paley is said to have been a very good classical scholar, and a mild and sensible man; and during the infancy of his son, being appointed head-master of Giggleswick School, he resigned his minor-canonry, and removed to that place. He had not long before married Elizabeth Clapham of that parish, a woman of strong intellects, and of an active disposition.

Respecting young Paley, it can scarcely be supposed a common-place compliment to say “that he soon surpassed his early class fellows at school; that his disposition was more studious than that of boys in general at his age; and that by successive promotions from one class to another, he at length obtained pre-eminence

over all." As his acquisitions were not of a flowery kind, his compositions as school exercises, had nothing remarkable. From the first, he was more attentive to things than to words, and warm in the pursuit of knowledge of every kind, particularly that of mechanism. Hence he was fond of conversing with workmen, and others capable of administering to his curiosity; but though in his *mind* he was uncommonly active, in his *body* he was quite the reverse. He was a bad horseman, and having a seeming aversion to any exercise which required exertion in his hands and feet, he engaged in no sport but angling. Still he was at all times a pleasant and lively companion, and as such esteemed by his school-fellows.

When about fifteen, he accompanied his father to Cambridge, and was admitted a sizar of Christ's College, Nov. 16, 1758. Soon after his return to Craven, the classics only being taught at Giggleswick School, Mr. William Howarth at Dishforth, near Topcliffe, about three miles from Rippon, became his teacher in the mathematics. Here the foundation of his knowledge in algebra and geometry was laid.

In October, 1759, he became resident member of Christ's College; soon after his departure

for which, his father observed to a pupil, then his only boarder, "My son is now gone to College; he'll turn out a great man—very great indeed—I'm certain of it; for he has by far the clearest head I ever met with in my life." He was little more than sixteen when he commenced his residence in the University, an age, which he frequently mentioned afterwards, as too early to encounter the dangers of a college life; but then he always had an old look, which, with the superior strength and vigour of his understanding, exhibited the appearance of a much maturer age.

On the 6th of December, he was appointed to one of the scholarships founded by Mr. Carr, and appropriated to students from Giggleswick School. On the following day he was elected a scholar on the foundation of his college, and appointed to the exhibition founded by Sir Walter Mildmay; and on the 26th of May, 1761, he was elected to the scholarship founded by Mr. Buntry, one of the college tenants. Mr. Shepherd, who then gave lectures in algebra, geometry, and the various branches of natural philosophy, being soon convinced of Mr. Paley's superior attainments, excused him from attending his college lectures with students of his

own year, but required this only at those public lectures which he gave as Plumian Professor, and occasionally proposed mathematical questions for his solution. Mr. Paley also during this period, regularly attended Mr. Backhouse's lectures on logic and metaphysics.

It has been remarked with respect to the power of abstraction which he possessed in his own mind, that "though his room used to be the common rendezvous for the idle young men of his college, he might often be seen in one corner as composed and attentive to what he was reading, as if alone; he also at one period indulged himself in bed till a late hour, and would be much in company after dinner, at tea, and at a coffee-house after nine in the evening;" of course it was inferred, "that he was considerably more indebted to observation and reflection, than to books for the general improvement of his mind." In reference to this period of Mr. Paley's life, Mr. Hall, one of his college friends, and afterwards vicar of Grantham, observed, "It was difficult to say what studies Paley most excelled in after he became a graduate. His knowledge was general; nothing escaped his notice; and he seemed conversant in every branch of science, and in every sort of informa-

tion ; so clear was his head, so retentive his memory."

Generally careless about his dress, and sometimes remarkably inattentive, particularly when he appeared in the public schools to keep his first *act*, he attracted more than common notice. His hair was full dressed, and he had a deep ruffled shirt and new silk stockings, which, together with his gestures, his action, and his whole manner, when earnestly engaged in the debate, excited no small mirth in the spectators ; however he acquitted himself with such ability, that afterwards the schools were always crowded when he was expected to dispute. Referring to this period, the Rev. Mr. Friend, his fellow collegian and pupil, once observed in respect to a former sketch of Paley's life and manners, " You should have seen him, Sir, as we did, when he stepped out of his little study into the lecture-room, rolled from the door to his arm-chair, turned his old scratch over his left ear, and his left leg over his right, buttoned up his waistcoat, pulled up a stocking, and fixed a dirty-covered, torn, ragged Locke upon his left knee, moistened his thumb with his lip, and then turned over the ragged leaves of his books, dog-eared and scrawled all over, with the utmost

rapidity. All this was done in much less time than you have read the description of it.

“ We were so accustomed to this preparation, that it ceased to make any impression upon us ; and sat each in expectation of the first question falling to his lot. Paley shone as lecturer at a place where the art of lecturing is better understood than in any other part of the world. In most places, and particularly in dissenting academies, the lecturer delivers a kind of preachment, and thinks he has done much, if from his notes he has uttered an harangue, suitable to the subject, however unsuitable it may be to his hearers. Not so the lecturers in Cambridge, and particularly Paley. After he had composed himself in the manner above described, he fastened his eyes upon one of his pupils, and, without any further prelude, questioned him on some point of the preceding lecture. Woe be to the unfortunate wight, who made a wrong answer ; he was hampered more and more by successive questions ; while the lecturer was enjoying his triumph, the pupil, as we called it, became dumb-founded, and the lecture-room in a laugh not to be suppressed.”

Mr. Paley's lectures were not less productive of amusement than improvement. Something it

has been said “ was then sure to come out, which amply repaid his hearers for the supposed trouble in many cases of going to lectures. Nor was there any danger of Paley’s conduct leading other lecturers astray. He was one among those few men of superior talents, who knew when to tighten, and when to slacken the reins. The moment the least symptom of unbecoming levity appeared, the culprit was called to order. ‘ None of your jokes, gibes, jeers, jests, wit, pleasantry, and all that, Mr. ————’ was sounded out against him in an instant ; and he had too strong a sense of his danger to persist one step farther, knowing full well the occasion he had for all his faculties to reply to the questions that were coming down upon him.

“ Paley, it was then observed, seemed to have taken throughout for his model, Locke on the Reasonableness of Christianity, and his Comments on the Epistles. These two last books he recommended continually, and his recommendation deserves the attention of all lecturers.” The same writer further observed, “ Indeed, if Paley’s mode of lecturing was pursued in our pulpits and lecture rooms, particularly in the lecture rooms of the dissenters, more scriptural knowledge would be diffused through this Island

in three years, than there has been by the usual methods for the last three hundred, or will by the present methods for the next three hundred years.

“After the questions in the former lecture were over, Paley’s position in his seat was changed; the scratch, the leg, the book, took exactly the opposite directions: the thumb was moistened as before, the leaves turned over, but nine times in ten not stopped at the place which had any reference to what he was going to say, when in the most familiar manner he discussed some subject in Locke or Clarke, or in moral philosophy, pointing out the passages to be read for the next lecture day, and explaining every thing in such a manner, that the driest subjects were made interesting. At this time the students were mostly employed in taking notes, and the manuscripts thus taken of his lectures, were eagerly sought after in other colleges.”

Another circumstance highly to his credit, and on which he laid great stress, was his evening lecture on the Sunday, always in the Greek Testament, and on two other evenings one also in the Greek Testament. Each student in his turn read and translated into English as many verses as the lecturer thought fit, who gave the general

sense of the whole, pointed out those passages which deserved particular attention, explained scripture by scripture, and accompanied the whole with suitable moral exhortations. These exhortations, it may be added, he confirmed and strengthened by his own example; for since his disease, when his friend, the present vicar of Grantham, was applied to for his assistance in supplying the public with information for his memoirs, his answer bore this testimony, viz. "that he never knew Mr. Paley guilty of a vicious act, nor inattentive to propriety of moral conduct."

In his college lectures, it should have been observed, he treated the thirty-nine articles of religion as mere articles of peace, the whole of which it was impossible the framers could expect any one person to believe; as, upon dissection, they would be found to contain about two hundred and forty distinct and independent propositions, many of them inconsistent with each other. They must, therefore, he said, be considered as propositions, which, for the sake of keeping peace amongst the different sects of reformers, who originally united in composing the church of England, it was agreed should not be impugned or preached against. "The chief

points insisted upon by Mr. Paley to his pupils, were, that they should listen to God, and not to man; that they should exert their faculties in understanding the language of holy men of old; that they should free themselves as much as possible, from all prejudices of birth, education, and country; and that they should not call any one their master in religion, but JESUS CHRIST."

A circumstance occurred in October, 1762, which gave rise to much animadversion at Cambridge. Mr. Jebb, fellow of Peterhouse, and Mr. Watson, afterwards bishop of Landaff, being invested with the office of moderators for the first time, soon after which the latter sent Mr. Paley an *act*. He was prepared with a mathematical question, but referring to *Johnson's Questiones Philosophicæ*, a book then common in the university, containing the subjects usually written upon in the schools, names of the authors, &c. he fixed upon two others, which, as far as he knew, had not been proposed before: the one against *capital punishments*, the other against *the eternity of hell torments*. But the heads of the university had no sooner heard that Mr. Paley had proposed such a question, than, jealous of his abilities so exerted, they ordered the master of the college, Dr. Thomas, to sum-

mon him to the lodge, where he warmly objected to both questions, especially the last, which he insisted he should absolutely relinquish. This step being communicated by him to Mr. Watson, he was indignant that "the heads of colleges should interfere in a matter which belonged solely," as he said, to him; for he was the judge of the propriety or impropriety of the questions sent to him. "Are you, sir," continued he, "independent of your college? if you are, these *shall* be the questions for your *act*." Mr. Paley answered, "he should be unwilling to offend the college, and therefore wished to change the last question." "Very well," replied the moderator, "the best way then for you to satisfy the scruples of these gentlemen, will be for you to defend the eternity of hell torments," which he actually did by changing his thesis to the affirmative.

In 1763, when Mr. Paley took his degree of bachelor of arts, he was also senior wrangler of the year. In the senate house, as in the schools, Mr. Frere was his most formidable competitor, and gained the second honours.

Soon after obtaining his bachelor's degree, through the recommendation of Mr. Shepherd, he engaged as second assistant in a great acade-

my at Greenwich, kept by Mr. Bracken. Here, it has been intimated, Mr. Paley improved his classical talents while teaching the Latin language to others. After this period, it appears that Mr. Paley paid a great deal of attention to public speaking, in an occasional attendance to the bar and the stage. His attendance upon law trials, it seems, commenced while he was in the country : what he observed during the trial of Eugene Aram, for murder at Lancaster, had been frequently the subject of his remarks ; and while he was with Mr. Bracken at Greenwich, it further appears, the liberty of paying occasional visits to, and rambling about London, were such gratifications, that to enjoy them to a greater extent, or with more security, he used frequently to say, that the highest object of his ambition would be obtained, could he only become the *first* assistant in that academy, in the room of the *second*.

In 1765, Mr. Paley wrote a prize essay, on a “ *Comparison between the Stoic and the Epicurean Philosophy, with respect to the Influence of each on the Morals of a People.*” In this essay, Mr. Paley used his pen against the Stoics, and most strenuously vindicated Epicurus from those calumnies with which he has been loaded

by persons who had misrepresented his system; and he maintained that the doctrines of Epicurus were favourable to rational pleasures only, and the true happiness of mankind. On the other hand, he brought many instances of Stoics, who affecting more than ordinary virtue, had descended to the most execrable crimes. Mr. Paley was successful in obtaining this prize, though he had nearly lost it in consequence of appending to it, long notes in *English*. Dr. Powell, Master of St. John's college, however, spoke warmly in its favour, insisting that it contained more matter than was to be found in all the others. The notes, he said, "shewed the author to be a young man of the most promising abilities and extensive reading;" and this opinion it appears was decisive in turning the balance in Mr. Paley's favour.

Having been ordained a deacon as soon as his age would admit, he engaged as curate to Dr. Hinchliffe of Greenwich, afterwards bishop of Peterborough. Soon after this, Mr. Paley left Mr. Bracken's school, on account of some difference; but still continued to officiate in the parish church. On the 24th of June, 1766, he was elected a fellow on the foundation of Christ's college, then worth about one hundred a year.

He then returned to a residence in the university, took his degree of master of arts, and engaged in the business of private tuition; and at the general ordination holden at St. James's Chapel, in London, in December, 1767, he was ordained a priest by bishop Terrick.

In 1768, Mr. Backhouse resigning his tutorship of Christ's college, Dr. Shepherd held the tuition alone, till he soon thought proper to transfer the active duties of his station to Mr. Paley and Mr. Law, his assistant. In 1770, Mr. Paley served the office of taxor in the university; and in the register of the Royal Chapel at Whitehall, for April 21, 1771, his name appeared for the first time, as one of the persons appointed to preach before his majesty.

Here Mr. Paley preached for the last time, on the 21st of April, 1776; and commenced his labours in the university in the May following. On the 6th of June, he was married to Miss Hewitt, at St. Mary's Carlisle, where his friend Mr. Law performed the ceremony. At Musgrove, his next residence on the banks of the Eden, he has owned that he passed some of the happiest hours of his life: here he indulged an early disposition for angling; here in a small farm he found he was not calculated for a farmer.

However, in December in the same year, he got the vicarage of Dalston in Cumberland, worth about ninety pounds a year. In the September following, he was inducted to the more valuable vicarage of Appleby, worth about two hundred pounds a year; after this he divided his time between Dalston and Appleby, residing by turns six months at each place.

In June, 1780, he was installed a prebendary of the fourth stall in the cathedral of Carlisle, worth about four hundred pounds per annum; and in 1782, he became archdeacon of Carlisle, to which the rectory of Great Salkeld is always annexed, worth about one hundred and twenty pounds a year.

For a considerable time while Mr. Paley was at the university, he was extremely intimate with Mr. Edward Law, now Lord Ellenborough, third son of the bishop of Carlisle. During the long vacation, they used to make excursions to different parts of the kingdom, usually travelling in a one horse chaise; and there is little doubt, that the latter was considerably indebted to Mr. Paley for the improvement of those talents that afterwards raised him to one of the first judicial situations in the kingdom.

Mr. Paley was much esteemed by Dr. Plump-

tre, master of Queen's College, and particularly intimate with Dr. Waring, fellow of Magdalen College, and Lucasian, professor of mathematics. Mr. Paley also shared largely in the esteem and confidence of Mr. Jebb, notwithstanding some difference in their opinions, as has since appeared from their writings. On essential points, however, it is said they cordially agreed, especially with respect to subscription and annual examinations.

The connection between Mr. Paley, Mr. Law, and Dr. Shepherd in the tuition, has been mentioned before. But as these gentlemen shared but one half of the emoluments, they at length insisted upon a *trisection*. They very properly contended for a greater portion; the doctor resisted; he thought himself extremely ill used; it was out of the power of logic to convince him that their demand was reasonable. The spirit of Paley however rose, and they brought him to this *ultimatum*: either we divide the profit equally, or we set up for ourselves, and leave you to do what you please with your pupils. Resistance being any longer in vain, the doctor gave up the point.

Among other casual acquaintance about this time, 1772, Mr. Paley used to mention the

American General Lee, who visited England with the Polish prince, Pongatowsky, of whom report has stated, since the late defeat of the Archduke Charles at Wagram, that he has become a favourite of the French emperor. In every party where this prince, General Lee, and some other Polish noblemen met, Mr. Paley used to say, the General gave this toast, "the King of Poland, the Parliament of Paris, and the people of America."

When the great controversy on the propriety of requiring a subscription to articles of faith, as practised by the Church of England, ran high at Cambridge, Mr. Paley, it is said, "though personally attached to many of the reforming party, and from the known liberality of his sentiments, considered favourable to their claims, did *not* sign the clerical petition for relief, which was presented to the House of Commons, alleging, jocularly, to Mr. Jebb, as an apology for his refusal, *that he could not afford to keep a conscience.*" On this occasion, Mr. G. W. Meadley remarks, "it may be fairly presumed, that reflecting on the power and influence of the adverse party, and the wonted indifference of the great mass of the community in all questions of principle, and enlightened reasoning, (he might have

said *abstract reasoning*,) he despaired of success, and thence prudently declined entering into a measure, which, without procuring any relief to the petitioners, might have narrowed his own sphere of present usefulness, as well as thwarted all his prospects in life.

But that such relief at some future time was not looked upon as impracticable or improper, has been inferred from the part which Mr. Paley afterwards took in the controversy. In January, 1774, an able and moderate pamphlet appeared from the press at Cambridge, entitled, “*Considerations on the Propriety of requiring a Subscription to Articles of Faith*,” which was reprinted in London with additions, on the April following. This, though anonymous, was soon discovered to have been written by the bishop of Carlisle. Soon after an *Answer to the Considerations* appeared from the Clarendon press at Oxford, without a name, which was soon known to have been written by Dr. Thomas Randolph, president of Corpus Christi. This was followed by a *Defence of the Considerations*, published at London in June following; a spirited and acute tract, uniformly ascribed to Mr. Paley. It was the first essay in argument, which he had given to the world. In the work, Mr. Paley

observes, in reply to a paragraph of considerable length in Dr. Randolph's work, that the sum and substance of it is this: "that if subscription to articles of faith were removed, confusion would ensue; the people would be distracted with the disputes of their teachers, and the pulpits filled with controversy and contradiction. Upon this fact, we join issue, and the more readily, as this is a sort of reasoning we all understand. The extent of a legislator's right may be an abstruse inquiry; but whether a law does more good or harm, is a plain question, which every man can ask. Now, that distressing many of the clergy, and corrupting others; that keeping out of churches good Christians and faithful citizens; that making parties in the state, by giving occasion to sects and separations in religion; that these are inconveniences, no man in his senses will deny. *The question, therefore, is, what advantage* do you find in the opposite scale to balance these inconveniences? The simple advantage pretended is, that you hereby prevent wrangling and contention in the pulpit. Now, in the first place, I observe, that, allowing this evil to be as grievous and as certain as you please, the most that can be necessary for the prevention of it is, to enjoin your preachers as to such

points, *silence* and *neutrality*. In the next place, I am convinced that the danger is greatly magnified. We hear little of these points at present in our churches and public teaching, and it is not probable, that leaving them at large would elevate them into more importance, or make it more worth men's while to quarrel about them. They would sleep in the same grave with many other questions of equal importance with themselves; or sink back into their proper place, into topics of speculation, or matters of debate from the press. None but men of some reflection would be forward to engage in such subjects, and the least reflection would teach a man, that *preaching* is not the proper vehicle of controversy. Even at present, says our author, *we speak and write what we please with impunity*; and where is the mischief? and what worse could ensue if subscriptions were removed? Nor can I discover any thing in the disposition of the petitioning clergy that need alarm our apprehensions. If they are impatient under the yoke, it is not from a desire to hold forth their opinions to their congregations, but that they may be at liberty to entertain them themselves, without offence to their consciences, or ruin to their fortunes."

Dr. Paley was further of opinion, "that subscription to the thirty-nine articles, might be altered or withdrawn upon general principles of justice and expediency, without reviving one religious controversy, or calling into a dispute a single proposition they contain. Who, said he, should excite disturbances? those who are relieved will not, unless subscription were like a tax, which being taken from one, must be laid with additional weight upon another. Is it probable, that any will complain that they are oppressed, because their brethren are relieved? or that those who are so strong *in the faith*, will refuse to bear with the infirmities of the weak?" He also thought, "that even the governors of the church themselves, would find their ease and account in consenting to an alteration."

It was in consequence of the expression of these and similar sentiments, that an interesting correspondence took place in the summer of 1789, between him and Dr. Percival of Manchester, on the case of subscription to articles. Mr. Percival of St. John's College, the eldest son of this eminent physician, was brought up a dissenter in the Arian scheme; but though originally designed for the medical profession, at length conceived a very strong desire of taking

orders in the established church. He, though much pleased with Mr. Paley's reasoning on *religious establishments*, had still some scruples, and therefore made use of his father to solicit a personal interview with Mr. Paley, who probably thinking conversation unnecessary, returned an answer in writing, in which he enlarged a little further upon what he had advanced in the chapter on *subscription* in his *Moral and Political Philosophy*, Book III. Part I. Chap. 22. but concluded with saying, "if your son were here, I know not that I ought to say more. In such cases, it is the office of an adviser to suggest general principles. The application of these to each man's case, must be made by the person himself, who alone knows the state of his own thoughts." Mr. Percival however was satisfied; he took orders the year following, became a respectable member of his profession, and died lamented in the prime of life.

A little essay was written by Mr. Paley about this time, viz. *Arguments against the unjust Pretensions of Slave Dealers and Holders, to be indemnified by pecuniary Allowances at the Public Expence, in case the Slave Trade should be abolished.* The substance of this was detailed

in the papers of the day ; but the original, though sought for, could never be recovered.

When Dr. Beadon was promoted to the see of Gloucester, the bishop of Ely, Dr. Yorke, offered Mr. Paley the mastership of Jesus College, Cambridge. As there had been no previous connection between the parties, it is justly to be inferred, that the bishop could have no wish but to promote the interest of the university, in rewarding the merit of one of her ablest sons. Like some other masterships, the place was more honourable than lucrative ; but though tenable with any other preferment, Mr. Paley declined the offer, notwithstanding he was urged to accept it by Sir John Wilson and other friends. The motives for his refusal, it is thought, were never made known, even to his most intimate acquaintance.

In 1798, Mr. Paley published his "*Horæ Paulinæ* ; or, the Truth of the Scripture History of St. Paul evinced, by a Comparison of the Epistles which bear his Name, with the Acts of the Apostles, and with one another." Mr. G. W. Meadley seems to think this excellent treatise " contains a larger portion of interest, and more profound invention, than any other of the arch-deacon's works."

At his annual visitation the same year, he delivered a *Charge to the Clergy of the Diocese of Carlisle*. Among other excellent hints in this Charge, he warmly advised the clergy, in order to render their sermons useful and interesting, to adapt them, after the example of Christ, to local circumstances, and the state of mind prevailing amongst their hearers, as well as to times and seasons, and the occasional dispensations of providence. But all personal allusions, and the remotest reference to *party* transactions, or *political* disputes, he most strenuously condemns as improper; observing that "the Christian preacher has no other province than that of religion and morality." In May 1791, he lost Mrs. Paley, after a long illness; she left him four sons and four daughters. In the following year Mr. Paley signalized himself as an advocate for the abolition of the slave trade. On the 7th of May 1792, he was inducted to the vicarage of Addingham, near Great Salkeld. This living, in the presentation of the Dean and Chapter of Carlisle, was worth about one hundred and forty pounds a year. In 1790, Dr. Vernon coming to the see of Carlisle, Mr. Paley vacated Dalston on being collated by his new diocesan to the vicarage of Stanwix; being some time after

asked why he exchanged Stanwix for Dalston, he answered, with his usual frankness, that it saved him from double housekeeping, Stanwix being within twenty minutes walk of his house at Carlisle; secondly it was fifty pounds a year more in value; and lastly, he said, he began to find his stock of sermons coming over again too fast."

Mr. Paley's View of the Evidences of Christianity, appeared early in 1794, in three volumes 12mo. and was soon after republished in two volumes 8vo. In this work the voluminous evidence, collected by the indefatigable Lardner, is selected and methodized, and the whole of the argument brought forward in a more perspicuous point of view; particularly the collateral proofs collected by Lardner, to which Mr. Paley has added various auxiliaries: he has likewise availed himself of Bishop Douglas's *Criterion*, by extracting from it all its pith and argument. It was once thought that Mr. Pitt had an intention of promoting Mr. Paley to the Deanery of Carlisle, vacant in 1792, and that probably the claims of Dr. Milner, as Master of Queen's College had such weight upon the Minister, as the High Steward and Representative of that University, as to prevent it. It has also

been suggested more than once, that “Mr. Paley’s writings stood in the way of his preferment: for instance, his story of the pigeons; his liberal construction of the oath of allegiance; his assertion, *that government may be too secure*; his limitation of the duty of civil obedience; his argument, that the obligation of subjects and sovereigns is reciprocal; his remark, that the divine right of *kings* is like the divine right of *constables*; and still more, by his enlightened views of religious establishments and toleration.”

In fact his principles have been thought to lead to more extensive conclusions than he himself was willing to pursue; however, the services of Mr. Paley were at length crowned with such a liberal reward as many who have had equal claims were not so fortunate as to obtain.

In August 1794, Dr. Porteus, the late Bishop of London, instituted Mr. Paley to the prebend of Pancras, in the Cathedral of St. Paul’s; this was tenable with any other preferment, and did not subject Mr. Paley to a residence in London. This promotion was soon followed by that of the Deanery of Lincoln, worth about seven hundred pounds a year, bestowed on him by Dr. Pretyman. After his instalment in that Cathedral in

1795, he proceeded to Cambridge to take his degree as Doctor in Divinity; and having been Master of Arts more than twelve years, and a non-gremial, the intermediate degree of Bachelor in Divinity was dispensed with, and no other exercises required of him but a *Concio ad Clerum*, and an English Sermon; but before he left Cambridge he received a letter from Dr. Barrington, with whom he had no previous acquaintance, with the offer of the rectory of Bishop Wearmouth, worth about twelve hundred pounds per annum. It has been justly observed, that “the unsolicited patronage of this eminent moralist, was indeed, in every respect, worthy of the son of Viscount Barrington, the disciple of Locke, and one of the most strenuous advocates for religious liberty in his own or any other age.”

At the same time, the Bishop, and the Dean of Carlisle were also Mr. Paley's patrons, and Mr. Paley was allowed to transfer all the preferments he held in the Diocese of Carlisle; the Rectory house at Bishop Wearmouth, to which he next removed, is noticed as being one of the best parsonage houses in the kingdom. Mr. Paley had been appointed Chancellor of the Diocese of Carlisle on the death of Dr. Burn, in 1785.

When he again visited Cambridge to complete his Doctor's degree, he preached before the University, *On the Dangers incidental to the Clerical Character*; this was afterwards published with a Dedication to the Vice Chancellor and Heads of Colleges; and a good abridgment of it has lately been published in Dr. Percival's works, with remarks.

Returning to Bishop Wearmouth, he preached the Assize sermon in the Cathedral of Durham, before the Lord Bishop and the Judges on the northern circuit. In this discourse he did not fail to inculcate the duties of persons in the most elevated stations of life; he reprobated the pernicious maxim, that "such persons are placed above work," and he concluded with a forcible description of the functions and character of a jury in a free country.

Before he had been long at Bishop Wearmouth, he agreed to a proposal from some of the principal land owners for an annual compensation for tythes, and granted them a lease for his life; thus readily sacrificing any eventual interest of his own, in the improvements which might follow, and thus leaving the farmer to enjoy the full value of his own exertions. It is allowed that he also secured himself from the disappoint-

ments of bad crops and unfavourable seasons. And when he heard of the former, he would sometimes exclaim in his own way, "Aye, aye, now I am well off; my tythes are safe, and I have nothing to do with them, or to think about them." But he did not stop here; he also granted long leases of his glebe lands, and particularly of a lime-stone-quarry to the *old tenant* upon very moderate terms. From the later rise in landed property, his tenants found they had very good bargains; and to this circumstance, probably occasioned by the remarks of his avaricious or more worldly-minded neighbours, he would sometimes allude in conversation, but without any symptoms of uneasiness upon the subject.

In December 1795, Dr. Paley married Miss Dobinson of Carlisle, and soon after set out for Lincoln, where as Sub-dean, he was obliged to reside three months in the year. At this city and at Bishop Wearmouth, he visited a good deal among his neighbours, and entertained company in return, in a handsome, but by no means ostentatious stile; and though he frequently mixed in card-parties, he would always readily give them up for conversation with an intelligent companion: to a lady who observed

that the only excuse for their playing was, that it served to kill time, he answered; "the best defence possible, Madam, though time will in the end kill us." Becoming soon after a magistrate, it was in vain that he attempted to move his brethren of the bench, to suppress the unnecessary accumulation of taverns, public-houses, and dram shops; his own example in endeavouring to use the utmost discrimination in granting licenses was not followed.

The doctor's mother died in 1796; and his father in September 1799, after having been master of the school at Giggleswick more than fifty years, and having been vicar of Helpestone sixty-four years. Added to this long life, he had the satisfaction of seeing his fondest predictions respecting the fate of his son amply gratified. The inscription in Giggleswick church, upon a brass plate, makes the age of his father 88 years, and his mother's 83.

In 1800, the doctor himself sustained a violent nephralgic complaint at Bishop Wearmouth, accompanied with a species of melæna, which laid him up for a time; a second attack while he was at Lincoln, in the spring of 1801, was not so violent, but a relapse, however, prevented him from going to Lincoln in 1802.

During some intervals of excruciating pain, his mind it was observed was still calm and vigorous, and his vivacity unimpaired

In the ensuing spring, as soon as Dr. Paley was able to travel in a coach, his physician, Dr. Clark of Newcastle, advised him to try the Buxton waters; and the doctor often expressed his admiration at the fortitude with which he sustained the most painful attacks, and at his readiness and alacrity in availing himself of every interval from pain to resume his literary labours. It is here particularly worthy of remark, that he was then writing the twenty-sixth chapter of his *Natural Theology*, and that what he then said of the *alleviation of pain* was not the thoughts of a philosopher in the full enjoyment of health, who may talk at his ease of an evil which he does not feel; on the contrary, when Dr. Paley speaks of the power which pain possesses "*Of shedding a satisfaction over intervals of ease which few enjoyments exceed;*" and assures us "*that a man resting from severe pain, is, for the time, in possession of feelings which undisturbed health cannot impart;*" these sentiments were, undoubtedly, the genuine result of his own experience. He was himself, the very subject which he then described. Here is the result of

well-regulated religious and moral feelings; so far superior to the boast and pride of a Stoical apathy, or that mockery of assertion, that pain is not an evil.

An absence of two months at Buxton enabled Dr. Paley to return to Bishop Wearmouth early in 1804; soon after which he published his *Natural Theology; or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity; collected from the Appearances of Nature*. In the same year, he resigned the archdeaconry of Carlisle, and the rectory of Great Salkeld; but in December 1804, as Mr. G. W. Meadley observes, though the Doctor had again “entered into the pleasures of society with his wonted zest; and his conversation was as animated and impressive as ever,” when Mr. Meadley saw him for the last time, his valuable life was drawing fast towards a close; and the powers of nature, gradually exhausted by repeated sufferings, were becoming daily less able to resist the force of his inveterate disease. Yet he kept his annual residence at Lincoln in 1805, and returned to Bishop Wearmouth about the beginning of May. Soon after his arrival there, he experienced a most violent attack, in which the usual remedies were found ineffectual. Human skill was therefore vain.

his appetite failing him, he was no longer able to take the requisite support, but soon sunk under the accumulated influence of debility and disease. His sight is supposed to have failed a few days before his death, whilst his other faculties remained unimpaired. The evening of his life was clouded with no displeasing recollections; no vain anxieties; no fond regrets: he had enjoyed the blessings of this world with satisfaction, and he relied for future happiness on the promises of that divine revelation, the truth of which he had so strenuously laboured to evince. He consequently met the approach of death with firmness, comforted his afflicted family with the consolations of religion, and late on the evening of Saturday, May 25, 1805, he tranquilly breathed his last.

On Tuesday, June 4, his remains were conveyed to Carlisle, attended by his two sons, and deposited in one of the aisles of the Cathedral, by the side of his first wife. In person Dr. Paley was above the common size, and in his latter years rather inclined to corpulence: he is said to have left a very competent fortune among his family; “for though he never levied the utmost value of his *préferments*, and had always lived in a style suitable to his station, he

had been through life, to use his own phrase, ‘an *economist upon a plan*.’”

His eldest son, Mr. William Paley, has lately been called to the bar by the honourable society of Lincoln’s Inn, and attends the northern circuit. The younger, Mr. Edmund Paley, a graduate of Queen’s College, Oxford, is intended for the clerical profession.

Of Dr. Paley’s character as a divine it is difficult to speak, when we consider the prejudices of parties in church and state. The candid and disinterested reader, in judging of the workman by the works he has left to posterity, will no doubt agree with one of his memorialists, that “his views of Christianity were at once cheerful and enlightened; in strict unison with the benevolent spirit of its founder, which appears to have been too much forgotten amidst the animosities of contending sects. The establishment of substantial Christianity, therefore, Dr. Paley deemed a matter of far greater moment than the defence of any peculiar system of religious faith.” He suffered “no subordinate differences of opinion, when there was a coincidence in the main intention and object, to produce any diminution of favour, or alienation of his esteem,” and “seemed anxious at all times, both from his writ-

ings and his example, to soften the antipathies which arise from sectarian disputes."

Dr. Paley's ideas of religious liberty were not confined to the protestants only: his tract on Subscription shews that as early as 1774 he was convinced that the Roman Catholics still groaned under very hard restraints. In fact, Dr. Paley was the consistent advocate for a complete toleration of all dissenters, perceiving, as he said, "no reason why men of different religious persuasions might not sit upon the same bench, deliberate in the same council, or fight in the same ranks, as well as men of various or opposite opinions upon any controverted topic of natural philosophy, history, or ethics."

The charge of unitarianism in Dr. Paley's creed, it may be said, has been made more from suspicion than proof; the *protégé* of Bishop Law and the friend of Dr. Jebb, it was supposed, could not be otherwise than attainted with their opinions; but in his *Natural Theology*, p. 487, it is remarked, "he has expressly limited his argument for the divine *unity* to a unity of counsel," and he elsewhere seems to have adopted the common notions about the *pre-existence*, the *propitiation*, the *present agency*, and the *intercession of Christ*. In the sermons published

after his death, it appears that he had rather different sentiments from those of his early years, relative to the doctrines of *conversion*, and the *influence of the spirit*.

As a preacher, Dr. Paley was never reckoned among the most graceful; he could never divest himself of the north-country accent; his voice also was rough, and defective in its modulation: however, among those “who prefer sense to sound,” it has been justly observed he was at all times a welcome preacher. His manner partook of his own openness and sincerity, which concealed other defects: he always spoke to the capacity of the least informed of his hearers, and at Appleby he is said to have frequently preached from short notes.

After the publication of his *Natural Theology*, it was Dr. Paley's intention to print a volume of sermons, not for sale to his parishioners, but for a gratuitous distribution among them. As this could not be effected during his life time, he provided for it by a codicil to his will, which has since been carried into execution by his survivors: they are thirty-five in number, containing some which he had previously delivered, and others which he had probably composed for the purpose; they were accordingly printed at Sun-

derland, and distributed at Bishop Wearmouth, as the last proof of his affection to his parishioners. However the people of Wearmouth regretted those discourses which were not reprinted; viz. “On a Death-bed Repentance;”—“On Lying;”—“On Training a Child;”—“On the Duty of celebrating the Lord’s Supper;” and the sermon “On Honesty,” the last but one which he ever preached among them; in which he pointed out the duties of men in all their mutual dealings with each other in a masterly manner, and insisted that the strictest integrity in every transaction, and not a mere compliance with the forms of law, was necessary to constitute the character of a truly honest man.

Though Dr. Paley frequently expressed himself as being perfectly satisfied with the patronage and promotion which he enjoyed, “as more than adequate to every object of reasonable ambition;” it was nevertheless reported “that a late prime minister did actually recommend him to a vacant mitre, but that a very high dignitary of the Church being consulted, the hints he gave relative to some passages in Dr. Paley’s writings prevented his promotion;” and it is well known that the doctor was not a man calculated to make his way by any thing like an abject solicitation of the great.

A fellow collegian, who is supposed to have been well acquainted with Paley's sentiments, has observed, that "Paley was the farthest in the world from a preferment-hunter; he would not give himself the trouble to *root* after it. The indolence of his character preserved him in some measure from that disgraceful mode of gaining preferment: and besides, he was above it from a sensation of its unworthiness. He was indeed the author of the term *rooting*, an expression after his time much used in the university of Cambridge, denoting that baseness and servility of character, which, like swine *rooting* in a dunghill, will perform the basest acts for a rich patron to gain his protection and a good benefice."

As to orthodoxy, as it seems an easy thing to prescribe for the consciences of others, some persons disposed to censure the archdeacon, seem to entertain a degree of astonishment "that a member of the Church should associate with those of different principles, without avowing a change of his own." Dr. Paley's intimacy with Bishop Law, Bishop Watson, Dr. Jebb, and several illustrious members of the university of Cambridge, might probably have been accounted for without bringing religion at all into the ques-

tion; besides, as Dr. Paley with respect to subscription to articles, seems to have preferred the *general utility* to any other consideration, his attachment to that principle might be equally as conscientious as the deviation of those who value themselves upon their disapprobation of any subscription to articles.

Though the writings which he has left behind him are striking indications of the mind which dictated them, several opportunities also occurred during the life of Dr. Paley, in which he expressed his sentiments on men and manners with that point and precision which could not be misunderstood. That he was an unequivocal friend to civil and religious liberty, might have been inferred from the part he took for the abolition of the slave trade, and his *Essay on the British Constitution*. It is true that he republished this Essay soon after the commencement of the French Revolution; but as a proof that no considerations of a party kind entered into this business, the Essay in question made its appearance “in the very year when a motion was made in the House of Commons upon the very same grounds by Mr. Pitt himself; several leading members of successive administrations, namely, the Duke of Richmond, the Marquis of Lansdown, Earl

Camden and Mr. Fox, having also been avowedly of the same sentiments."

As a friend to good order, he republished a short tract, entitled, *Reasons for Contentment*, addressed to the *labouring classes*.

That his principles uniformly entered into his practice, and that he was a lover of strict and impartial justice, was manifested on several occasions: a striking instance of this is recorded, when in consequence of the discussions which took place about Cold-Bath Fields prison, Dr. Paley explicitly declared, "that the magistrates of Hicks's Hall were by no means proper persons to be entrusted with the exclusive power of examining into, and controlling the conduct of Governor Aris, since they were salaried officers like himself: that the inquiry moved for was, in his opinion, no party question, but one which deserved to be very seriously considered; and that for his part, he had always thought Sir Francis Burdett right in persevering to agitate the subject, for by such continued exertions he must ultimately succeed in correcting the abuse." The case of the late Governor Wall also being coupled in a conversation with the capital punishment of some unfortunate seamen, for mutiny in the channel fleet, the archdeacon observed: "Since

the discipline of the *navy* and *army* require that the *men* shall be *hanged* or *shot* for *mutiny* or *desertion*, it is very fit that the officers be punished with equal severity for those cruelties by which *mutiny* and *desertion* are too often caused."

It would be an act of unpardonable partiality in a biographer to represent the writings of the archdeacon to have been as unobjectionable as his life; upon the former many able remarks have been made with a view to their improvement, particularly by the Rev. Edward Pearson, Rector of Rempstone, Nottinghamshire, who has critically examined the theoretical parts of Dr. Paley's *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*, in the Remarks of the former, "On the Theory of Morals," and in his "Annotations on the Practical part of Dr. Paley's Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy," both of which were published during the doctor's life time.

It is certainly to the credit of Dr. Paley, that the work just mentioned is used in the university of Cambridge, for the purpose of a *lecture* and *examination book*; of course this is the work in which the public examination in moral subjects for a bachelor's degree is conducted. The errors of such a work, Mr. Pearson observed, (if it

has any) may easily, if suffered to remain unnoticed, obtain an incalculable influence over the public mind: nothing of this kind, he also remarked, could materially detract from that which is Dr. Paley's great and appropriate praise. It was said of *Socrates*, that "he brought down philosophy from the sacred abodes of the Gods, to dwell on earth with men." In like manner, it may truly be said of Dr. Paley, "that he has brought philosophy from the retreats of the learned, into the walks of common life, and almost into the cradles of the young."

"The author of the *Pursuits of Literature* objected to Dr. Paley's *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*, as a *lecture book*, on the ground, that in academical education the great end should be to recommend the study of *original works*; and he thinks that Locke, Grotius, Puffendorf, Cumberland, and Woolaston, should be preferred to the writers who have arisen since their day." To this it has been answered, that Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding* is not, properly speaking, a treatise on *Morality*, though morality is incidentally introduced; but on *Metaphysics*, and therefore could not be superseded by Dr. Paley's work before mentioned. The study of *Locke*, in fact, is not neglected in

the university, but only less attended to than before in *public exercises and examinations*; but a *proficiency* in Locke, Paley, and other writers on Metaphysics and Morality, seemed to the writer of the Annotations, not to be so much attended to and encouraged as it ought to be.

With respect to *promises*, Dr. Paley, it has been remarked, thinks “it is the *performance* being unlawful, and not any unlawfulness in the subject or motive of a promise which destroys its validity;” and therefore, that “the reward of any crime, after the crime is committed, ought, if promised, to be paid.” But this maxim, which seems to suit better with what the world sometimes calls (miscalls) honour, has besides been deemed inconsistent with Dr. Paley’s own rule of *general utility*; a rule which he introduces into *religion* as well as morals; for though in the particular case in which the reward is paid, the “sin and mischief,” as he observes,” are over, and will be neither more nor less for the performance of the promise;” yet the belief of an obligation to perform such promises would not fail, “upon the whole, at the long run,” to encourage what it cannot be the will of God to encourage, *similar instances of sin and mischief*. It would surely be more

conducive to the interest of society, as well as more consonant to sound morality, to lay it down as a maxim, that from an action which is founded on injustice no claims of justice on the part of those who are concerned in it, knowing it to be so founded, can possibly arise. Agreeably to this, Hutcheson says, "*Humani generis interest, ut nulla, sint ex pactis scelerum invitamenta; nullaque in istius modi paciis fides.*" Philos. Moral. Inst. l. 2. c. 9.

On this principle, the case which Dr. Paley states to have been referred to Bp. Sanderson, ought not to have been decided as Dr. Paley has done. Dr. Paley is further supposed not to have rightly stated the case of conscience resolved by Bp. Sanderson. If it be the second of the nine cases of conscience to which the Doctor referred, it is there stated that a gentleman and a lady *both* of whom were married, made a promise to each other, that in case either of them, by the death of his or her present partner, should ever be at liberty to marry again, he or she would remain unmarried, till the other should be at liberty to marry also, though it were to the end of life; and that the lady, who was set at liberty first was desirous of marrying, provided the obligation of her promise

was adjudged not to stand in the way. Bp. Sanderson adjudges the promise to be void, and the lady at liberty to marry. Dr. Paley said expressly on the case of this gentleman and lady, "that if both the parties were actually free from the marriage bond, they not only lawfully might, but would in conscience be bound, unless some other lawful impediment should hinder, to join themselves together in matrimony." Now the Bishop's reasoning goes no farther than to prove that the parties in that case *might* marry, and not that in consequence of their promise they would be *obliged* to do so. The cases that he mentions in order to show that the promise was not null and void at the first, are different in their *nature* from the case of a *matrimonial* connection, and therefore do not come up to the point. For though a woman, during the life of her husband has the right of making a promise of *one* kind, of which the performance is not to take place till after her husband's death, it does not follow that she has the right of making a promise of *any* kind. Now the promise of marriage in the case we are considering, is one which neither of the parties has a right to make. It includes the promise of an *affection*, which either exists at the time, or not.

If it does not then exist, the promise of its taking place at any future period implies an absurdity. Such a promise, indeed, would hardly be made; or if made and the condition of it declared, would hardly be accepted. If the condition does then exist, it is of an immoral nature, as being inconsistent with a present duty, and whatever proceedings are founded upon it must partake of the same immorality. It is in short, a promise of that which the promiser has no right to give, and which therefore no one who knows of that circumstance has a right to receive. For though in some cases, according to the maxim "*quæ fieri non debebant, facta sæpe valent*," an obligation to do a thing may be built on an unlawful design, it is only when the obligation refers to something different from the unlawful design itself. Bp. Sanderson refers to what he judges to be an instance of the Latin maxim just quoted, and what indeed is such, though not according to his mode of application, in the well-known case of the Gibeonites; here the thing promised was what the princes of Israel had a right to give, and the Gibeonites a right to receive. The command which was given to the Israelites to destroy the nations of Canaan, and which may have been urged as a reason why they should

not fulfil this contract with the Gibeonites, extended only to those nations which came against Israel in battle, see Deut. xx. 10, compared with Josh. xi. 19, 20. And Grotius de Jur. Bell. ac Pacis. The inference from the whole is this, that as Bp. Sanderson's conclusion is right, and might have been deduced from his premises, so Dr. Paley's is wrong, and cannot be deduced from his. It is also justly observed that many mischievous consequences would arise from the belief that unlawfulness in the *subject* of promises (to say nothing of the *motive* of them) does not affect their validity: for the belief of an obligation to observe a promise which was itself a violation of duty, but which comprehended a desired event, would naturally lead to such further violations, as seemed to promote that event, and farther instigate the parties concerned, to hasten as much as they could the period of their fulfilment which in many cases would be a fruitful source of immoralities.

Still Dr. Paley's sentiments with respect to the general inadvertency in this country to the obligation of oaths, and which is to be lamented both in a religious and a political point of view, have been very highly spoken of by persons by no means disposed to flatter this eminent writer.

The remedy suggested by Dr. Paley also does him great credit, as it shews how much he had the veneration of the great Creator at heart. It would certainly be highly laudable to make a distinction in the manner of administering oaths of a *commercial* nature, and those which relate to the more solemn occasions of *life and death*. In the first cases the Doctor recommended a form of *affirmation*, in which no reference is made to the sacred name of God, and to leave the legal penalties of perjury to attach to the breach of that *affirmation*. With respect to Quakers this is already the case. The form of their *affirmation* is this: "I do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm;" and they incur the temporal punishment of perjury by a false *affirmation*, just as they would have done by a false oath. Thus would the solemnity of an oath be reserved for more serious and important occasions, and its conscientious observance, perhaps more effectually secured.

Conscious of his own virtue and the integrity of his views, Dr. Paley appears in many cases as a writer uncommonly bold. What he has said relative to the oath of allegiance, as to what it permits and what it does not require, has subjected him to very close animadversion. In

the first place it has been observed, that resistance to the king is permitted, when his ill-behaviour or imbecility is such as to make resistance beneficial to the community; and that this assertion though speculatively true, is so indeterminately expressed that it may easily lead into dangerous error. Who, it has been asked, is to be the judge whether the ill-behaviour or imbecility of the king is such as to render resistance beneficial to the community? Though the convention parliament, which introduced the oath of allegiance in the reign of William III. did not mean to exclude all resistance, they never meant that resistance should be founded on any vague and uncertain notions of public interest, or of ill-behaviour and imbecility inconsistent with it. They resisted James II. not because of his general ill-behaviour and imbecility, but because of his infringement of the laws; because he executed not the laws, but his own will; and not merely his own will, but his own will in *opposition* to the laws. — The Rev. Mr. Pearson in his Annotations upon the Practical Part of Dr. Paley's Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, concludes thus upon the subject of allegiance: "While the supreme magistrate and his ministers govern according to

the laws, resistance to them is the same as resistance to the legislature. When they do not, obedience is a duty on no other ground than that of immediate utility. If, indeed the encroachments be such as involve no consequences of importance to the general welfare, individuals ought to bear much, rather than hazard an interruption of the public peace, or the lessening of that reverence in others which is so necessary to their ready obedience. But if they be such as materially affect the interests of the community, and are so extensively felt and acknowledged as to afford the probability of a decided superiority, resistance is then as much a duty, as obedience is in general. Of this, in the proceedings of our happy revolution an instance was exhibited deserving the admiration of ages. The supreme magistrate had, by the most indubitable signs evinced a determination to govern not by the laws, but by his own will; and though he might possibly have in view only the good of his subjects; yet as he was not the appointed judge of that good, and the majority of the people were unwilling that he should be so, his encroachments on the legislative authority were legally, and very justly opposed.

In Dr. Paley's illustration of the nature of

revenge, and how far it is permitted to Christians, it seems he has not been so explicit as he might have been. He repeats Matthew, chap. vi. 14. "For if ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you." The doctrine of Christian forgiveness is much clearer in Luke xvii. 4. "If thy brother trespass against thee rebuke him; and if he repent forgive him.—And if he trespass against thee seven times in a day, and seven times in a day turn again to thee, saying, I repent; thou shalt forgive him." This passage is preferred to that in St. Matthew quoted by Dr. Paley, because here the *condition* on which we are commanded to forgive, namely, the repentance of the offender is expressly mentioned, whereas, in the other it is only implied. "If ye forgive men their trespasses," saith our Saviour, "your heavenly father will also forgive you." But then, as it is supposed, that we repent us of our trespasses before God will forgive us; so it is supposed, that men repent of their trespasses against us, before it is our duty to forgive them. This is mentioned lest the duty of forgiving injuries, like many others, should be strained to so high a pitch as to discourage men from attempting to observe it. In all cases great harm is done by

aiming at too much. For those who find they cannot attain to what is pointed out to them as right, are very apt to give over their efforts to attain it. An endeavour at *exactness* is also recommended in preference to the maxim that principles in this respect had better be too *lax* than too *strict*; and that maxim of *forgiving* but not *forgetting* is admitted as a “distinction which is founded in truth, and is in itself altogether just.”

Dr. Paley, it has been supposed, has not been justifiable in introducing a new sense of the term *charity* in his Moral Philosophy, Book iii. Part II. Chap. I. for which there was certainly no occasion, namely, “*the promoting the happiness of our inferiors.*” The three principal methods of performing this duty, viz. 1. By the treatment of our domestics and dependents. 2. By professional assistance. 3. By pecuniary bounty;—it is justly thought should have been considered as *three* distinct duties rather than as *one* under the term of *charity*. However in the developement of his position Dr. Paley evidently makes it appear, that what is too commonly called *charity* to the poor, is no more than *justice*. And the acute writer of a critique upon Dr. Paley’s definition of charity, admits that

almsgiving is sometimes, though not very properly, called *charity*.

Respecting *relative duties*, and Dr. Paley's division of rights into *perfect* or *imperfect*, it has been proposed to change these terms into *determinate* and *indeterminate*; because according to his division, relative duties must be classed under two great heads JUSTICE and CHARITY. "Justice comprehends the determinate duties, and teaches us to do no *harm* to others. Charity comprehends the indeterminate duties and teaches us to do them *good*. But, if generally speaking, *human* laws enforce the performance of the duties of justice, while those of *charity* are left to the operation of moral laws, however useful this division may be for some purposes, in a *moral* view, justice is *comprehended* under charity, and therefore not to be considered as *distinct* from it. The apostle referring to the law by which the duties of justice are enforced, says, "Love worketh *no ill* to his neighbour; therefore love is the fulfilling of the law." The performance of the duties of *justice*, therefore appear to be equally as incumbent upon men as those of *charity*, as being in their nature one and the same.

These demonstrations of an *est ubi peccat*

might be still further enlarged from the Doctor's Moral and Philosophical writings, and the Remarks on them by Thomas Gisborne, M. A. &c. &c. to which it may be added, that "Students of anatomy have questioned the accuracy of some parts of his delineation of the human body, arising from his having consulted the earlier, rather than the later authorities, in a science so much extended by the skill and ingenuity of its modern professors; all these, however, are no more derogatory to the great merits of Dr. Paley, than the supposed spots in the grand luminary of our horizon. They certainly convince us that "to err is human," but they may at the same time teach us that there is as great a distinction between some errors, compared with others, as that general difference between error and truth. It has been already asserted, and remains undoubted, that "the character of Dr. Paley can never be justly estimated from his public exertions alone; for he appeared at all times with still greater advantage in the intercourse of private life. He was a good husband, an affectionate father, an indulgent master, and a faithful friend. He was ready on all occasions to accommodate his more immediate neighbours with any civilities or kind offices in

his power. His little defects, it is possible, might strike the common observer more forcibly; but they were not only such as might well be borne with, but such as afforded his friends continual opportunities of discovering under them the goodness of his heart."

The character of Dr. Paley must be esteemed so much the more, when it is considered that in the great outline of his *political* opinions he never lost sight of the good of the people, nor of respect for the sovereign. And so far from flattering men in power, he always spoke of them as accountable for their conduct, and obnoxious to punishment. To say nothing of greater enormities of more recent date, it seems he even thought, previous to the abolition of the slave trade, that the conduct of the British Legislature in so long lending its assistance would produce some future "season for reflecting, whether this *legislature was fit to be trusted* with an empire, the most extensive that ever obtained in any age or quarter of the world." In his decisions upon the *insufficient causes* or, *unjustifiable causes of war*, it is also remarkable, that he has designated those of the *extension of trade*, and the *misfortunes, or accidental weakness of a neighbouring or rival nation*.

The application of this implied censure, is not difficult.

With respect to the conclusion of all wars among the nations of Christendom, doubtless Dr. Paley was a rational Millenarian. He was not, as the expectants of a fifth monarchy have been, and generally are, actuated by a fanciful idea of the personal coming of Christ, just before the end of the world, not to *renew* and re-establish, but rather to *destroy* all things: but with the late Bishop Hurd, and some other commentators, instead of the *personal* coming of Christ, he seems to have adopted the idea of some peculiar manifestation of the power and providence of God or Christ, unfolding itself by just degrees, and *coming*, viz. made known by a divine interposition, and in the signal acts of his administration, to be perfected in the last ages: so Archdeacon Paley seems confident of a future period in *this life*, when the kingdom or power of the Christian age, or dispensation, would most certainly be more perfectly known, more universally felt and acknowledged than ever. Hence, instead of following the ideas of common Millenarians in referring these hopeful times to a period as uncertain as that of the world's existence, he thought the *Christian re-*

lsgion, and even the *world itself*, might be still in their *infancy*.

Applying the great mental powers he was endowed with to the prosecution of these sublime views, though it would seem that he differed widely from some other commentators, it is only in his application of some passages which by them are referred to *another life*, he applies to that *future period* in this state of existence, which by the spread of the Christian religion, will constitute the establishment of the Kingdom of God upon earth.

The general run of commentators upon the prophecies have seen nothing in the state but the church, and have thereby rendered their observations uninteresting or ridiculous; but Dr. Paley, following Bishop Butler and Bishop Hurd in their more liberal ideas of an approaching Millenium, seems to expect such a change as shall be equivalent to the bringing about a total and radical renovation of all the kingdoms and states in Christendom; and not simply a reform in religion, or the substitution of the protestant religion for that of the Catholic.

Scarcely any impartial person can read Dr. Paley's sentiments on the Millenium in his 22d Sermon upon Heb. xiii. 8, and continue to re-

main under any mistake as to what he calls a “still future order of things, and a more perfect display of the power of Christ, and his religion; which may be still in reserve.” In fact, this future “order of things,” which he also calls *an economy* (or government) *destined for the human creation* (and not for disembodied spirits) is reserved for the period of the second coming of Christ, “when they shall live in a state of local society one with another.” This he illustrates from John xiv. 2, 3. xvii. 20; passages which by commentators in general are referred to the state of bliss in a future life, and by no means to the Millenium, the improvement or perfection of the present state, as it respects Christianity in general, or the moral and political regeneration of Christendom. But to this dispensation Dr. Paley certainly does refer, even in his application of scriptural phrases to this great event, which have been hitherto generally confined to the resurrection. These texts of scripture he applies to the *new state*; but these he says “are not likely to be rendered quite intelligible by our experience before the circumstances take place to which they refer.” Differing from the common acceptation of several other texts, he also observes that the words

“ he shall change our vile body that it may be like his glorious body,” “ the dead in Christ rising first,” “ meeting the Lord in the air, &c.” “ describe a change (or rather improvement) of which we, that is, Christians in general, are to be the object.” The same remarks, Dr. Paley says, may be repeated concerning the first and second death, expressly spoken of in the Revelations chap. xx. 6. 14. And in none of the latter-mentioned texts does he seem to apprehend any reference to the final judgment, or the destruction of the world; but rather the end and destruction of the grand apostacy, and that antichristian system which has hitherto stood in the way of its happiness and perfection. But as the bare mention of the Millenium may probably raise a smile upon the face of the modern unbeliever, or the half-thinking Christian, it may be necessary to shield the memory of Dr. Paley from the imputation of any absurdity, by reminding them that the truly illustrious Sir Isaac Newton, expected such a period as has been alluded to; and that the disbelief of the same is an argument that unbelievers in this particular, are as far from being acquainted with the common course of nature, and with moral distinctions, as they are with divine revelation. The power of virtue

over vice, is a quality in the former naturally inherent. Bp. Butler in his Analogy, therefore supposes the existence of a kingdom, the general influence of which, would render it superior to all others, and that the world must gradually come under its empire, not by lawless violence, but partly by what must be allowed to be just conquest, and partly by other kingdoms submitting themselves voluntarily to it, and claiming its protection in successive exigencies. The head of it would be an universal Monarch in another sense than any mortal has yet been, and the eastern style would be literally applicable to him, "That all people, nations, and languages should serve him." Upon these principles where is the impropriety, or the absurdity, of supposing the erection of a kingdom or several kingdoms, actuated by genuine Christian principles, and at least for a very considerable period, disseminating peace and all its attendant blessings throughout the world, or the whole sphere of its influence? This approaching period is the Christian Millennium.

POSTSCRIPT.

THE Monthly Review for September 1809, having appeared some time after the preface to this Volume, and the foregoing account of Dr. Paley, were sent to press, the remarkable coincidence of sentiments respecting his character as a divine, was thought a sufficient apology for the following extract, as a Supplement.

“ Complaints are often made of the inefficacy of preaching, without advertiing to the chief cause of this failure. Man, as a moral and religious being, frequently acts a very strange and inconsistent part; and it is extremely difficult to teach and manage him by exhortation. He assents without being touched, hears the serious preacher with declared satisfaction, but without correspondent feelings, and owns the importance of religious principle without being religious. With such a creature, something more than the exhibition of general views must be attempted. The ordinary operations of the mind as they affect the religious principle, must be minutely analyzed; and those sentiments and affections which lurk about the heart, and disincline us to the spiritual life, must be so detected.

and exposed to the inward monitor as to baffle the arts of self-deception, and make us ashamed of the farce which we are playing with our own souls. The discourses of Dr. Paley have this great aim : they are neither pretty nor fine compositions ; but they are plain and searching ; calculated to tear off the mask with which we often veil ourselves to *ourselves* ; and to set every man on that close examination of his own mind, which is necessary to excite in the soul any activity in repelling sin, or in cultivating inward purity. With a perfect knowledge of the human heart, he developes those hidden springs of action, which, though they set in motion the whole moral machine (if we may use the expression) pass unobserved by the generality of mankind. Were we to ask men if they do not prefer the favour of God to his displeasure, and a state of happiness to a state of rejection in a future life ; whether virtue be not preferable to vice, and whether “ he who walketh uprightly ” does not walk more surely than the sinner ; the answer would be uniformly in the affirmative ; but how little does that answer accord with the overwhelming immorality of the world ? Declamations against infidelity and irreligion have no effect on the hearers of sermons ; because, ad-

dresses of this kind they cannot apply to themselves, nor are they more sensibly moved by calls to the unconverted. The probe must be particularly applied. The unbelief of the unbelieving, the irreligion of the irreligious, and the immorality of the immoral must be scrutinized. Even by the majority of Church goers, Christianity is made to consist of a sort of accommodation, by which they mean to keep on favourable terms both with God and Mammon—to be good enough to cherish the hope of heaven, and yet not so good as to preclude all worldly conformity.

If any sermons can reach such puzzling cases, those of Dr. Paley may be expected to succeed. They appear not to have been intended by him for general circulation, and in one respect they are better for this circumstance, since they are unostentatiously practical, consisting for the most part of that plain and serious argumentation and exhortation, which a sensible believer would employ in the parlour towards friends for whose spiritual welfare he felt the deepest concern. Though he appears to us not to be correct in the explanation of all his texts, and not to be most happy in the elucidation of some difficult theological points, yet as a Christian mo-

philosopher, he perfectly knows his ground, and he has taken the most effectual means of bringing the religious principle into full activity."

Though it cannot be expected with respect to the life of Dr. Paley, that the whole minutiae of detail could be conveyed through these select outlines, ample justice, it is presumed, is done to his character and abilities; his works at large, which perhaps are the best calculated to perpetuate the memory of his indefatigable industry, are as follow:

1. A Defence of the Considerations on the Propriety of requiring a Subscription to Articles of Faith, in reply to a late Answer from the Clarendon Press. 8vo. London. 1774.

2. Observations upon the Character and Example of Christ, and an Appendix on the Morality of the Gospel, annexed to Bishop Law's Reflections on the Life and Character of Christ. 8vo. Cambridge. 1776.

3. Caution recommended in the Use and Application of Scripture Language. A Sermon preached July 15, 1777, in the Cathedral Church of Carlisle, at the Visitation of the Rt. Rev. Edmund Lord Bishop of Carlisle. 4to. London. 1777. reprinted in 8vo. 1782.

4. The Clergyman's Companion in visiting the Sick. Small 8vo. 10th edition. 178-.
5. Advice addressed to the Young Clergy of the Diocese of Carlisle, in a Sermon preached at a General Ordination, holden at Rose Castle, on Sunday, July 29, 1781. 4to. rep. in 8vo. 1783.
6. A Distinction of Orders in the Church defended upon the Principles of Public Utility, in a Sermon preached in the Castle-Chapel, Dublin, at the Consecration of John Law, D. D. Lord Bishop of Clonfert and Kilmacduagh, Sep. 21, 1782. 4to. rep. in 8vo. 1783.
7. Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. 4to. rep. 2 vols. 8vo. 15th edition. 1785.
8. The Young Christian instructed in Reading and in the Principles of Religion; compiled for the use of the Sunday-Schools in Carlisle. 16mo. Carlisle. 2d edit. 178-.
9. *Horæ Paulinæ*; or, The Truth of the Scripture History of St. Paul evinced, by a Comparison of the Epistles which bear his name with the Acts of the Apostles, and with one another. 8vo. 4th edition. 1790.
10. The Use and Propriety of local and occasional Preaching: a Charge delivered to the Clergy of the Diocese of Carlisle, in the year 1790, 4to.

11. An Essay upon the British Constitution, being the 7th Chapter of the 6th Book of the Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. 2 vols. 1792.

12. Reasons for Contentment, addressed to the labouring part of the British Public. Carlisle. 2mo. 1792. rep. 8vo. 1793.

13. A short Memoir of the Life of Edmund Law, D.D. Bishop of Carlisle, inserted in Hutchinson's History of Cumberland, and in the Encyclopedia Britannica, 1794, and rep. with Notes, 1800.

14. A View of the Evidences of Christianity. 3 vols. 12mo. 1794; rep. 2 vols. 8vo. ninth edition.

15. Dangers incidental to the Clerical Character stated, in a Sermon preached before the University of Cambridge, at Great St. Mary's Church, on Sunday, July 5, 1795, being Commencement Sunday, 4to.

16. A Sermon preached at the Assizes at Durham, July 29, 1795, and published at the request of the Lord Bishop, the Honourable the Judges of the Assize, and the Grand Jury. 4to. 1795.

17. Natural Theology; or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, collected

from the Appearances of Nature. 8vo. 1803.
3th edition.

18. Sermons on several Subjects. Distributed gratis amongst the Inhabitants of Bishop Wearmouth, in compliance with a codicil to the Author's will, 1806; they have been since published.

19. Sermons and tracts. 1803.

THE
BEAUTIES
OF
WILLIAM PALEY, D. D.

Actions.

ACTIONS are to be estimated by their tendency. Whatever is expedient is right. It is the utility of any moral rule alone which constitutes the obligation of it.

The general consequence of any action may be estimated, by asking what would be the consequence if the same sort of actions were generally permitted. But suppose they were, and a thousand such actions perpetrated under this permission, is it just to charge a single action with

the collected guilt and mischief of the whole thousand? I answer, that the reason for prohibiting and punishing an action (and this reason may be called the *guilt* of the action, if you please) will always be in proportion to the whole mischief that would arise from the general impunity and toleration of actions of the same sort.

“Whatever is expedient is right.” But then it must be expedient upon the whole, at the long run, in all its effects collateral and remote, as well as in those which are immediate and direct; as it is obvious, that in computing consequences, it makes no difference in what way or at what distance they ensue.

Right and obligation are reciprocal; that is, wherever there is a right in one person, there is a corresponding obligation upon others. If one man has a “right” to an estate, others are “obliged” to abstain from it: if parents have a “right” to reverence from their children, children are “obliged” to reverence their parents; and so in all other instances.

Now, because moral *obligation* depends, as we have seen, upon the will of God, *right*, which is correlative to it, must depend upon the same. Right, therefore, signifies *consistency with the will of God*.

By virtue of the two principles, that God wills the happiness of his creatures, and that the will of God is the measure of right and wrong, we arrive at certain conclusions, which conclusions become rules, and we soon learn to pronounce actions right and wrong, according as they agree or disagree with our rules, without looking any farther: and when the habit is once established of stopping at the rules, we can go back and compare with these rules even the divine conduct itself, and yet it may be true (only not observed by us at the time) that the rules themselves are deduced from the divine will.

*Activity of Mind the best preservative from
Discontent.*

Human life has been said to resemble the situation of spectators in a theatre, where, whilst each person is engaged by the scene which passes before him, no one thinks about the place in which he is seated.

It is only when the business is interrupted, or when the spectator's attention to it grows idle and remiss, that he begins to consider at all who is before him or who is behind him; whether others are better accommodated than himself; or

whether many be not much worse. It is thus with the various ranks and stations of society; so long as a man is intent upon the duties and concerns of his own condition, he never thinks of comparing it with any other; he is never troubled with reflections upon the different orders and classes of mankind; the advantages and disadvantages of each; the necessity or non-necessity of civil distinctions; much less does he feel within himself a disposition to covet or envy any of them. He is too much taken up with the occupations of his calling, its pursuits, cares, and business, to bestow unprofitable meditations upon the circumstances in which he sees others placed, and by this means a man of a sound and active mind has, in his very constitution, a remedy against the disturbance of envy and discontent. These passions gain no admittance into his breast, because there is no leisure or vacancy for the traits of thought which generate them. He enjoys therefore ease in this respect, and ease resulting from the best cause, the power of keeping his imagination at home; of confining it to what belongs to himself, instead of sending it forth to wander amongst speculations which have neither limits nor use; amidst views of unattainable grandeur, fancied happi-

ness of extolled, because unexperienced, privileges and delights.

Advantages enjoyed by Subjects of Free States.

The satisfaction which the people in free governments derive from the knowledge and agitation of political subjects ; such as the proceedings and debates of the senate ; the conduct and character of ministers ; the revolutions and intrigues and contention of parties ; and in general, from the discussion of public measures, questions, and occurrences. Subjects of this sort excite just enough of interest and emotion to afford a moderate engagement to the thoughts, without rising to any painful degree of anxiety, or ever leaving a fixed oppression upon the spirits—and what is this, but the end and aim of all those amusements which compose so much of the business of life, and of the value of riches. For my part, and I believe it to be the case with most men who have arrived at the middle age, and occupy the middle classes of life ; had I all the money which I pay in taxes to government at liberty to lay out upon amusement and diversion, I know not whether I could make choice of any, in which I should find greater

pleasure, than what I receive from expecting and hearing of public news ; reading parliamentary debates and proceedings ; canvassing the political arguments, projects, predictions and intelligence, which are conveyed by various channels to every corner of the kingdom. These topics, exciting universal curiosity, and being such as almost every man is ready to form, and prepared to deliver his opinion about, greatly promote, and I think, improve conversation. They render it more rational and more innocent. They supply a substitute for drinking, gaming, scandal and obscenity. Now the secrecy, the jealousy, the solitude and precipitation of despotic governments exclude all this. But the loss, you say, is trifling. I know that it is possible to render even the mention of it ridiculous, by representing it as the idle employment of the most insignificant part of the nation ; the folly of village statesmen and coffee-house politicians. But I allow nothing to be a trifle which ministers to the harmless gratification of multitudes ; nor any order of men to be insignificant, whose number bears a respectable proportion to the sum of the whole community.

Advantages and Duties of the Inferior Clergy.

The stations which you are likely, for some time at least, to occupy in the church, although not capable of all the means of rendering service and challenging respect, which fall within the power of your superiors, are free from many prejudices that attend upon higher preferments. Interfering interests and disputed rights; or where there is no place for dispute; the very claim and reception of legal dues, so long as what is received by the minister is taken from the parishioner, form sometimes an almost insuperable obstruction to the best endeavours that can be used to conciliate the good will of a neighbourhood. These difficulties perplex not *you*. In whatever contests with his parishioners the *principal* may be engaged, the *curate* has neither dispute nor demand to stand between him and the affections of his congregation.

Another, and a still more favourable circumstance in your situation is this; being upon a level with the greatest part of your parishioners, you gain an access to their conversation and confidence, which is rarely granted to the superior clergy, without extraordinary address, and the most insinuating advances on their parts. And

this is a valuable privilege ; for it enables you to inform yourselves of the moral and religious state of your flocks ; of their wants and weaknesses, their habits and opinions, of the vices which prevail, and the principles from which they proceed : in a word, it enables you to study the distemper before you apply the remedy ; and not only so, but to apply the remedy in the most commodious form, and with the best effect ; by private persuasion and reproof, by gentle and unsuspected conveyances, in the intimacy of friendship and opportunities of conversation. To this must be added the many occasions, which the living in habits of society with your parishioners affords you of reconciling dissensions, healing animosities, administering advice to the young and inexperienced, and consolation to age and misery. I put you in mind of this advantage, because the right use of it constitutes one of the most respectable employments, not only of our order, but of human nature ; and leaves you, believe me, little to envy in the condition of your superiors, or to regret in your own. It is true that this description supposes you to reside so constantly, and to continue so long in the same parish as to have formed some acquaintance with the persons and characters of

your parishioners ; and what scheme of doing good in your profession, or even of doing your duty, does not suppose this ?

But whilst I recommend a just concern for our reputation, and a proper desire of public esteem, I would by no means flatter that passion for praise and popularity, which seizes oftentimes the minds of young clergymen, especially when their first appearance in their profession has been received with more than common approbation. Unfortunate success ! if it incite them to seek fame by affectation and hypocrisy, or lead, as vanity sometimes does, to enthusiasm and extravagance. This is not the taste or character I am holding out to your imitation. The popular preacher courts fame for its own sake, or for what he can make of it ; the sincerely pious minister of Christ modestly invites esteem, only, or principally, that it may lend efficacy to his instruction, and weight to his reproofs ; the one seeks to be known and proclaimed abroad, the other is content with the silent respect of his neighbourhood, sensible that *that* is the theatre upon which alone his good name can assist him in the discharge of his duty.

It may be necessary likewise to caution you against some awkward endeavours to lift them-

selves into importance, which young clergymen not unfrequently fall upon ; such as a conceited way of speaking, new airs and gestures, affected manners, a mimicry of the fashions, language, and diversions, or even of the frolics and vices of higher life ; a hunting after the acquaintance of the great, a cold and distant behaviour towards their former equals, and a contemptuous neglect of their society. Nothing was ever gained by these arts, if they deserve the name of arts, but derision and dislike. Possibly they may not offend against any rule of moral probity, but if they disgust those with whom you are to live, and upon whom the good you do must be done, they defeat not only their end, but in a great measure, the very design and use of your vocation. I would warn you, and that with all the solemnity that can belong to any admonition of mine, against rendering your discourses so local, as to be pointed and levelled at particular persons in your congregation. This species of address may produce in the party for whom it is intended, confusion perhaps, and shame, but not with their proper fruits of penitence and humility. Instead of which, these sensations will be accompanied with bitter resentment against the preacher, and a kind of obstinate and determined

opposition to his reproof. He will impute your officiousness to personal enmity, to party spirit, to the pleasure of triumphing over an adversary without interruption or reply, to insult, assuming the form of advice, or to any motive rather than a conscientious solicitude for the amendment and salvation of your flock. And as the person himself seldom profits by admonitions conveyed in this way, so are they equally useless, or perhaps noxious, to the rest of the assembly; for the moment the congregation discover to whom the chastisement is directed, from that moment they cease to apply any part of it to themselves. They are not edified, they are not affected; on the contrary they are diverted, by descriptions, of which they see the design, and by invectives, of which they think they comprehend the aim. Some who would feel strongly the impropriety of gross and evident personalities, may yet hope to hit their mark by covert and oblique allusions. Now of this scheme, even when conducted with the greatest skill, it may be observed, that the allusions must either be perceived or not. If they be not perceived, they fail of the effect intended by them; if they be, they are open to the objections which lie against more explicit and undissembled attacks. When-

ever we are conscious, in the composition of our discourses, of a view to particular characters in our congregation or parish, we ought to take for granted that our view will be understood. Those applications therefore, which, if they were direct, would produce more bad emotions than good ones, it is better to discard entirely from our sermons, that is to say, it is better to lay aside the design altogether, than to attempt to disguise it by a management which is generally detected, and which, if not seen through, defeats its purpose by its obscurity. The crimes then of individuals let us reserve for opportunities of private and seasonable expostulation. Happy is the clergyman who has the faculty of communicating advice and remonstrance with persuasion and effect, and the virtue to seize and improve every proper occasion of doing it; but in the pulpit, let private character be no otherwise adverted to, than as they fall in with the delineations of sins and duties which our discourses must necessarily contain, and which, whilst they avoid personalities, can never be too close or circumstantial.

Age; the true way of making it comfortable.

That is, by making it the means of religious

improvement. Let a man be beset by ever so many bodily complaints, bowed down by ever so many infirmities; if he find his soul grown, and growing better; his seriousness increased; his obedience more regular and more exact; his inward principles and dispositions improved from what they were formerly, and continuing to improve; that man hath a fountain of comfort and consolation springing up within him. Infirmities which have this effect, are infinitely better than strength and health themselves; though these, considered independently of their consequences, be justly esteemed the greatest of all blessings and of all gifts. The old age of a virtuous man admits of a different, and of a most consoling description.

“To the intelligent and virtuous, old age presents a scene of tranquil enjoyments; of obedient appetites; of well-regulated affections; of maturity in knowledge; and of calm preparation for immortality. In this serene and dignified state, placed as it were on the confines of two worlds, the mind of a good man reviews what is past with the complacency of an approving conscience, and looks forward with humble confidence in the mercy of God, and with devout aspirations towards his eternal and ever increasing favour.”

Agriculture.

There exists in this country conditions of tenure which condemn the land itself to perpetual sterility. Of this kind is the right of *common*, which precludes each proprietor from the improvement, or even the convenient occupation of his estate, without (what seldom can be obtained) the consent of many others. This tenure is also usually embarrassed by the interference of *manorial* claims, under which it often happens that the surface belongs to one owner, and the soil to another ; so that neither owner can stir a clod without the concurrence of his partner in the property. In many manors, the tenant is restrained from granting leases beyond a short term of years ; which renders every plan of solid improvement impracticable. In these cases, the owner wants what the first rule of rational policy requires, “ sufficient power over the soil for its perfect cultivation.” This power ought to be extended to him by some easy and general law of enfranchisement, partition, and enclosure ; which, though compulsory upon the lord, or the rest of the tenants, whilst it has in view the melioration of the soil, and tenders an equitable compensation for every right that it takes away,

is neither more arbitrary, nor more dangerous to the stability of property than that which is done in the construction of roads, bridges, embankments, navigable canals, and indeed in almost every public work in which private owners of land are obliged to accept that price for their property which an indifferent jury may award. And although the inclosure of wastes and pastures be generally beneficial to population, yet the inclosure of lands in tillage, in order to convert them into pastures, is as generally hurtful.

Ambition, its Pleasures.

Those which are supposed to be peculiar to high stations, are in reality common to all conditions. The farrier who shoes a horse better, and who is in far greater request for his skill than any man within ten miles of him, possesses the delight of *distinction*, and of *excelling* as truly and substantially as the statesman, the soldier, and the scholar, who have filled Europe with the repetition of their wisdom, their valour or their knowledge.

No superiority appears to be of any account, but a superiority over a rival. This, it is manifest, may exist where rivalships do; and rival-

ships fall out amongst men of all ranks and degrees. The object of emulation, the dignity or magnitude of this object makes no difference; as it is not what either possesses that constitutes the pleasure, but what one possesses more than the other.

Anger. & Emulation

All reasoning upon the subject supposes the passion of anger to be within our power; and this power consists not so much in any faculty we possess of appeasing our wrath at the time, for we are passive under the smart which an injury or affront occasions, and all then we can do is to prevent its breaking out into action; as in so mollifying our minds by habits of just reflection as to be less irritated by impressions of injury, and to be sooner pacified.

Reflections proper for this purpose, and which may be called the *sedatives* of anger, are the following: the possibility of mistaking the motives from which the conduct that offends us proceeds; how often *our* offences have been the effect of inadvertency, when they were construed into indications of malice; the inducement which prompted our adversary to act as he did, and how

powerfully the same inducement has, at one time or other, operated upon ourselves ; that he is suffering perhaps, under a contrition, which he is ashamed, or wants opportunity to confess ; and how ungenerous it is to triumph by coldness or insult over a spirit already humbled in secret ; that the returns of kindness are sweet, and that there is neither honour, nor virtue, nor use, in resisting them. Add to this, the indecency of extravagant anger ; how it renders us, whilst it lasts, the scorn and sport of all about us, of which it leaves us, when it ceases, sensible and ashamed ; the inconveniences and irretrievable misconduct into which our irascibility has sometimes betrayed us ? the friendships it has lost us ; the distresses and embarrassments in which we have been involved by it ; and the sore repentance which on one account or other it always costs us.

But the reflection calculated above all others to allay that haughtiness of temper which is ever finding out provocations, and which renders anger so impetuous, is that which the gospel proposes ; namely, that we ourselves are, or shortly shall be suppliants for mercy and pardon at the judgment-seat of God. Imagine our secret sins disclosed and brought to light ; imagine us thus

humbled and exposed, trembling under the hand of God, casting ourselves on his compassion, crying out for mercy—imagine such a creature to talk of *satisfaction* and *revenge* ; refusing to be entreated ; disdaining to forgive ; extreme to mark and resent what is done amiss ; imagine, I say, this, and you can hardly feign to yourself an instance of more impious and unnatural arrogance.

The Assistance of the Holy Spirit.

The language of scripture is, that God gives his holy spirit to them that ask it ; and moreover, that to them who use and improve it as they ought, it is given in more and more abundance. “He that hath not, from him shall be taken away even that which he hath :” Matt. xiii. 12. Now, this being the general nature and economy of God’s assisting grace, there is no reason why it should not extend to our faith, as well as to our practice ; our perceiving the truth, as well as obeying the truth, may be helped and succoured by it. God’s Spirit can have access to our understandings as well as our affections. He can render the mind sensible to the impressions of evidence, and the power of truth. If creatures

like us, might take upon themselves to judge what is a proper object of divine help, it should seem to be a serious, devout, humble, and apprehensive mind, anxiously desiring to learn and know the truth ; and in order to know it, keeping the heart and understanding pure and prepared for that purpose ; that is to say, carefully abstaining from the indulgence of passions, and from practices which harden and indispose the mind against religion. I say, a mind so guarding and qualifying itself, and imploring with devout earnestness and solicitude the aid of God's holy Spirit in its meditations and inquiries, seems, so far as we can presume to judge, as meet an object of divine help and favour as any of which we can form an idea ; and it is not for us to narrow the promises of God concerning his assisting grace, so as, without authority, to exclude such an object from it.

Beneficence and Optimism.

Throughout that order of nature, of which God is the author, what we find is a system of *beneficence*, we are seldom or never able to make out a system or *optimism*. The rain which descends from heaven is confessedly amongst the contri-

vances of the creator, for the sustentation of the animals and vegetables upon the face of the earth. Yet how partially and irregularly it is supplied! How much of it falls upon the sea, where it can be of no use! How often is it wanted where it would be of the greatest! This observation may be repeated concerning most of the phenomena of nature, and the true conclusion to which it leads is this: that to inquire what the Deity might have done, could have done, or even as we sometimes speak, ought to have done, and to build any propositions upon such inquiries against evidence of facts is wholly unwarrantable. It is a mode of reasoning which will not do in natural history, which will not do in natural religion, and which cannot therefore be applied with safety to revelation. It may have some foundation in certain speculative *à priori* ideas of the divine attributes; but it has none in experience or in analogy. The general character of the works of nature, is on the one hand goodness both in design and effect; and on the other, a liability to difficulty and to objections, if such objections be allowed, by reason of seeming incompleteness or uncertainty in obtaining their end. Christianity participates of this character. The true similitude between nature and

revelation consists in this: that they bear strong marks of their original; that they each also bear appearances of irregularity and defect. *A system of strict optimism may nevertheless be the real system in both cases.* But what I contend is, that the *proof* is hidden from *us*; that we ought not to expect to receive *that* in revelation, which we hardly perceive in any thing; that *beneficence* of which we can judge, ought to satisfy us that *optimism*, of which we *cannot* judge, ought not to be sought after. We can judge of beneficence, because it depends upon effects which we experience, and upon the relation between the means which we see acting, and the ends which we see produced. We cannot judge of optimism, because it necessarily implies a comparison of that which is tried with that which is not tried: of consequences which we see, with others which we imagine, and concerning many of which, it is more than probable we know nothing: concerning some, that we have no notion.

British Constitution.

It resembles one of those old mansions, which instead of being built all at once after a regular plan, has been reared in different ages, altered

from time to time, and has been continually receiving additions and repairs, suited to the taste, fortune, or conveniency of its successive proprietors. In England the system of public jurisprudence is made up of acts of parliament, decisions of courts of law, and of immemorial usages ; consequently these are the principles of which the English constitution itself consists, the sources from which all our knowledge of its nature and limitations is to be deduced, and the authorities to which all appeal ought to be made, and by which every constitutional doubt and question can alone be decided.

In the British, and possibly in all other constitutions, there exists a wide difference between the actual state of the government and the theory. When we contemplate the *theory* of the British government, we see the king invested with the most absolute personal impunity ; with the power of rejecting laws resolved upon by both houses of parliament : with the power of conferring by his charter, upon any set or succession of men, the privilege of sending representatives into one house of parliament, as by his immediate appointment he can place whom he will in the other. What is this, a foreigner might ask, but a mere circuitous despotism ?

Yet, when we turn our attention from the legal extent to the actual exercise of royal authority in England, we see these formidable prerogatives dwindled into mere ceremonies, and, in their stead, a sure commanding influence, of which the constitution, it seems, is totally ignorant, growing out of that enormous patronage which the increased territory and opulence of the empire have placed in the disposal of the executive magistrate. Our ancestors knew not what the experience and reflection of modern ages has discovered; that *patronage* universally is power.

We proceed to inquire in what manner the constitution has provided for its own preservation, or in what manner each part of the legislature is secured in the exercise of the powers assigned to it, from the encroachments of the other parts. But though the power of the two houses of parliament is checked by the king's negative; on the other hand, the arbitrary application of this negative is checked by the privilege which parliament possesses of refusing supplies of money to the king's administration.

The constitutional maxim "that the king can do no wrong," is balanced by another maxim not less constitutional; "that the illegal commands of the king do not justify those who as-

sist, or concur in carrying them into execution, and that the acts of the crown acquire not a legal force, until authenticated by some of its great officers." The wisdom of this contrivance is worthy of observation. As the king could not be punished without a civil war, the constitution exempts his person from trial or account; but lest this impunity should encourage a licentious exercise of dominion, various obstacles are opposed to the private will of the sovereign, when directed to illegal objects. The pleasure of the crown must be announced by certain solemnities, and in some cases, the royal order must be signified by a secretary of state; in others, it must pass under the privy seal, and in many, under the great seal. And when the king's command is regularly published, no mischief can be achieved by it, without the ministry and compliance of those to whom it is directed; all of whom who concur in an illegal order, or in any manner assist in carrying it into execution, subject themselves to prosecution and punishment for the part they have taken, and are not permitted to plead or produce the command of the king, in justification of their obedience.

The practice of addressing the king, to know by whose advice he resolved upon a particular

measure, I forbear to mention amongst the checks which parliament holds over the administration of public affairs, for this reason—that it does not so much subject the king to the controul of parliament, as it supposes him to be already in subjection. For if the king were so far out of the reach of the resentment of the house of commons, as to be able with safety to refuse the information requested, or to take upon himself the responsibility inquired after, there must be an end of all proceedings founded in this mode of application.

But further: the power of the crown to direct the military force of the kingdom, is balanced by the annual necessity of resorting to parliament for the maintenance and government of that force. The king's choice of his ministers is controuled by the obligation he is under of appointing those men to offices in the state who are capable of managing his affairs in the government with the two houses of parliament. Which consideration imposes such a necessity upon the crown, as hath in a great measure subdued the influence of favouritism ; insomuch that it is become no uncommon spectacle in this country to see men promoted by the king to the highest offices in his power to bestow, who have been

distinguished by their *opposition* to his personal inclinations.

Again, if the king should endeavour to extend his authority by contracting the power and privileges of the commons, the house of lords would see their own dignity endangered by every advance which the crown made to independency upon the resolutions of parliament. And whereas arbitrary or clandestine confinement is most to be dreaded from the strong hand of the executive government, the constitution has provided against this danger with double solicitude. The *Habeas Corpus* act of Charles the Second, and the determinations of our courts founded upon these laws afford a complete remedy for every conceivable case of illegal punishment. For, upon complaint in writing, by, or on behalf of any person in confinement to any of the four Courts of Westminster Hall in term time, or to the Lord Chancellor, or one of the Judges in the vacation; and upon a probable reason being suggested to question the legality of the detention, a writ is issued to the person in whose custody the complainant is alleged to be, commending him within a certain limited and short time to produce the body of the prisoner, and the authority under which he is detained. Upon

the return of the writ, if no lawful cause of imprisonment appear, the Court or Judge before whom the prisoner is brought, is authorized and bound to discharge him, even though he may have been committed by a secretary, by the privy council, or by the king in person : so that no subject of this realm can be held in confinement by any power whatever, if he can find means to convey his complaint to one of the four Courts of Westminster Hall. He may make application to all the judges in succession ; and if one out of the number thinks the prisoner entitled to his liberty, that one possesses authority to restore it to him.

Again : treason being that charge, under colour of which, the destruction of an obnoxious individual is often sought ; and government, being at all times more immediately a party in the prosecution, the law, sensible of the unequal contest in which the subject is engaged, has assisted his defence with extraordinary indulgencies. Every person, by two statutes enacted since the revolution, may have a copy of his indictment, a list of the witnesses to be produced, and of the jury impannelled, delivered to him ten days before his trial ; he is also permitted to make his defence by counsel ; privi-

leges which are not allowed to the prisoner in a trial for any other crime; and what is of more importance to the party than all the rest, the testimony of two witnesses, at the least, is required to convict a person of treason; whereas one positive witness is sufficient in almost every other species of accusation.

Lastly, with respect to Juries, the wisdom of man hath not devised a happier institution than that of juries, or one founded on a juster knowledge of human life, or of the human capacity. In jurisprudence, as in every other science, the points ultimately rest upon common sense. But to reduce a question to these points, and propose them accurately, requires not only an understanding superior to that which is necessary to decide upon them when proposed, but oftentimes also a technical and peculiar erudition. Agreeably to this distinction, which runs perhaps through all sciences, what is preliminary and preparatory, is left to the legal profession; what is final, to the plain understanding of plain men. But since it is necessary that the judgment of such men should be informed; and since it is of the utmost importance that that advice which falls with so much weight, should be drawn from the purest sources, judges are

sent down to us, who have spent their lives in the study and administration of the laws of their country, and who come amongst us, strangers to our contentions, if we have any, our parties and our prejudices; strangers to every thing, except the evidence which they hear. The effect corresponds with the wisdom of the design, juries may err, and frequently do so; but there is no system of error incorporated with their constitution. Corruption, terror, influence, are excluded by it: and prejudice in a great degree, though not entirely. This danger, which consists in juries viewing one class of men, or one class of rights, in a more or less favourable light than another, is the only one to be guarded against. It is a disposition, which, whenever it rises up in the minds of jurors, ought to be repressed by their probity, their consciences, the sense of their duty, the remembrance of their oaths.

And this institution is not more salutary, than it is grateful and honourable to those popular feelings of which all good governments are tender. Hear the language of the law. In the most momentous interests, in the last peril indeed of human life, the accused appeals to God and his country, "which country you are."

What pomp of titles, what display of honours, can equal the real dignity which these few words confer upon those to whom they are addressed ? They show, by terms the most solemn and significant, how highly the law deems of the functions and character of a jury : they show also, with what care of the safety of the subject it is, that the same law has provided for every one a recourse to the fair and indifferent arbitration of his neighbours. This is substantial equality, real freedom, equality of protection, freedom from injustice. May it never be invaded, never abused ! May it be perpetual ! And it will be so, if the affection of the country continue to be preserved to it by the integrity of those who are charged with its office.

Canaanites : the Cause of their Destruction justified.

When God for the wickedness of a people sends an earthquake, or a fire, or a plague amongst them, there is no complaint of injustice, especially when the calamity is known, or expressly declared before-hand to be inflicted for the wickedness of such people. It is rather regarded as an act of exemplary penal justice, and

as such, consistent with the character of the moral governor of the universe. The objection, therefore, is not to the Canaanitish nations' being destroyed, but the objection is solely to the manner of destroying them: their wickedness accounts for the thing itself. If the thing itself be just, the manner is of little signification, of little signification even to the sufferers. For where is the great difference, even to them, whether they are destroyed by an earthquake, a pestilence, a famine, or by the hands of an enemy? Where is the difference, even to our imperfect apprehensions of divine justice, provided it be, and is known to be for their wickedness that they were destroyed. But this destruction you say, confounded the innocent with the guilty. The sword of Joshua and of the Jews spared neither women nor children. Is it not the same with all other national visitations? Would not an earthquake, or a fire, or a plague, or a famine amongst them have done the same? Even in an ordinary and natural death the same thing happens. God takes away the life he lends, without regard that we can perceive, to age, or sex, or character.

But after all promiscuous massacres, the burning of cities, the laying waste of countries

are things dreadful to reflect upon. Who doubts it? So are all the judgments of Almighty God. The effect in whatever way it shows itself must necessarily be tremendous, when the Lord, as the Psalmist expresses it, “moveth out of his place to punish the wicked.” But it ought to satisfy us; at least, this is the point upon which we ought to fix and rest our attention; that it was for excessive, wilful and fore-warned wickedness that all this befel them, and that this is all along so declared in the history which recites it.

Charity : the different kinds of it.

There are three kinds which prefer a claim to attention. The first, and in my judgment, one of the best, is to give stated and considerable sums by way of pension or annuity to individuals or families, with whose behaviour and distress we ourselves are acquainted. When I speak of *considerable* sums, I mean only that five pounds, or any other sum, given at once, or divided amongst five or fewer families will do more good than the same sum distributed amongst a great number in shillings or half-crowns; and that because it is more likely to be properly applied

by the persons who receive it. A poor fellow, who can find no better use for a shilling than to drink his benefactor's health, and purchase half an hour's recreation for himself, would hardly break into a guinea for any such purpose, or be so improvident as not to lay it by for an occasion of importance; for example, for his rent, his clothing, fuel, or stock of winter's provision. It is still a greater recommendation of this kind of charity, that pensions and annuities which are paid regularly, and can be expected at the time, are the only way by which we can prevent one part of a poor man's sufferings—the dread of want. A second method of doing good, which is in every one's power who has the money to spare, is by subscription to *public charities*, which admit of this argument in their favour, that your money goes further towards attaining the end for which it is given, than it can do by any private and separate beneficence. A guinea contributed to an infirmary, becomes the means of providing one patient at least with a physician, surgeon, apothecary, with medicine, diet, lodging, and suitable attendance; which is not the tenth part of what the same assistance, if it could be procured at all, would cost to a sick person or family in any other situation.

The last and lowest exertion of benevolence, is in the relief of beggars. Nevertheless, I by no means approve the indiscriminate rejection of all who implore our alms in this way. Some may perish by such a conduct. Men are sometimes overtaken by distress, for which all other relief would come too late. Besides which, resolutions of this kind, compel us to offer such violence to our humanity, as may go near in a little while to suffocate the principle itself; which is a very serious consideration. A good man, if he do not surrender himself to his feelings without reserve, will at least lend an ear to importunities, which come accompanied with outward attestations of distress; and after a patient audience of the complaint, will direct himself, not so much by any previous resolution which he may have formed upon the subject, as by the circumstances, and the credibility of the account that he receives.

There are other species of charity well contrived to make the money expended *go far*: such as keeping down the price of fuel or provision, in case of monopoly or temporary scarcity, by purchasing the articles at the best market, and retailing them at prime cost, or at a small loss; or the adding a bounty to particular species

of labour, when the price is accidentally depressed.

The proprietors of large estates have it in their power to facilitate the maintenance, and thereby to encourage the establishment of families, (which is one of the noblest purposes to which the rich and great can convert their endeavours,) by *building cottages, splitting farms*, erecting manufactures, cultivating wastes, embanking the sea, draining marshes, and other expedients which the situation of each estate points out. If the profits of these undertakings do not pay the expence, let the authors of them place the difference to the account of charity. It is true of almost all such projects, that the public is a gainer by them, whatever the owner be. And where the loss can be spared, this consideration is sufficient.

Christianity vindicated against the Charges of Persecution, Wars, Massacres, &c.

Christianity is charged with many consequences for which it is not responsible. I believe that religious motives had no more to do in the formation of nine-tenths of the intolerant and persecuting laws which in different countries

have been established upon the subject of religion, than they have had to do in England with the making of the game laws. These measures, although they have the Christian religion for their subject, are resolvable into a principle which Christianity certainly did not plant; that is to say, "that they who are in possession of power do what they can to keep it." Christianity is answerable for no part of the mischief brought upon the world by persecution, except that which has arisen from *conscientious* persecutors. Now these perhaps have never been either numerous or powerful. Nor is to Christianity that even *their* mistake can fairly be imputed. They have been misled by an error not properly Christian or religious, but by an error in their moral philosophy, They pursued the particular, without adverting to the general consequence. Believing certain articles of faith, or a certain mode of worship to be highly conducive, or perhaps essential to salvation, they thought themselves bound to bring all they could, by every means into them. And this they thought, without considering what would be the effect of such a conclusion when adopted amongst mankind as a general rule of conduct. Had there been in the New Testament what

there are in the Koran, precepts authorizing coercion in the propagation of the religion, and the use of violence towards unbelievers, the case would have been different. This distinction could not have been taken, nor this defence made.

I apologize for no species nor degree of persecution, but I think that even the fact has been exaggerated. The slave trade destroys more in a year than the Inquisition does in a hundred. If it be objected that Christianity is chargeable with every mischief of which it has been the *occasion*, though not the motive, I answer, that if the malevolent passions be there, the world will never want occasions. The noxious element will always find a conductor. Any point will produce an explosion. Did the applauded intercommunity of the Pagan theology preserve the peace of the Roman world? Did it prevent oppressions, proscriptions, massacres, devastations? Was it bigotry that carried Alexander into the East, or brought Cæsar into Gaul? Are the nations of the world, into which Christianity hath found its way, or from which it hath been banished, free from contentions? Is it owing to Christianity, or to the want of it, that the finest regions of the East, the countries

inter quatuor maria, the peninsula of Greece, together with a great part of the Mediterranean Coast, are at this day, a desert? Or, that the banks of the Nile, whose constantly renewed fertility is not to be impaired by neglect, or destroyed by the ravages of war, serve only for a scene of ferocious anarchy, or the supply of unceasing hostilities? Europe itself has known no religious wars for some centuries, yet has hardly ever been without war. Are the calamities which this day afflict it to be imputed to Christianity? Hath Poland fallen by a Christian Crusade? Hath the overthrow in France of civil order and security been effected by the votaries of our religion or by the foes? Amongst the awful lessons which the crimes and the miseries of that country afford to mankind, this is one, that in order to be a persecutor it is not necessary to be a bigot. That in rage and cruelty, in mischief and destruction, fanaticism itself can be out-done by infidelity.

But Christianity in every country in which it is professed, hath obtained a *sensible*, although not a *complete* influence upon the public judgment of morals. And this is very important; for without the occasional correction which public opinion receives, by referring to some fixed

standard of morality, no man can foretell into what extravagancies it might wander : assassination might become as honourable as duelling ; unnatural crimes be accounted as venial, as fornication is wont to be accounted. In this way, it is possible many may be kept in order by Christianity, who are not themselves Christians. They may be guided by the rectitude which it communicates to public opinion. Their consciences may suggest their duty truly, and they may ascribe these suggestions to a *moral sense*, or to the native capacity of the human intellect, when, in fact, they are nothing more than the public opinion, reflected from their own minds, in a considerable degree, modified by the lessons of Christianity. Certain it is, and this is a great deal to say, that the generality, even of the meanest and most vulgar and ignorant people, have truer and worthier notions of God, more just and right apprehensions concerning his attributes and perfections, a deeper sense of the difference of good and evil, a greater regard to moral obligations, and to the plain and most necessary duties of life, and a more firm and universal expectation of a future state of rewards and punishments, than in any *heathen* country, any considerable number of men were found to

have had. After all, the value of Christianity is not to be appreciated by its *temporal effects*. The effects upon human salvation; those of the mission, of the death of Christ, may be universal, though the religion be not universally known.

*Christian Worship, and its tendency to promote
Civil Liberty.*

Assemblies for the purpose of divine worship, placing men under impressions by which they are taught to consider their relation to the deity, and to contemplate those around them with a view to that relation, force upon their thoughts the natural equality of the human species, and thereby promote humility and condescension in the highest orders of the community, and inspire the lowest with a sense of their rights. The distinctions of civil life are almost always insisted upon too much, and urged too far. Whatever therefore conduces to restore the level by qualifying the dispositions which grow out of great elevation or depression of rank, improves the character on both sides. Now things are made to appear little by being placed beside what is great. In which manner, superiorities, that

occupy the whole field of their imagination will vanish, or shrink to their proper diminutiveness, when compared with the distance by which even the highest of men are removed from the Supreme Being; and this comparison is naturally introduced by all acts of joint worship. If ever the poor man holds up his head, it is at Church, if ever the rich man views him with respect, it is there; and both will be the better, and the public profited the oftener they meet in a situation, in which the consciousness of dignity in the one is tempered and mitigated, and the spirit of the other erected and confirmed. We recommend nothing adverse to subordinations which are established and necessary: but then it should be remembered that subordination itself is an evil, being an evil to the subordinate, who are the majority, and therefore ought not to be carried a tittle beyond what the greater good, the peaceable government of the community requires.

*Civil Government, its Origin and Obedience
to it.*

Government, at first, was either patriarchal or military, that of a parent over his family, or of a commander over his fellow warriors.

Paternal authority, and the order of domestic life, supplied the foundation of *civil government*. Did mankind spring out of the earth mature and independent, it would be found perhaps impossible to introduce subjection and subordination among them; but the condition of human infancy prepares men for society by combining individuals into small communities, and by placing them from the beginning under direction and controul. A family contains the rudiments of an empire. The authority of one over many, and the disposition to govern and to be governed are in this way incidental to the very nature, and coeval no doubt with the existence of the human species.

With respect to the manner in which subjection to civil government is maintained, could we view our own species from a distance, or regard mankind with the same sort of observation with which we read the natural history, or remark the *manners* of any other animal, there is nothing in the human character which would more surprize us *than the almost universal subjugation of strength to weakness*; than to see many millions of robust men in the complete use and exercise of their personal faculties, and without any defect of courage, waiting upon the

will of a *child*, a *woman*, a *driveller* or a *lunatic*. And although, when we suppose a vast empire in absolute subjection to one person, and that one depressed beneath the level of his species by infirmities or vice, we suppose, perhaps, an extreme case ; yet in all cases, even in the most popular forms of civil government, *the physical strength resides in the governed*.

Now, though we should look in vain for any single reason which will account for the general submission of mankind, yet it may not be difficult to assign for every class and character in the community, considerations powerful enough to dissuade each from any attempts to resist established authority. Some obey from *prejudice*, others from *reason*, a third class from *self-interest* ; others again, principally from *fear*, foreseeing that by resistance they would bring themselves into a worse situation than their present, inasmuch as the strength of government, each discontented subject reflects, is greater than his own, and he knows not that others would join him. This last consideration has often been called *opinion of power*.

Let civil *governors* learn hence to respect their subjects ; let them be admonished that *the physical strength resides in the governed* ; that this

strength wants only to be felt and roused to lay prostrate the most ancient and confirmed dominion ; that civil authority is founded in opinion ; that general opinion therefore ought always to be treated with deference, and managed with delicacy and circumspection.

Asto civil obedience, if I met with a person who appeared to entertain doubts whether civil obedience were a moral duty which ought to be voluntarily discharged, or whether it were not a mere submission to force, like that which we yield to a robber who holds a pistol to our breast, I should represent to him the use and offices of civil government ; the end and the necessity of civil subjection ; I should explain to him the social compact, urge him with the obligation and equity of his implied promise and tacit consent to be governed by the laws of the state from which he received protection ; or I should argue, perhaps, that nature herself dictated the law of subordination when she planted within us an inclination to associate with our species, and framed us with capacities so various and unequal. From whatever principle I set out, I should labour to infer from it this conclusion, " That obedience to the state is to be numbered amongst the relative duties of human life, for the

transgression of which, we shall be accountable at the tribunal of Divine Justice, whether the magistrate be able to punish us for it or not.

If in a short time afterwards, I should be accosted by the same person with complaints of public grievances, of exorbitant taxes, of acts of cruelty and oppression, of tyrannical encroachments upon the ancient or stipulated rights of the people, and should be consulted whether it were lawful to revolt, or justifiable to join in an attempt to shake off the yoke by open resistance, I should certainly consider myself as having a case and question before me very different from the former.

I should now define and discriminate. I should reply, that if public expediency be the *foundation*, it is also the *measure* of civil obedience; that the *obligation* of *sovereigns and subjects* is *reciprocal*; that the duty of allegiance is neither *unlimited* nor *unconditional*; that peace may be purchased too dearly; that patience becomes culpable pusillanimity, when it serves only to encourage our rulers to increase the weight of our burthen, or to bind it the faster; that the submission which surrenders the liberty of a nation, and entails slavery upon future generations, is enjoined by no law of rational morality. .

St. Paul has said, “Whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God.” This phrase, “the ordinance of God,” is by many so interpreted, as to authorise the most exalted and superstitious ideas of the regal character. But surely such interpreters have sacrificed *truth* to *adulation*; for in the first place, the expression as used by St. Paul, is just as applicable to one kind of government, and to one kind of succession as another:—to the elective magistrates of a pure republic, as to an absolute hereditary monarch. In the next place, it is not affirmed of the supreme magistrate exclusively, that *he* is the ordinance of God; the title, whatever it imports, belongs to every inferior officer of the state, as much as to the highest. The divine right of *kings* is like the divine right of other magistrates, the law of the land, or even actual and quiet possession of their office; a right, ratified, we humbly presume, by the divine approbation, so long as obedience to their authority appears to be necessary or conducive to the common welfare. Princes are ordained *of God*, by virtue only of that general decree by which he assents, and adds the sanction of his will to every law of society which promotes his own purpose, the communication of human happiness; ac-

according to which idea of their origin and constitution, and without any repugnancy to the words of St. Paul, they are by St. Peter denominated the *ordinance of man*.

But rejecting the intervention of *compact*, as unfounded in its principle, and dangerous in the application, we assign for the only ground of the subjects' obligation, *the will of God as collected from expediency*.

The steps by which the argument proceeds, are few and direct.—“It is the will of God that the happiness of human life be promoted.”—this is the first step, and the foundation not only of this, but of every moral conclusion.—“Civil society conduces to that end;”—this is the second proposition.—“Civil societies cannot be upholden, unless in each the interest of the whole society be binding upon every part and member of it: this is the third step, and conducts us to the conclusion: namely, that so long as the interest of the whole society requires it, that is, so long as the established government cannot be resisted or changed without public inconveniency, it is the will of God (which *will* universally determine our duty) that the established government be obeyed,”—and no longer.

Contentment, method of acquiring it.

The wisest advice that can be given is, never to allow our attention to dwell upon comparisons between our own condition and that of others, but to keep it fixed upon the duties and concerns of the condition itself. But since every man has not this power; since the minds of some men will be busy in contemplating the advantages they see others possess; and since persons in laborious stations of life are wont to view the higher ranks of society, with sentiments which not only tend to make themselves unhappy, but which are very different from the truth, it may be an useful office to point out to them some of these considerations, which if they will turn their thoughts to the subject, they should endeavour to take fairly into the account.

And, first; we are most of us apt to murmur when we see exorbitant fortunes placed in the hands of single persons; larger, we are sure, than they can want, or, as we think, than they can use. This is so common a reflection, that I will not say it is not natural.

But whenever the complaint comes into our minds, we ought to recollect, that the thing

happens in consequence of those very rules and laws which secure to ourselves our property, be it ever so small. The laws which accidentally cast enormous estates into one great man's possession, are, after all, the self-same laws which protect and guard the poor man. Fixed rules of property are established for one as well as another, without knowing before-hand whom they may affect. If these rules sometimes throw an excessive or disproportionate share to one man's lot, who can help it? It is much better that it should be so, than that the rules themselves should be broken up; and you can only have one side of the alternative or other. To abolish riches would not be to abolish poverty; but, on the contrary, to leave it without protection or resource. It is not for the poor man to repine at the effects of laws and rules, by which he himself is benefited every hour of his existence; which secure to him his earnings, his habitation, his bread, his life; without which he, no more than the rich man, could either eat his meal, or go to bed in safety. Of the two, it is rather more the concern of the poor to stand up for the laws, than of the rich; for it is the law which defends the weak against the strong, the humble against the powerful, the little against the great;

and weak and strong, humble and powerful, little and great, there would be, even were there no laws whatever. Besides, what, after all, is the mischief? The owner of a great estate does not eat or drink more than the owner of a small one. His fields do not produce worse crops, nor does the produce maintain fewer mouths. If estates were more equally divided, would greater numbers be fed, or clothed, or employed? Either, therefore, great estates are not a public evil, or, if they be in any degree an evil, it is to be borne with, for the sake of those fixed and general rules concerning property, in the preservation and steadiness of which all are interested.

Fortunes, however, of any kind, from the nature of the thing can only fall to the lot of a few. I say, "from the nature of the thing." The very utmost that can be done by laws and government, is to enable every man, who hath health, to procure a healthy subsistence for himself and a family. Where this is the case, things are at their perfection. They have reached their limit. Were the princes and nobility, the legislators and counsellors of the land, all of them the best and wisest men that ever lived, their united virtue and wisdom could do no more than

this. They, if any such there be, who would teach you to expect more, give you no instance that more has ever been attained.

Conversion.

Now of the persons to whom we not only may, but must preach the doctrine of conversion plainly and directly, are those, who, with the name indeed of Christians, have hitherto passed their lives without any internal religion whatever; who have not at all thought upon the subject; who, a few easy and customary forms excepted, (and which with them are mere forms,) cannot truly say of themselves that they have done one action, which they would not have done equally if there had been no such thing as a God in the world; or that they have ever sacrificed any passion, any present enjoyment, or even any inclination of their minds, to the restraints and prohibitions of religion; with whom indeed religious motives have not weighed a feather in the scale against interest or pleasure. To these it is utterly necessary that we preach conversion. At this day we have not Jews and Gentiles to preach to; but these persons are really in as unconverted a state as any Jew or

Gentile could be in our Saviour's time. They are no more Christians as to any actual benefit of Christianity to their souls, than the most hardened Jew or the most profligate Gentile was in the age of the gospel. As to any difference in the two cases, the difference is all against them. These must be converted before they can be saved; the course of their thoughts must be changed; the very principles upon which they act must be changed; considerations which never, or which hardly ever entered into their minds, must deeply and perpetually engage them; views and motives which did not influence them at all, either as checks from doing evil, or as inducements to do good, must become the views and motives which they regularly consult, and by which they are guided; that is to say, there must be a revolution of principle; the visible conduct will follow the change, but there must be a revolution within. A change so entire, so deep, so important as this, I do allow to be a conversion, and no one who is in the situation above described, can be saved without undergoing it; and he must necessarily both be sensible of it at the time, and remember it all his life afterwards. It is too momentous an event ever to be forgotten. A man might as easily for-

get his escape from a shipwreck. Whether it was sudden, or whether it was gradual, if it was effected, (and the fruits will prove that,) it was a true conversion, and every such person may justly both believe and say of himself, that he was converted at a particular assignable time. It may not be necessary to speak of his conversion, but he will always think of it with unbounded thankfulness to the giver of all grace, the author of all mercies, spiritual as well as temporal.

Are there then some sins in which we live continually? some duties which we continually neglect? we are not children of God; we are not sincere disciples of Christ. The allowed prevalence of any one known sin, is sufficient to exclude us from the character of God's children, and we must be converted from that sin in order to become such. Here then we must preach conversion. The habitual drunkard, the habitual fornicator, the habitual cheat must be converted. The breaking off a habit, especially when we had placed much of our gratification in it, is alone so great a thing, and such a step in our Christian life, as to merit the name of conversion. Then as to the time of our conversion, there can be little question about that. The

drunkard was converted when he left off drinking; the fornicator, when he gave up his criminal indulgences, haunts, and connections; the cheat, when he quitted dishonest practices, however gainful and successful, provided that, in these cases, religious views and motives influenced the determination, and a religious character accompanied and followed these determinations.

Crimes and Punishments, their proportion.

The proper end of human punishments is, not the *satisfaction* of justice, but the *prevention* of crimes. By the satisfaction of justice, I mean the retribution of so much pain for so much guilt; which is the dispensation we expect at the hand of God, and which we are accustomed to consider as the order of things, that perfect justice dictates and requires. In what sense, or whether with truth in any sense, justice may be said to demand the punishment of offenders, do not now enquire! but I assert that this *demand* is not the motive or occasion of human punishment. What would it be to the magistrate, that offences went altogether unpunished if the impunity of the offenders were follow-

by no danger or prejudice to the commonwealth? The fear lest the escape of the criminal should encourage him, or others by his example, to repeat the same crime, or to commit different crimes, is the sole consideration which authorizes the infliction of punishment by human laws. Now that, whatever it be, which is the cause and end of the punishment, ought undoubtedly to regulate the measure of its severity. But this cause appears to be founded, not in the guilt of the offender, but in the necessity of preventing the repetition of the offence: and from hence results the reason, that crimes are not by any government punished in proportion to their guilt, nor in cases ought to be so, but in proportion to the difficulty and the necessity of preventing them.

The certainty of punishment is of more consequence than the severity. Criminals do not so much flatter themselves with the lenity of the sentence, as with the hope of escaping. They are not so apt to compare what they gain by the crime with what they may suffer from the punishment, as to encourage themselves with the chance of concealment or flight. For which reason a vigilant magistracy, an accurate police, a proper distribution of force and intelli-

gence, together with due rewards for the discovery and apprehension of malefactors, and an undeviating impartiality in carrying the laws into execution, contribute more to the restraint and suppression of crimes, than any violent exacerbations of punishment.

Crimes of Violence.

Injuries effected by terror and violence, are those which it is the first and chief concern of legal government to repress; because their extent is unlimited; because, no private precaution can protect the subject against them; because they endanger life and safety, as well as property; and, lastly, because they render the condition of society wretched, by a sense of personal insecurity. These reasons do not apply to frauds, which circumspection may prevent; which must wait for opportunity; which can proceed only to certain limits; and, by the apprehension of which, although the business of life be incommoded, life itself is not made miserable. The appearance of this distinction has led some humane writers to express a wish, that capital punishments might be confined to crimes of violence.

In estimating the comparative malignancy of crimes of violence, regard is to be had, not only to the proper and intended mischief of the crime, but to the fright occasioned by the attack, to the general alarm excited by it in others, and to the consequences which may attend future attempts of the same kind. Thus in affixing the punishment of burglary, or of breaking into dwelling-houses by night, we are to consider not only the peril to which the most valuable property is exposed by this crime, and which may be called the direct mischief of it, but the danger also of murder in case of resistance, or for the sake of preventing discovery, and the universal dread with which the silent and defenceless hours of rest and sleep must be disturbed, were attempts of this sort to become frequent; and which dread alone, even without the mischief which is the object of it, is not only a public evil, but almost of all evils the most insupportable. These circumstances place a difference between the breaking into a dwelling-house by day and by night; which difference obtains in the punishment of the offence by the law of Moses, and is probably to be found in the judicial codes of most countries from the earliest times to the present.

Death, Sudden, its benefits.

It seems to be expedient that the period of human life should be *uncertain*. Did mortality follow any fixed rule it would produce a security in those that were at a distance from it, which would lead to the greatest disorders; and a horror in those who approached it, similar to that which a condemned prisoner feels on the night before his execution. But that death be *uncertain*, the young must sometimes die as well as the old. Also were deaths never *sudden*, they who are in health, would be too confident of life. The strong and the active, who want most to be warned and checked, would live without apprehension or restraint. On the other hand, were sudden deaths very frequent, the sense of jeopardy would interfere too much with the degree of ease and enjoyment intended for us; and human life be too precarious for the business and interests which belong to it. There could not be dependence either upon our own lives, or the lives of those with whom we were connected, sufficient to carry on the regular offices of human society. The manner, therefore, in which death is made to occur, conduces to the purposes of

admonition without overthrowing the necessary stability of human affairs.

Disease being the forerunner of death, there is the same reason for its attacks coming upon us under the appearance of *chance*, as there is for uncertainty in the time of death itself.

Debts.

Whoever borrows money is bound in conscience to pay it. This every man sees; but every man cannot see, or does not reflect, that he is in consequence also bound to use the means necessary to enable himself to repay it. "If he pay the money when he has it, or has it to spare, he does all that an honest man can do," and all he imagines that is required of him; whilst the previous measures which are necessary to furnish him with the money, he makes no part of his care, nor observes to be as much his duty as the other; such as selling a family seat, or a family estate, contracting his plan of expence, laying down his equipage, reducing the number of his servants, or any of those humiliating sacrifices which justice requires of a man in debt, the moment he perceives that he has no reasonable prospect of paying his debts with-

out them. An expectation which depends upon the continuance of his own life, will not satisfy an honest man, if a better provision be in his power; for it is a breach of faith to subject a creditor, when we can help it, to the risk of our life, be the event what it will; that, not being the security to which credit was given.

Deity, Existence of; Utility of Investigation to prove it.

Of the greater part of those who either in this book, or in any other, read arguments to prove the existence of a God, it will be said that they leave off only where they began; that they were *never ignorant* of this great truth, *never doubted* of it; that it therefore does not appear, what is gained by researches from which no new opinion is learnt, and of which, *no proofs* were wanted. Now I answer that, by *investigation*, the following points are always gained in favour of doctrines, even the most generally acknowledged, (supposing them to be true) viz. *stability and impression*. Occasions will arise to try the firmness of our most habitual opinions. And upon these occasions, it is a matter of incalculable use to feel our foundation; to find a sup-

port in argument for what we had taken up upon authority. In the present case, the arguments upon which the conclusion rests, are exactly such as a truth of universal concern ought to rest upon. They are sufficiently open to the views and capacities of the unlearned, at the same time that they acquire new strength and lustre from the discoveries of the learned. If they had been altogether abstruse and recondite, they would not have found their way to the understandings of the mass of mankind; if they had been merely popular, they might have wanted solidity. What is gained by *research*, is also gained from *impression*. Physicians tell us there is a great deal of difference between taking a medicine, and the medicine getting into the constitution. A difference not unlike which, obtains with respect to those great moral propositions which ought to form the directing principles of human conduct. It is one thing to assent to a proposition of this sort: another, and a very different thing, to have properly imbibed its influence. I take the case to be this: perhaps almost every man living has a particular train of thought, into which his mind glides and falls when at leisure from the impressions and ideas that occasionally excite it; perhaps also, the

train of thought here spoken of, more than any other thing, determines the character. It is of the utmost consequence, therefore, that this property of our constitution be well regulated. Now it is by frequent or continued meditation upon a subject, by placing a subject in different points of view, by induction of particulars, by variety of examples, by applying principles to the solution of phænomena, by dwelling upon proofs and consequences, that mental exercise is drawn into any particular channel. It is by these means, at least, that we have any power over it. And if one train of thinking be more desirable than another, *it is that which regards the phænomena of nature with a constant reference to a supreme intelligent Author.* To have made this the ruling, the habitual sentiment of our minds, is to have laid the foundation of every thing which is religious. The world thenceforth becomes a temple, and life itself one continued act of adoration. The change is no less than this, that whereas formerly, God was seldom in our thoughts, we can now scarcely look upon any thing without perceiving its relation to him. Every organized natural body, in the provisions which it contains for its sustentation and propagation, testifies a care on the part of the Crea-

for expressly directed to these purposes. We are on all sides surrounded by such bodies; examined in their parts wonderfully curious: compared with one another, no less wonderfully diversified. So that the mind as well as the eye, may either expatiate in variety and multitude, or fix itself down to the investigation of particular divisions of the science. And in either case, it will rise up from its occupation possessed by the subject in a very different manner, and with a very different degree of influence from what a mere assent to any verbal proposition which can be formed concerning the existence of the Deity, will or can produce upon the thoughts. More especially may this difference be perceived in the degree of admiration or awe with which the Divinity is regarded, when represented to the understanding by *its own remarks, its own reflections, and its own reasonings*, compared with what is excited by any language which can be used by *others*. The existence and *character* of the Deity, is in every view, the most interesting of all human speculations. In none, however, is it more so, than as it facilitates the belief of the fundamental articles of *Revelation*. It is a step to know, that amongst the invisible things of nature, there must be an intelligent mind, con-

cerned in its production, order, and support. These points being assured to us by *Natural Theology*, we may well leave to *Revelation* the disclosure of many particulars which our researches cannot reach, respecting the nature of this Being, as the original cause of all things, or his character and designs as a moral governor. The true Theist will be the first to listen to any credible communication of Divine knowledge. Nothing which he has learned from Natural Theology will diminish his desire of further instruction, or his disposition to receive it with humility and thankfulness. He wishes for light; he rejoices in light. His inward veneration of this great Being, will incline him to attend with the utmost seriousness to all that is taught by a revelation, which gives reasonable proof of having proceeded from him.

Devotion.

That devotion to God is a duty, stands upon the same proof as that God exists. But devotion is an act of the mind strictly.—In a certain sense, duty to a fellow creature may be discharged if the outward act be performed, because the benefit to him depends upon the act. Not so with

devotion. It is altogether the operation of the mind. God is a Spirit, and must be worshipped in spirit, that is, in mind and thought. The devotion of the mind may be, will be, ought to be testified and accompanied by outward performances and expressions; but, without the mind going along with it, no form, no solemnity can avail as a service to God. It is not so much a question under what mode men worship their Maker; but this is the question, whether their mind, and thoughts, and affections accompany the mode which they adopt or not. I do not say that modes of worship are indifferent things; for certainly one mode may be more rational, more edifying, more pure than another; but they are indifferent, in comparison with the question, whether the heart attend the worship or be estranged from it.

So many pathetic reflections are awakened by every exercise of social devotion, that most men, I believe, carry away from public worship, a better temper towards the rest of mankind than they brought with them. Sprung from the same extraction, preparing together for the period of all worldly distinctions, reminded of their mutual infirmities, and common dependency, imploring and receiving support and supplies from the

same great source of power and bounty ; having all one interest to secure, one Lord to serve, one judgment, the supreme object of all their hopes and fears to look towards ; it is hardly possible in this position, to behold mankind as strangers, competitors, or enemies ; or not regard them as children of the same family, assembled before their common parent, and with some portion of the tenderness which belongs to the most endearing of our domestic relations. It is not to be expected that any single effect of this kind, should be considerable or lasting ; but the frequent return of such sentiments as the presence of a devout congregation naturally suggests, will gradually melt down the ruggedness of many unkind passions, and may generate in time a permanent and productive benevolence.

The Divine Benevolence.

When God created the human species, either he wished their happiness, or he wished their misery, or he was indifferent and unconcerned about both. If he had wished our misery, he might have made sure of his purpose, by forming our senses to be so many sores and pains to us, as they are now instruments of gratification

and enjoyment ; or by placing us amidst objects so ill suited to our perceptions, as to have continually offended us, instead of ministering to our refreshment and delight. If he had been indifferent about our happiness or misery, we must have imputed to our good fortune, both the capacity of our senses to receive pleasure, and the supply of external objects fitted to produce it. But either of these being too much to be attributed to accident, nothing remains but the first supposition, that God, when he created the human species, wished their happiness ; and made for them the provision which he has made, with that view, and for that purpose evil, no doubt, exists ; but is never, that we can perceive, the object of contrivance. Teeth are contrived to eat, not to ache ; their aching now and then is incidental to the contrivance, perhaps inseparable from it, or even, a defect in the contrivance, but it is not the *object* of it. This is a distinction which well deserves to be attended to. In describing implements of husbandry, you would hardly say of the sickle, that it is made to cut the reapers' fingers, though from the construction of the instrument, and the manner of using it, this mischief often happens. But if you had occasion to describe instruments of torture or execu-

tion, this engine, you would say, is to extend the sinews; this to dislocate the joints; this to break the bones; this to scorch the soles of the feet. Here pain and misery are the very *objects* of the contrivance. Now, nothing of this sort is to be found in the works of nature. We never discover a train of contrivance to bring about an evil purpose. No anatomist ever discovered a system of organization calculated to produce pain and disease; or in explaining the parts of the human body, ever said, this is to irritate; this to inflame; this duct is to convey the gravel to the kidneys: this gland to secrete the humour that forms the gout. Since God then has called forth his consummate wisdom to contrive and provide for our happiness, and the world appears to have been constituted with this design at first, so long as this constitution is upholden by him, we must in reason suppose the same design to continue.

The contemplation of universal nature, rather bewilders the mind than affects it. There is always a bright spot in the prospect upon which the eye rests; a single example, perhaps, by which each man finds himself more convinced than by all others put together; and the example which strikes every man most strongly is the ex-

ample for him: and hardly two minds hit upon the same, which shews the abundance of such examples about us. We conclude therefore, that God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures.

Drunkenness.

The consequences of a vice, like the symptoms of a disease, though they be all enumerated in the description, seldom meet in the same subject. The age and temperature of one drunkard may have little to fear from inflammation of lust or anger; the fortune of a second may not be injured by the expence; a third may have no family to be disquieted by his irregularities; a fourth may possess a constitution fortified against the poison of strong liquors. But if, as we always ought to do, we comprehend within the consequences of our *conduct* the mischief and tendency of the *example*, the above circumstances, however fortunate for the individual, will be found to vary the guilt of his intemperance less, probably, than he supposes. The moralist may expostulate with him thus: "although the waste of time and money be of small importance to you, it may be of the utmost to some one or

other, whom your society corrupts. Repeated or long-continued excesses which do not hurt *your* health, may be fatal to your companion. Although you have neither wife, nor child, nor parent, to lament your absence from home, or expect your return to it with terror; other families in which fathers and husbands have been invited to share in your inebriety, or encouraged to imitate it, may justly lay their misery or ruin at your door.

Domestics, Treatment of.

A party of friends setting out together upon a journey, soon find it to be the best, for all sides, that while they are upon the road, one of the company should wait upon the rest; another ride forward to seek out lodging and entertainment; a third carry the portmanteau; a fourth take charge of the horses; a fifth bear the purse, conduct and direct the route; not forgetting, however, that as they were equal and independent when they set out, so they are all to return to a level again at their journey's end. The same regard and respect; the same forbearance, lenity, and reserve in using their service; the same mildness in delivering commands; the same study

to make their journey comfortable and pleasant, which he, whose lot it was to direct the rest, would in common decency think himself bound to observe towards them, ought we to shew to those, who in the casting of the parts of human society, happen to be placed within our power, or to depend upon us.

Whatever uneasiness we occasion to our domestics, which neither promotes our service, nor answers the just ends of punishment, is manifestly wrong, were it only upon the general principle of diminishing the sum of human happiness. By which rule we are forbidden, 1. To enjoin unnecessary labour, or confinement, from the mere love and wantonness of domination. 2. To insult our servants, by harsh, scornful, or opprobrious language. 3. To refuse them any harmless pleasures.

Education not complete without Religion.

It is not only fair and right, but it is absolutely necessary to give to religion all the advantage we can give it by dint of education : for all that can be done is too little to set religion upon an equality with its *rival* ; which rival is the *world*. A creature which is to pass a small portion of its

existence in one state, and that state to be preparatory to another, ought no doubt, to have its attention constantly fixed upon its ulterior and permanent destination. And this would be so, if the question between them came fairly before the mind. We should listen to the Scriptures, we should embrace religion, we should enter into every thing which had relation to the subject, with a concern and impresssion, even far more than the pursuits of this world, eager and ardent as they are, excite.

But the question between religion and the world does not come fairly before us. What surrounds us is this world; what addresses our senses and our passions is this world: what is at hand, what is in contact with us, what acts upon us, what we act upon, is this world.

Reason, faith, and hope, are the only principles to which religion applies, or possibly can apply: and it is reason, faith, and hope, striving with sense, striving with temptation, striving for things absent against things which are present. That religion, therefore, may not be quite excluded and overborne, may not quite sink under these powerful causes, every support ought to be given to it, which can be given by education, by instruction, and, above all, by the

example of those, to whom young persons look up, acting with a view to a future life themselves.

Evidences of Christianity.

The truth of Christianity depends upon its leading facts, and upon them alone. Now of these we have evidence which ought to satisfy us. We have some uncontested and incontestable points to which the history of the human species hath nothing similar to offer. A Jewish peasant changed the religion of the world, and that without force, without power, without support: without one natural source or circumstance of attraction, influence, or success. The companions of this person, after he himself had been put to death for his attempt, asserted his supernatural character, founded upon his supernatural operations, and in testimony of these assertions, they suffered persecution and death. A very few days after this person had been publicly executed, and in the very city in which he was buried, these his companions declare, with one voice, that his body was restored to life; in this fact they persisted, in the face of those who had killed him, and who were armed with the whole power of the country. As to these facts, the

Christian story hath never varied; nor has any other ever been set up in its room. All sects in all ages have *concurred* in representing these fact in this manner.

These propositions prove the existence of the transaction. The particulars we have from the persons themselves, and their companions, in *four* books, the authenticity of which is established by stronger proofs, than belong to almost any other ancient book. They also bear strong *internal* evidence of their truth, inasmuch as the writers understood the history, and usages of the times to which they refer. In comparing them with one another, we find them varying, so as to repel suspicion of *confederacy*; and so agreeing under this variety, as to shew they had one real transaction for their common foundation.

The four narratives are confined to the history of the founder, and end with *his* ministry. The story is carried on by a person connected with the business, and the substance is *confirmed* by a number of *original letters*, written by a person who is the principal subject of the history. The event, as might be expected, was *noticed* in the prophetic writings of the Jews; had the consequences been more distinctly revealed, it would

have cooled their ardour for an institution, which was eventually to give place to one more perfect.

The great importance of revelation is to be estimated the doctrine of a *resurrection* from the dead; the other articles of the Christian faith are but adjuncts to this; its *morality* is wise and pure, neither adapted to vulgar prejudices, nor flattering popular notions, nor excusing established practices, but calculated to promote human happiness. The Deity to *fix* the institution, vouchsafed a miraculous attestation; he then committed its future progress to the natural means of human communication. In this, Christianity is analogous to most other provisions for human happiness. The provision is made, and left to act according to the laws of a more general system.

Let the constant recurrence to our observation of contrivance, design, and wisdom in the works of nature, fix upon our minds the belief of a God, and all is easy. A future state rectifies every thing: since, however, a future state, and the revelation of a future state, are not only perfectly consistent with the attributes of God, but also remove many difficulties, since there is such a strong body of historical evidence that such a revelation has been communicated, we

may set our minds at rest with the assurance, that in the resources of *creative* wisdom, expedients cannot be wanted to carry into effect what the Deity hath proposed. This hypothesis solves all that objection to the divine care and goodness which the promiscuous distribution of good and evil is apt to create. I do not mean in the doubtful advantages of riches and grandeur, but in the unquestionably important distinctions of health and sickness, strength and infirmity, bodily ease and pain, mental alacrity and depression. This one truth changes the nature of things, gives order to confusion, and makes the moral world of a piece with the natural.

Fitness of Things.

The fitness of things, means their fitness to produce happiness : the nature of things, means that actual constitution of the world, by which some things, as such and such actions for example, produce happiness, and others misery : reason is the principle by which we discover or judge of this constitution ; truth is this judgment expressed or drawn out into propositions. So that it necessarily comes to pass, that what promotes the public happiness, or happiness upon

the whole, is agreeable to the fitness of things, to nature, to reason, and to truth ; and such is the divine character, that what promotes the general happiness is required by the will of God ; and what has all the above properties, must needs be right ; for right means no more than conformity to the rule we go by, whatever that rule be. Because moral *obligation* depends upon the will of God, *right* which is correlative to it, must depend upon the same. *Right* therefore signifies *consistency with the will of God*. By virtue of the two principles that God wills the happiness of his creatures, and that the will of God is the measure of right and wrong, we arrive at certain conclusions ; which conclusions become rules ; and we soon learn to pronounce actions right and wrong, according as they agree or disagree with our rules, without looking any farther ; and when the habit is once established of stopping at the rules, we can go back and compare with these rules, even the divine conduct itself, and yet it may be true (only not observed by us at the time) that the rules themselves are deduced from the divine will.

Frauds and Injuries.

Of those which are effected without force, the

most noxious kinds are forgeries, counterfeiting or diminishing of the coin, and the stealing of letters in the course of their conveyance ; inas-much as these practices tend to deprive the public of accomodations, which not only improve the conveniences of social life, but are essential to the prosperity, and even the existence, of commerce. Of these crimes it may be said, that although they seem to affect property alone, the mischief of their operations does not terminate there. For let it be supposed, that the remissness or lenity of the laws, should, in any country, suffer offences of this sort to grow into such a frequency, as to render the use of money, the circulation of bills, or the public conveyance of letters no longer safe or practicable ; what would follow, but that every species of trade and of activity must decline under these discouragements ; the sources of subsistence fail, by which the inhabitants of the country are supported ; the country itself where the intercourse of civil life was so endangered and defective, [be deserted : and that, beside the distress and poverty which the loss of employment would produce to the industrious and valuable part of the existing community, a rapid depopulation must take place, each generation becoming less nu-

merous than the last; till solitude and barrenness overspread the land; until a desolation similar to what obtains in many countries of Asia, which were once the most civilized and frequented parts of the world, succeed in the place of crowded cities, of cultivated fields, of happy and well peopled regions? When we carry forwards therefore our views to the more distant, but not less certain consequences of these crimes, we perceive, that though no living creature be destroyed by them, yet human life is diminished; that an offence, the particular consequence of which deprives only an individual of a small portion of his property, and which even in its general tendency seems to do nothing more than obstruct the enjoyment of certain public conveniences, may nevertheless, by its ultimate effects, conclude in the laying waste of human existence. This observation will enable those who regard the divine rule "of life for life, and blood for blood," as the only authorized and justifiable measure of capital punishment, to perceive with respect to the effects and quality of the actions, a greater resemblance than they suppose to exist between certain atrocious frauds, and those crimes which attack personal safety.

*Gifts and Graces ; upon their unsearchable
Nature.*

Unsearchable, does not mean arbitrary. Our necessary ignorance of the motives which rest and dwell in the divine mind in the bestowing of his grace, is no proof that it is not bestowed by the justest reason. And with regard to the gifts and graces of the Spirit, the charge against it of its being an arbitrary system, or, in other words, independent of our own endeavours, is not founded in any doctrine or declaration of scripture. It is not arbitrary in its origin, in its degree, or in its final success.

First it is not arbitrary in its origin : for you read that is given to prayer. “If ye, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask it.” But whether we will ask it or not, depends upon ourselves. It is proposed, you find, as a subject for our prayers ; for prayer, not formal, cold, heartless, transitory, but prayer from the soul ; prayer, earnest and persevering ; for this last alone is what the scripture means by prayer. In this, therefore, it cannot be said to be arbitrary, or independent of our endeavours. On the con-

trary, the scripture exhorts us to a striving in prayer for this best of all gifts.

But it will be asked, is not the very first touch of true religion upon the soul, sometimes at least, itself the action of the Holy Spirit? This therefore, must be prior to our praying for it. And so it may be, and yet not arbitrarily given. The religious state of the human soul is exceedingly various. Amongst others, there is a state in which there may be good latent dispositions, suitable faculties for religion, and yet no religion. In such a state the spark alone is wanting. To such a state, the elementary principle of religion may be communicated, *though not prayed for*. Nor can this be said to be arbitrary. The Spirit of God is given where it is wanted; where, when given, it would produce its effect; but that state of heart and mind upon which the effect was to be produced, might still be the result of moral qualification, improvement, and voluntary endeavour. It is not, I think, difficult to conceive such a case as this.

It is not true that the doctrine of an influencing spirit is an arbitrary system, setting aside our own endeavours. Nor, on the other hand, is it true, that the connecting it with our own endeavours, as obtained through them, as as-

sisting them, as co-operating with them, renders the doctrine unimportant, or all one as putting the whole upon our endeavours without any such doctrine. If it be true, in fact, that the feebleness of our nature requires the succouring influence of God's Spirit in carrying on the grand business of salvation; and in every state and stage of its progress, in conversion, in regeneration, in constancy, in perseverance, in sanctification; it is of the utmost importance that this truth be declared, and understood, and confessed, and felt; because the perception and sincere acknowledgment of it will be accompanied by a train of sentiments, by a turn of thought, by a degree and species of devotion, by humility, by prayer, by piety, by a recourse to God in our religious warfare, different from what will, or perhaps can, be found in a mind unacquainted with this doctrine, or in a mind rejecting it, or in a mind unconcerned about these things one way or the other.

Again; a person who knows or believes himself to be beholden to another for the progress and success of an undertaking, though still carried on by his own endeavours, acknowledges his friend and benefactor; feels his dependency and obligation; turns to him for help and aid in his dif-

faculties; is humble under the want and need which he finds he has of assistance; and above all things, is solicitous not to lose the benefit of that assistance. This is a different turn of mind, and different way of thinking from his who is sensible of no such want, who relies entirely upon his own strength; who of course can hardly avoid being proud of his success, or feeling the confidence, the presumption, the self-commendation, and the pretension, which, however they might suit with a being who achieves his work by his own powers, by no means, and in no wise, suit with a frail constitution, which must ask and obtain the friendly aid and help of a kind and gracious benefactor, before he can proceed in the business set out for him, and which it is of unspeakable consequence to him to execute some how or other.

Goodness of the Creator.

One great cause of our insensibility to the goodness of the Creator, is the very *extensiveness* of his bounty. We prize but little what we share only in common with the rest, or with the generality of the species. When we hear of blessings, we think forthwith of successes, of pros-

perous fortunes, of honours, riches, preferments, i. e. of those advantages and superiorities over others, which we happen either to possess, or to be in pursuit of, or to covet. The common benefits of our nature entirely escape us. Yet these are the great things. These constitute what most properly ought to be accounted blessings of Providence ; what alone, if we might so speak, are worthy of its care. Nightly rest and daily bread, the ordinary use of our limbs and senses and understandings, are gifts which admit of no comparison with any other. Yet because almost every man we meet possesses these, we leave them out of the enumeration. They raise no sentiment, they move no gratitude. Now herein is our judgment perverted by our selfishness. A blessing ought in truth to be the more satisfactory, the bounty at least of the donor is rendered more conspicuous by its very diffusion, its commonness, its cheapness ; by its falling to the lot, and forming the happiness of the great bulk and body of our species, as well as ourselves. Nay, even where we do not possess it, it ought to be matter of thankfulness that others do. But we have a different way of thinking. We court distinction. That is not the worst : we see nothing but what has distinction

to recommend it. This necessarily contracts our views of the Creator's beneficence within a narrow compass ; and most unjustly. It is in those things which are so common as to be of no distinction, that the amplitude of the Divine benignity is perceived.

Gospels ; Differences in their Accounts.

A story should not be rejected by reason of some *diversity* of circumstances with which it is related ; for the character of human testimony is substantial truth under circumstantial variety ; but a close agreement induces suspicion of confederacy and fraud. Important variations, and even *contradictions*, are not always deemed sufficient to shake the credibility of the fact. The embassy of the Jews to Claudian, Phiso places in *harvest*, Josephus in *seed-time*. Lord Clarendon states, that the Marquis of Argyle was condemned to be *hanged*, which was performed on the *same day*. Four other historians say, that he was *beheaded* upon the *Monday*, having been condemned on the *Saturday*. This contradiction never led a person to doubt whether the Marquis was executed or not. Dr. Middleton thought the different hours of the day assigned

to the crucifixion by John, and the other evangelists, did not admit of reconciliation. But this does not injure the history of the principal fact.

A great deal of the discrepancy arises from omission, which is always an uncertain ground of objection. Suetonius, Tacitus and Dio Cassius, have all written of the reign of Tiberius, and each has omitted many things mentioned by the rest. These discrepancies will be more numerous when men do not write histories, but *memoirs*, which, perhaps, is the true name of the gospels; (i. e.) when they do *not* undertake to deliver, in the order of time, a regular account of *all* things of importance, which the subject of the history did and said, but only such passages as were suggested by their *particular design*, at the time of writing.

Government; its Forms, Advantages, and Defects.

Political writers enumerate three principal forms of government, which, however, are to be regarded rather as the simple forms, by some combination and intermixture of which all actual governments are composed, than as any

where existing in a pure and elementary state. These forms are,

1. Despotism, or absolute *monarchy*, where the legislature is in a single person.

2. An *aristocracy*, where the legislature is in a select assembly, the members of which either fill up by election the vacancies in their own body, or succeed to their places in it by inheritance, property, tenure of certain lands, or in respect of personal right, or qualification.

3. A *republic*, or democracy, where the people at large, either collectively or by representation, constitute the legislature.

The separate advantages of *monarchy* are unity of counsel, activity, decision, secrecy, dispatch; the mischiefs, or rather the dangers of *monarchy*, are tyranny, expence, exaction, military domination.

The separate advantage of an *aristocracy* consists in the wisdom which may be expected from experience and education—a permanent council naturally possessing experience.

The mischiefs of an *aristocracy* are, dissensions in the ruling orders of the state, which, from the want of a common superior, are liable to proceed to the most desperate extremities; oppression of the lower orders by the privileges

of the higher, and by laws partial to the separate interests of the law-makers.

The advantages of a *republic* are, liberty, or exemption from needless restrictions; equal laws; regulations adapted to the wants and circumstances of the people; public spirit, frugality, averseness to war; the opportunities which democratic assemblies afford to men of every description, of producing their abilities and councils to public observation, and the exciting thereby, and calling forth to the service of the commonwealth the faculties of its best citizens.

The evils of a *republic* are, dissension, tumults, faction.

A *mixed* government is composed by the combination of two or more of the simple forms of government above described—and, in whatever proportion each form enters into the constitution of a government, in the same proportion may both the advantages and evils, which we have attributed to that form be expected.

Habit.

Habit produces more actions than reflection. It is only on few and great occasions that men deliberate at all; on fewer still that they insti-

tute any thing like a regular inquiry into the moral rectitude or depravity of what they are about to do, or wait for the result of it. We are for the most part determined at once; and by an impulse which is the effect and energy of pre-established habits. And this constitution seems well adapted to the exigencies of human life, and to the imbecility of our moral principle. In the current occasions and rapid opportunities of life, there is sometimes little leisure for reflection; and were there more, a man who has to reason about his duty when the temptation to transgress it is upon him, is almost sure to reason himself into an error.

Happiness ; Political.

The final view of all rational politics is to produce the greatest quantity of happiness in a given tract of country. The riches, strength and glory of nations; the topics which history celebrates, and which alone almost engage the praises, and possess the admiration of mankind, have no value farther than as they contribute to this end. When they interfere with it, they are evils, and not the less real for the splendour that surrounds them.

Secondly, although we speak of communities as of sentient beings: although we ascribe to them happiness and misery, desires, interests, and passions, nothing really exists or feels but *individuals*. The happiness of a people is made up of the happiness of single persons; and the quantity of happiness can only be augmented by increasing the number of the percipients, or the pleasure of their perceptions.

Thirdly, notwithstanding that diversity of condition, especially different degrees of plenty, freedom, and security, greatly vary the quantity of happiness enjoyed by the same number of individuals; and notwithstanding that extreme cases may be found, of human beings so galled by the rigours of slavery, that the increase of numbers is only the amplification of misery; yet, within certain limits, and within those limits to which civil life is diversified under the temperate governments that obtain in Europe, it may be affirmed, I think, with certainty, that the quantity of happiness produced in any given district, *so far* depends upon the number of inhabitants, that, in comparing adjoining periods in the same country, the collective happiness will be nearly in the exact proportion of the numbers, that is, twice the number of inhabit-

ants will produce double the quantity of happiness; in distant periods, and different countries, under great changes or great dissimilitude of civil condition, although the proportion of enjoyment may fall much short of that of the numbers, yet still any considerable excess of numbers will usually carry with it a preponderation of happiness; that, at least, it may, and ought to be assumed in all political deliberations, that a larger portion of happiness is enjoyed amongst *ten* persons, possessing the means of healthy subsistence, than can be produced by *five* persons, under every advantage of power, affluence, and luxury.

From these principles it follows, that the quantity of happiness in a given district, although it is possible it may be increased, the number of inhabitants remaining the same, is chiefly and most naturally affected by alteration of the numbers: that, consequently, the decay of population is the greatest evil that a state can suffer; and the improvement of it the object which ought, in all countries, to be aimed at, in preference to every other political purpose whatsoever.

Health.

Health is the one thing needful. Therefore no pains, expence, self-denial, or restraint, to which we subject ourselves for the sake of health is too much. Whether it requires us to relinquish lucrative situations, to abstain from favourite indulgencies, to controul intemperate passions, or undergo tedious regimens; whatever difficulties it lays us under, a man who pursues his happiness rationally, and resolutely will be content to submit to. When we are in perfect health and spirits we feel in ourselves a happiness independent of any particular outward gratification whatever, and of which we can give no account. This is an enjoyment which the Deity has annexed to life, and probably constitutes, in a great measure, the happiness of infants and brutes, especially of the lower and sedentary orders of animals.

Honour; the Law of, and the Law of the Land inadequate without Religion.

Never ought we to yield the authority of religion to the law of honour, a law, (if it deserve that name,) which beside its continual mutabi-

lity, is at best but a system of manners suited to the intercourse and accomodation of higher life ; and which consequently neglects every duty, and permits every vice, that has no relation to these purposes. Amongst the rules which contend with religion for the government of life, the law of the land also, has not a few, who think it very sufficient to act up to its direction, and to keep within the limits which it prescribes : and this sort of character is common. We must therefore apprise those who make the statutes of the realm the standard of their duty, that they propose to themselves a measure of conduct totally inadequate to the purpose. The boundaries which nature has assigned to human authority and controul, the partial ends to which every legislator is obliged to confine his views, prevent human laws, even were they, what they never are, as perfect as they might be made, from becoming competent rules of life to any one who advances his hopes to the attainment of God Almighty's favour. In contradiction, then, to these several systems which divide a great portion of mankind amongst them, we preach "faith which worketh by love," that principle of action and restraint which is found in a Christian alone. It possesses qualities to which

none of *them* can make pretensions. It operates where they fail : is present upon all occasions, firm upon the greatest ; pure as under the inspection of a vigilant omniscience ; innocent where guilt could not be discovered ; just, exact, and upright, without a witness to its proceedings ; uniform amidst the caprices of fashion, unchanged by the vicissitudes of popular opinion ; often applauded, not seldom misunderstood, it holds on its straight and equal course, through “good report and evil report,” through encouragement and neglect, approbation and disgrace. If the philosopher or the politician can point out to us any influence, but that of Christianity, which has these properties, I had almost said, which does not want them all, we will listen with reverence to his instruction. But until this be done, we may be permitted to resist every plan which would place virtue upon any other foundation, or seek final happiness through any other medium, than faith in Jesus Christ.

Human Happiness.

The art in which the secret of human happiness in a great measure consists, is to set the

habits in such a manner, that every change may be a change for the better. The habits themselves are much the same ; for whatever is made habitual becomes smooth and easy, and nearly indifferent. The return to an old habit is likewise easy, whatever the habit may be. Therefore the advantage is with those habits which allow of indulgence in the deviation from them. The luxurious receive no greater pleasure from their dainties than the peasant does from his bread and cheese ; but the peasant whenever he goes abroad, finds a feast, whereas the epicure must be well entertained to escape disgust. Those who spend every day at cards, and those who go every day to plough, pass their time much alike ; intent upon what they are about, wanting nothing, regretting nothing, they are both for the time in a state of ease ; but then whatever suspends the occupation of the card-player, distresses him ; whereas, to the labourer, every interruption is a refreshment ; and this appears in the different effect that Sunday produces upon the two ; which proves a day of recreation to the one ; but a lamentable burden to the other. Again, the man who has learned to live alone, feels his spirits enlivened whenever he enters into company, and takes his leave

without regret ; another, who has long been accustomed to a crowd, or continual succession of company, experiences in company no elevation of spirits, nor any greater satisfaction than what the man of a retired life finds in his chimney corner. So far their conditions are equal : but let a change of place, fortune, or situation, separate the companion from his circle, his visitors, his club, common-room or coffee-house, and the difference and advantage in the choice and constitution of the two habits will shew itself : solitude comes to the one, clothed with melancholy ; to the other it brings liberty and quiet. You will see the one fretful and restless, at a loss how to dispose of his time, till the hour come round that he can forget himself in bed : the other, easy and satisfied, taking up his book or his pipe as soon as he finds himself alone ; ready to admit any little amusement that casts up, or to turn his hands and attention to the first business that presented itself.

Without entering into a detail of Scripture morality, the following general positions may be advanced, I think, with safety :

I. That a state of happiness is not to be expected by those that are conscious of no moral or religious rule—I mean those who cannot with

truth say, that they have been prompted to one action or withheld from one gratification by any regard to virtue or religion, either immediate or habitual.

II. That a state of happiness is not to be expected by those who reserve to themselves the habitual practice of any one sin, or neglect of one known duty.

Humility.

The next duty, or rather disposition, which flows from the doctrine of spiritual influence, is *humility*. There never was a truer saying, than "that pride is the adversary of religion, lowliness and humility the tempers for it." Now religious humility consists in the habit of referring every thing to God. From one end of the New Testament to the other, God is set forth and magnified in his agency and operations. In the greatest of all business, the business of salvation, he is operating, and we co-operating with him. "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling;" and why? "for it is God that worketh in us to will and to do according to his good pleasure." He is not superseding our endeavours (the very contrary is implied by commending us to exert

them) ; but still, nothing is done without him. If we have moral strength, we are strong in the inward might of the Holy Ghost ; consequently, all boasting, all vanity, all self-sufficiency, all despising of others on the score of moral and religious inferiority are excluded. Without the grace of God we might have been as the worst of them. There is in the nature of things, one train of sentiment belonging to him who has achieved a work by his own might, and power, and prowess ; and another to him who had been fain to beg for succour and assistance, and by that assistance alone has been carried through difficulties which were too great for his own strength and faculties. This last is the true sentiment for us. It is not for a man, whose life has been saved in a shipwreck by the compassionate help of others, it is not for a man so saved to boast of his own alertness and vigour, though it be true that, unless he had exerted what power and strength he was possessed of, he would not have been saved at all.

Humble stations ; their advantages.

It is an inestimable blessing of such situations, that they supply a constant train of em-

ployment, both to body and mind. A husbandman, or a manufacturer, or a tradesman, never goes to bed at night without having his business to rise up to in a morning. He would understand the value of this advantage, did he know that the want of it composes one of the greatest plagues of the human soul; a plague by which the rich, especially those who inherit riches, are exceedingly oppressed. Indeed it is to get rid of it, that is to say, it is to have something to do, that they are driven upon those strange and unaccountable ways of passing their time, in which we sometimes see them, to our surprise, engaged. A poor man's condition supplies him with that which no man can do without, and which a rich man, with all his opportunities and all his contrivances, can hardly supply himself, regular engagements, business to look forward to, something to be done for every day, some employment prepared for every morning. A few of better judgment can seek out for themselves constant and useful occupation; there is not one of you takes the pains in his calling, which some of the most independent men in the nation have taken, and are taking to promote what they deem to be a point of great concern to the interests of humanity, by which neither they

nor their's can ever gain a shilling, and in which, should they succeed, those who are to be benefited by their service will neither know nor thank them for it. I only mention this to shew, in conjunction with what has been observed above, that, of those who are at liberty to act as they please, the wise prove, and the foolish confess, by their conduct, that a life of employment is the only life worth leading; and that the chief difference between their manner of passing their time and your's is, that they choose the objects of their activity, which you cannot. This privilege may be an advantage to some, but, for nine out of ten it is fortunate that occupation is provided to their hands, that they have it not to seek, that it is imposed upon them by their necessities and occasions; for the consequence of liberty in this respect would be, that lost in the perplexity of choosing, they would sink into irrecoverable indolence, inaction, and unconcern; into that vacancy and tiresomeness of time and thought, which are inseparable from such a situation.—A man's thoughts must be going: whilst he is awake, the workings of his mind is as constant as the beating of his pulse. He can no more stop the one than the other. Hence if our thoughts have nothing to act upon they

act upon ourselves. They acquire a corrosive quality. They become in the last degree irksome and tormenting. Wherefore that sort of equitable engagement, which takes up the thoughts sufficiently, yet so as to leave them incapable of turning to any thing more important, as occasions offer or require, is a most invaluable blessing. And, if the industrious be not sensible of the blessing, it is for no other reason, than because they have never experienced, or rather suffered the want of it.

Again, some of the necessities which poverty (if the condition of the working part of mankind, must be so called) imposes, are not hardships but pleasures. Frugality itself is a pleasure. It is an exercise of attention and contrivance, which, whenever it is successful, produces satisfaction. The very care and forecast that are necessary to keep expenses and earnings upon a level, form, when not embarrassed by too great difficulties, an agreeable engagement of the thoughts. This is lost amidst abundance. There is no pleasure in taking out of a large unmeasured fund. They who do that, and only that, are the mere conveyers of money from one hand to another. A yet more serious advantage which persons in inferior stations possess, is the

ease with which they provide for their children. All the provision a poor man's child requires, is contained in two words, "industry and innocence." With these qualities, though without a shilling to set him forwards, he goes into the world prepared to become an useful, virtuous, and happy man. Nor will he fail to meet with a maintenance adequate to the habits in which he has been brought up, and to the expectations which he has formed; a degree of success sufficient for a person of any condition whatever. These qualities of industry and innocence, which, I repeat again, are all that are absolutely necessary, every parent can give to his children without expense, because he can give them by his own authority and example; and they are to be communicated, I believe, and preserved in no other way. I call this a serious advantage of humble stations, because, in what we reckon superior ranks of life, there is a real difficulty in placing children in situations which may in any degree support them in the class and in the habits in which they have been brought up with their parents: from which great and oftentimes distressing perplexity the poor are free. With health of body, innocency of mind, and habits of industry, a poor man's child has nothing

to be afraid of; nor his father or mother any thing to be afraid of for him.

What then (for this is the fair way of calculating) is there in higher stations to place against these advantages? What does the poor man see in the life or condition of the rich that should render him dissatisfied with his own.

Imitation ; its power in producing Moral Sentiments.

Amongst the causes assigned for the continuance and diffusion of the same moral sentiments amongst mankind, we may mention imitation. The efficacy of this principle is most observable in children; indeed, if there be any thing in them, which deserves the name of an instinct, it is their propensity to imitation. Now there is nothing which children imitate or apply more readily than expressions of affection and aversion, of approbation, hatred, resentment, and the like; and when these passions and expressions are once connected, which they soon will be by the same association which unites words with their ideas, the passion will follow the expression, and attach upon the object to which the child has been accustomed to apply the epithet. In a word,

when almost every thing else is learned by imitation, can we wonder to find the same cause concerned in the generation of our moral sentiments.

Indiscriminate Praise.

Indiscriminate praise is the opposite of slander, but it is the opposite extreme; and, however it may affect to be thought excess of candour, is commonly the effusion of a frivolous understanding, or proceeds from a settled contempt of all moral distinctions.

Indifference in Religion; its danger.

Decency, order, regularity, industry, application to our calling, are all good things; but then they are accompanied with this great danger, viz. that they may subsist without any religious influence whatever: and that, when they do so, their tendency is to settle and confirm men in religious insensibility. For finding things go on very smoothly, finding themselves received and respected without any religious principle, they are kept asleep as to their spiritual concerns, by the very quietness and prosperity of things round them. “There is a way that seemeth

right unto a man, but the end thereof are the ways of death." It is possible to slumber in a fancied security, or rather in an unconsciousness of danger, a blindness to our true situation, a thoughtlessness or stupefaction concerning it, even at the very time when we are in the utmost peril of salvation; when we are descending fast towards a state of perdition. It is not the judgment of an erroneous conscience: that is not the case I mean. It is rather a want of conscience, or a conscience which is never exerted; in a word, it is an indifference and insensibility towards religion, even in the midst of seeming and external decency of behaviour, and soothed and lulled by this very circumstance. Now it is not only within the compass of possibility, but it frequently, nay, I hope very frequently comes to pass, that open, confessed, acknowledged sins, sting the sinner's conscience: that the upbraidings of mankind, the cry, the clamour, the indignation which his wickedness has excited, may at length come home to his own soul; may compel him to reflect, may bring him, though by force and violence, to a sense of his guilt, and a knowledge of his situation. Now, I say, that this sense of sin, by whatever cause it be produced, is better than religious insensibility.

The sinners penitence is more to be trusted to, than the seemingly righteous man's security.— The one is roused ; is roused from the deep forgetfulness of religion in which he had hitherto lived. Good fruit, even fruit unto life everlasting, may spring from the motion which is stirred in his heart. The other remains, as to religion, in a state of torpor. The thing wanted is the quickening principle, as the seed and germ of religion in the heart, is compunction, conviction of sin, of danger, of the necessity of flying to the Redeemer, and to his religion in good earnest.

But how, it will be said, is this ? Is it not to encourage sin ? I answer, it is to encourage the sinner who repents ; and if the sinner repent, why should he not be encouraged ? But some, you say, will take occasion from this encouragement to plunge into sin. I answer, that then they wilfully misapply it : for if they enter upon sin, intending to repent afterwards, I take upon me to tell them, that no true repentance can come of such intention. The very intention is a fraud : instead of being the parent of true repentance, is itself to be repented of bitterly. The moment a plan is formed of sinning, with an intention afterwards to repent,

at that moment the whole doctrine of grace, of repentance, and, of course, this part of it among the rest, is wilfully misconstrued. The grace of God is turned into lasciviousness. At the time this design is formed, the person forming it is in the bond of iniquity, as St. Peter told Simon he was; in a state of imminent perdition. We say, that repentance is sometimes more likely to be brought about in a confessed, nay, in a notorious and convicted sinner, than in a seemingly regular life: but it is of true repentance that we speak, and no true repentance can proceed from a previous intention to repent, I mean an intention previous to the sin. Therefore no advantage can be taken of this doctrine to the encouragement of sin, without wilfully misconstruing it.

The Influence of Religion.

The influence of religion is not to be sought for in the councils of princes, in the debates or resolutions of popular assemblies, in the conduct of governments towards their subjects, or of states and sovereigns towards one another, or of conquerors at the head of their armies, or of parties intriguing for power at home (topics which

alone almost occupy the attention and fill the pages of history) ; but must be perceived, if perceived at all, in the silent course of private and domestic life. Nay more, even *there* its influence may not be very obvious to observation. If it check, in some degree, personal dissoluteness, if it beget a general probity in the transaction of business, if it produce soft and humane manners in the mass of the community, and occasional exertions of laborious or expensive benevolence in a few individuals, it is all the effect which can offer itself to external notice. The kingdom of heaven is within us. That which is the substance of religion, its hopes and consolations, its intermixture with the thoughts by day and by night, the devotion of the heart, the controul of appetite, the steady direction of the will to the commands of God, are necessarily invisible. Yet upon these depend the virtue and the happiness of millions. This cause renders the representations of history, with respect to religion, defective and fallacious, in a greater degree than they are upon any other subject.— Religion operates most upon those of whom history know the least ; upon fathers and mothers of families, upon men-servants and maid-servants, upon the orderly tradesman, the quiet

villager, the manufacturer at his loom, the husbandman in his fields. Amongst such, its influence collectively may be of inestimable value, yet its effects, in the mean time, little upon those who figure upon the stage of the world. *They* may know nothing of it; they may believe nothing of it; they may be actuated by motives more impetuous than those which religion is able to excite. It cannot, therefore, be thought strange, that this influence should elude the grasp and touch of public history: for, what is public history, but a register of the successes and disappointments, the vices, the follies, and the quarrels of those who engage in contentions for power?

I will add, that much of this influence may be felt in times of public distress, and little of it in times of public wealth and security. This also increases the uncertainty of any opinions that we draw from historical representation. The influence of Christianity is commensurate with no effects which history states. We do not pretend that it has any such necessary and irresistible power over the affairs of nations, as to surmount the force of other causes.

The Christian religion also acts upon public usages and institutions, by an operation which

is only secondary and indirect. Christianity is not a code of civil law. It can only reach private actions, public institutions repugnant to its principles, may remain. To get rid of these, the reigning part of the community must act, and act together. But it may be long before the persons who compose this body, be sufficiently touched with the Christian character, to join in the suppression of practices, to which they and the public have been reconciled by causes which will reconcile the human mind to any thing, by habit and interest. Nevertheless, the effects of Christianity, even in this view, have been important. It has mitigated the conduct of war, and the treatment of captives; it has softened the administration of despotic or of nominally despotic governments; it has abolished polygamy; it has restrained the licentiousness of divorces; it has put an end to the exposure of children, and the immolation of slaves; it has suppressed the combats of gladiators, and the impurity of religious rites; it has banished, if not unnatural vices, at least the toleration of them; it has greatly meliorated the condition of the laborious part, that is to say, of the mass of every community, by procuring for them a day of weekly rest. In

all countries, in which it is professed, it has produced numerous establishments for the relief of sickness and poverty; and, in some, a regular and general provision by law.

But the argument to which I recur, is, that the benefit of religion being felt chiefly in the obscurity of private stations, necessarily escapes the observation of history. From the first general notification of Christianity to the present day, there have been in every age many millions, whose names were never heard of, made better by it, not only in their conduct but in their disposition; and happier, not so much in their external circumstances, as in that which is *interpræcordia*, in that which alone deserves the name of happiness, the tranquillity and consolation of their thoughts. It has been, since its commencement, the author of happiness and virtue to millions and millions of the human race. Who is there that would not wish his son to be a Christian!

Innocence ; worth of.

I observe, concerning licentious practices, that it is most practicable to be entirely innocent; that it is a more easy thing to withstand

them altogether, than it is to set bounds to their indulgence. This is a point not sufficiently understood ; though true, it is not believed. Men know not what they are doing when they enter upon vicious courses ; what a struggle, what a contest, what misery, what torment are they preparing for themselves. I trust that there is hardly a man or woman living who enters into a course of sin with the design of remaining in it to the end ; who can brave the punishment of hell ; who intends to die in that state of pure perdition, to which a course of unrepented sin must bring on her. No, that is not the plan even of the worst, much less of the generality of mankind. Their plan is to allow themselves to a certain length, and there stop ; for a certain time, and then reform ; in such and such opportunities and temptations, but in no more. Now, to such persons, and to such plans, I say this, that it would not have cost them one-tenth of the mortification, pain, and self-denial, to have kept themselves at a distance from sin, that it must and will cost them to break it off : adding the further consideration, that, so long as men preserve their innocence, the consciousness of doing what is right is both the strongest possible support of their resolution, and the most constant

source of satisfaction to their thoughts: but that when men once begin to give way to vicious indulgencies, another state of things takes place in their breasts. Disturbance at the heart, struggles and defeats, resolutions and relapses, self-reproach and self-condemnation, drive out all quietness and tranquillity of conscience. Peace within us is at an end. All is unsettled. Did the young and inexperienced know the truth of this matter; how much easier it is to keep innocency than to return to it; how great and terrible is the danger they do not return to it at all; surely they would see, and see in a light strong enough to influence their determination, that to adhere inviolably to the rules of temperance, soberness, and chastity, was their safety, their wisdom, their happiness. How many bitter thoughts does the innocent man avoid? Serenity and cheerfulness are his portion. Hope is continually pouring its balm into his soul.—His heart is at rest, whilst others are goaded and tortured by the stings of a wounded conscience, the remonstrances and risings up of principles which they cannot forget; perpetually teased by returning temptations, perpetually lamenting defeated resolutions. “There is no peace unto the wicked, saith my God.” There is no com-

fort in such a life as this, let a man's outward circumstances be what they will. Genuine satisfaction of mind is not attainable under the recurring consciousness of being immersed in a course of sin, and the still remaining prevalence of religious principles.

Justice, Penal; its Administration.

There are two methods of administering penal justice. The first method assigns capital punishment to few offences, and inflicts it invariably. The second method assigns capital punishment to many kinds of offences, but inflicts it only upon a few examples of each kind.

The latter of which two methods has been long adopted in this country, where, of those who receive sentence of death, scarcely one in ten is executed. And the preference of this to the former method seems to be founded in the consideration, that the selection of the proper objects for capital punishment principally depends upon circumstances, which, however easy to perceive in each particular case after the crime is committed, it is impossible to enumerate or define before-hand; or to ascertain however with that exactness, which is requisite in legal de-

scriptions. Hence, although it be necessary to fix by precise rules of law the boundary on one side, that is, the limit to which the punishment may be extended ; and also that nothing less than the authority of the whole legislature be suffered to determine that boundary, and assign these rules ; yet the mitigation of punishment, the exercise of lenity, may without danger be intrusted to the executive magistrate, whose discretion will operate upon those numerous unforeseen, mutable, and indefinite circumstances, both of the crime and the criminal, which constitute or qualify the malignity of each offence. Without the power of relaxation lodged in a living authority, either some offenders would escape capital punishment, whom the public safety required to suffer ; or some would undergo this punishment, where it was neither deserved nor necessary. For if judgment of death were reserved for one or two species of crimes only, which would probably be the case if that judgment was intended to be executed without exception, crimes might occur of the most dangerous example, and accompanied with circumstances of heinous aggravation, which did not fall within *any* description of offences that the laws had made capital, and which consequently could not

receive the punishment their own malignity and the public safety required. What is worse, it would be known, beforehand, that such crimes might be committed without danger to the offender's life. On the other hand, if, to reach these possible cases, the whole class of offences to which they belong be subjected to pains of death, and no power of remitting this severity remain any where, the execution of the laws will become more sanguinary than the public compassion would endure, or than is necessary to the general security.

• The law of England is constructed upon a different and a better policy. By the number of statutes creating capital offences, it sweeps into the net every crime, which under any possible circumstances may merit the punishment of death; but, when the execution of this sentence comes to be deliberated upon, a small proportion of each class are singled out, the general character, or the peculiar aggravations of whose crimes render them fit examples of public justice. By this expedient few actually suffer death, whilst the dread and danger of it hang over the crimes of many. The tenderness of the law cannot be taken advantage of. The life of the subject is spared, as far as the necessity of restraint and

intimidation permits ; yet no one will adventure upon the commission of any enormous crime, from a knowledge that the laws have not provided for its punishment. The wisdom and humanity of this design furnish a just excuse for the multiplicity of capital offences, which the laws of England are accused of creating beyond those of other countries. The charge of cruelty is answered by observing, that these laws were never meant to be carried into indiscriminate execution ; that the legislature, when it establishes its last and highest sanctions, trusts to the benignity of the crown to relax their severity, as often as circumstances appear to palliate the offence, or even as often as those circumstances of aggravation are wanting, which rendered this rigorous interposition necessary. Upon this plan it is enough to vindicate the lenity of the laws, that *some* instances are to be found in each class of capital crimes, which require the restraint of capital punishment ; and that this restraint could not be applied, without subjecting the whole class to the same condemnation.

Liberty in a State of Nature.

The boasted liberty of a state of nature exists only in a state of solitude. In every kind and

degree of union and intercourse with his species, it is possible that the liberty of the individual may be augmented by the very laws that restrain it; because he may gain more from the limitation of other men's freedom, than he suffers by the diminution of his own. Natural liberty is the right of a common upon a waste, civil liberty is the safe, exclusive, unmolested enjoyment of a cultivated enclosure. Actual liberty always bearing a reversed proportion to the number and severity of the restrictions, which are either useless or do not outweigh the evil of the restraint, it follows, that every nation possesses some, no nation perfect liberty; that this liberty may be enjoyed under every form of government, that, consequently, those popular phrases which speak of a free people; of a nation of slaves; which call one revolution the era of liberty, or another the loss of it; with many expressions of a like absolute form, are intelligible only in a comparative sense.

Lies.

A lie is a breach of promise; for whoever seriously addresses his discourse to another, tacitly promises to speak the truth, because he knows the truth is expected. Or the obligation of ve-

racity may be made out from the direct ill consequences of lying to social happiness. Which consequences consist either in some specific injury to particular individuals, or in the destruction of that confidence which is essential to the intercourse of human life ; for which latter reason, a lie may be pernicious in its general tendency, and therefore criminal, though it produce no particular, or visible mischief to any one.

There are falsehoods which are not lies ; that is, which are not criminal ; as 1. Where no one is deceived ; which is the case in parables, fables, novels, jests, tales to create mirth, ludicrous embellishments of a story, where the declared design of the speaker is not to inform, but to divert ; compliments in the subscription of a letter ; a servant's *denying* his master, a prisoner's pleading not guilty, an advocate asserting the justice, or his belief of the justice of his client's cause. In such instances no confidence is destroyed, because none was reposed ; no promise to speak the truth is violated, because none was given, or understood to be given—2. When the person to whom you speak has no right to know the truth, or, more properly where little or no inconveniency results from the

want of confidence in such cases; as where you tell a falsehood to a madman for his own advantage; to a robber to conceal your property; to an assassin to defeat or divert him from his purpose. The particular consequence is by the supposition beneficial; and, as to the general consequence, the worst that can happen is, that the madman, the robber, the assassin will not trust you again, which is sufficiently compensated by the immediate benefit which you propose by the falsehood.

It is upon this principle that by the laws of war, it is allowed to deceive an enemy by feints, false colours, spies, false intelligence and the like? but by no means in treaties, truces, signals of capitulation or surrender: and the difference is, that the former supposes hostilities to *continue*; but the latter are calculated to *terminate* or suspend them. In the conduct of war there is no place for confidence between the contending parties; but in whatever relates to the *termination* of war, the most religious fidelity is expected, because without it wars could not cease, nor the victors be secure but by the entire destruction of the vanquished.

Many people indulge, in serious discourse, a habit of fiction and exaggeration, in the accounts

they give of themselves, of their acquaintance, or of the extraordinary things which they have seen or heard; and so long as the facts they relate are indifferent, and their narratives, though false, are inoffensive, it may seem a superstitious regard for truth to censure them merely for truth's sake.

But this liberty in conversation defeats its own end. Much of the pleasure, and all the benefit of conversation, depends upon our own opinion of the speaker's veracity, for which this rule leaves no foundation. The faith indeed of a hearer must be extremely perplexed, who considers the speaker, or believes that the speaker considers himself, as under no obligation to adhere to truth, but according to the particular importance of what he relates.

But beside, and above both these reasons, *white* lies always introduce others of a darker complexion. I have seldom known any one who deserted truth in trifles, that could be trusted in matters of importance. Nice distinctions are out of the question, upon occasions which, like those of speech, return every hour.

The habit therefore of lying, when once formed, is easily extended to serve the designs of malice or interest; like all habits it spreads

indeed of itself. As there may be falsehoods which are not lies, so there may be lies without literal or direct falsehood ; as when the literal and grammatical signification of a sentence is different from the popular and customary meaning. It is the wilful deceit that makes the lie ; and we wilfully deceive when our expressions are not true in the sense in which we believe the hearer to apprehend them : besides that, it is absurd to contend for any sense of words in opposition to usage ; for all senses of words are founded upon usage, and upon nothing else. Or a man may *act* a lie, as by pointing his finger in a wrong direction when a traveller inquires of him his road ; or when a tradesman shuts up his windows to induce his creditors to believe that he is abroad : for, to all moral purposes, and therefore as to veracity, speech and action are the same ; speech being only a mode of action.

Or, lastly, there may be lies of *omission*. A writer of English history, who, in his account of the reign of Charles the First, should wilfully suppress any evidence of that prince's despotic measures, and designs might be said to be ; for by entitling his book a *History of England*, he engages to relate the whole truth of the history, or at least all that he knows of it.

Love of God; its Operation.

The purest motive of human action is the love of God. There may be motives stronger and more general, but none so pure. The religion, the virtue, which owes its birth in the soul to this motive, is always genuine religion, always true virtue. Indeed, speaking of religion, I should call the love of God, not so much the ground-work of religion, as religion itself. So far as religion is disposition, it is religion itself. But though of religion it be more than the ground-work, yet being a disposition of mind, like other dispositions, it is the ground-work of action. Well might our blessed Saviour preach up as he did, the love of God. It is the source of every thing which is good in man. I do not mean that it is the only source, or that goodness can proceed from no other, but, that of all principles of conduct, it is the safest, the truest, the best, the highest.

This love is to be engendered in the soul, not so much by hearing the words of others, or by instruction from others, as by a secret and habitual contemplation of God Almighty's bounty, and by a constant referring of our enjoyments and our hopes to his goodness. This is in a

great degree a matter of habit; and like all good habits, particularly mental habits, is what every person must form in himself, and for himself by endeavour and perseverance. In this great article, as well as in others which are less, every man must be the author to himself, of his train of thinking, be it good or bad. I shall only observe, that when this habit, or as some would call it, turn and course of thought is once happily generated, occasions will continually arise to minister to its exercise and augmentation. A night's rest, or a comfortable meal will immediately direct our gratitude to God. The use of our limbs, the possession of our senses; every degree of health, every hour of ease, every sort of satisfaction which we enjoy, will carry our thoughts to the same object.

If it be asked, how does the love of God operate in the production of virtuous conduct, I shall answer, that it operates in exactly the same manner as affection towards a parent, or gratitude towards a human benefactor operates, by stirring up a strong rebuke in the mind upon the thought of offending him. This lays a constant check upon our conduct. And this sensation is the necessary accompaniment of love; it cannot, I think, be separated from it. But it is not the

whole of its influence. Love and gratitude towards a benefactor, not only fill us with remorse, and with internal shame whenever, by our wilful misbehaviour, we have given cause to that benefactor to be displeased with us; but also prompts us with a desire upon all occasions of doing what we believe he wills to be done, which, with respect to God, is in other cases, a desire to serve him. Now this is not only a restraint from vice, but an incitement to action. Instructed, as in Christian countries men generally are, in the main articles of human duty, this motive will seldom mislead them.

Luxury, its Effects.

Luxury, as it supplies employment and promotes industry, assists population; but then, there is another consequence attending it, which counteracts, and often overbalances these advantages. When, by introducing more superfluities into general reception, luxury has rendered the usual accommodations of life more expensive, artificial, and elaborate, the difficulty of maintaining a family, conformably with the established mode of living, becomes greater, and what each man has to spare from his personal

consumption, proportionably less : the effect of which is, that marriages grow less frequent, and which must be remembered as the foundation of all our reasoning upon the subject, that men will not marry to sink their place or condition in society, or to forego those indulgencies, which their own habits, or what they observe amongst their equals, have rendered necessary to their satisfaction. This principle is applicable to every article of diet and dress, to houses, furniture, attendance ; and this effect will be felt in every class of the community. For instance, the custom of wearing broad-cloth and fine linen repays the shepherd and flax-grower, feeds the manufacturer, enriches the merchant, gives not only support but existence to multitudes of families : hitherto, therefore, the effects are beneficial ; and were these the only effects, such elegancies, or if you please to call them so, such luxuries, could not be too universal. But here follows the mischief ; when once fashion hath annexed the use of these articles of dress to any certain class, to the middling ranks, for example, of the community, each individual of that rank finds them to be *necessaries* of life ; that is, finds himself obliged to comply with the example of his equals, and to maintain that appearance

which the custom of society requires. This obligation creates such a demand upon his income, and withal adds so much to the cost and burthen of a family, as to put it out of his power to marry, with the prospect of continuing his habits, or of maintaining his place and situation in the world. We see, in this description, the cause which induces men to waste their lives in a barren celibacy ; and this cause, which impairs the very source of population, is justly placed to the account of luxury. It appears, then, that luxury, considered with a view to population, acts by two opposite effects ; and it seems probable that there exists a point in the scale, to which luxury may ascend, or to which the wants of mankind may be multiplied, with advantage to the community, and beyond which the prejudicial consequences begin to preponderate.

Of different kinds of luxury, those are the most innocent, which afford employment to the greatest number of artists and manufacturers ; or those, in other words, in which the price of the work bears the greatest proportion to that of the raw material. Thus, luxury in dress or furniture is universally preferable to luxury in eating, because the articles which constitute the one, are more the production of human art and industry than those which supply the other.

Mahomet.

MAHOMETANISM resembles Christianity in the rapidity of its progress, the recency of its history, and the *prophetic* character assumed by its author. But there are points of difference, which separate the two cases entirely.

1. Mahomet did not found his pretensions upon miracles *capable of being known, and attested by others*; he expressly disclaims the power. Hence no credit is due to the miraculous stories related of Mahomet by Abulteda, who wrote the account 600 years after his death; or which are found in the legend of Al Janabi, who came 200 years later. Admitting the whole of Mahomet's authentic history as far as was witnessed by others, to be true, he might still be an impostor, or enthusiast, or an union of both: but admit almost any part of Christ's public history to be true, and he must have come from God. Objection: If one religion could make its way without miracles, why might not another?

Answer: This is not the question. The proper question is, whether a religion, founding itself, on miracles could succeed without any reality to rest on? As Mahomet did not take this

course, it may be presumed very difficult, if not impossible. He knew the importance of miracles by incessantly referring to those of preceding prophets.

2. The establishment of Mahomet's religion was effected by causes, which in no degree appertained to the origin of Christianity.

During the first *ten* years, when Mahomet used only persuasion, and confined his exertions to Mecca, it appears, that he could reckon upon no more converts than 83 men and 18 women; yet this progress was aided by the following important advantages: 1. He was the grandson of the most honourable and powerful family in Mecca. 2. He conducted his design with great art and prudence. 3. The Arabs probably acknowledged *one* supreme deity, which, at first, was the leading doctrine of Mahomet. 4. Mahomet seems to have had these two purposes in view; *to make converts, and those converts soldiers*, as the following particulars will shew. (1). He assures the Jews, Christians, and Arabs, that *his* religion had been originally their own. (2.) He never ceased from describing the future anguish of unbelievers. (3.) His voluptuous paradise. (4.) The highest heavens for those who fought his battles, or expended their

fortune in his cause. (5.) He applied the doctrine of predestination to fortify the courage of his adherents. (6.) He allowed a plurality of wives in compliance with the climate of the country.

When Mahomet was received into the city of Medina, he changed his conduct, pretending that he had received a commission to *destroy infidels*, and to set up the true faith by the *sword*. An early victory over a very superior force established his renown; we have, therefore, from this time nothing left to account for, but that he should be able to collect an army, and that his army should conquer.

The success of Mahometanism during this and every future period, cannot be stated in prejudice of the Christian argument; nor does it stand in the way of this important conclusion, that the propagation of Christianity, in the manner, and under the circumstances in which it was propagated, is an *unique* in the history of the species—A Jewish peasant overthrew the religion of the world.

*Merits ; our own considered as a source of
Comfort..*

It is an exceedingly good observation, that we may safely leave our virtues and good qualities to themselves. And besides the use we have made of it in shewing the superfluity, as well as the danger of giving into the contemplation of our virtues, it is also a quieting and consoling reflection for a different, and in some degree, an opposite description of character, that is to say, for tender and timorous consciences. Such are sometimes troubled with doubts and scruples about even their good actions. Virtue was too easy for them, or too difficult; too easy and pleasant to have any merit in it: or difficult by reason of fleshly, selfish, or depraved propensities, still existing unsubdued, still struggling in their unregenerated hearts. These are natural, and as I have sometimes known them, very distressing scruples. But it will be said, are we not to *taste the comforts of religion*? Are we not to be permitted, or rather, ought we not to be encouraged to relish, to indulge, to enjoy these comforts? And can this be done without meditating upon our *good actions*?

I answer, that this can be done *without me-*

dictating upon our *good actions*. We need not seek the comforts of religion in this way. Much we need not *seek* them at all ; they will visit us of their own accord, if we be serious and hearty in our religion. A well-spent life will impart its support to the spirits without any endeavour on our part to call up our merits to our view, or even allowing the idea of merit to take possession of our minds. There will in this respect, always be as much difference as there ought to be between the righteous man and the sinner (or, to speak more properly, between sinners of different degrees) without taking pains to draw forth in our recollection, instances of our virtue, or to institute a comparison between ourselves and others, or certain others of our acquaintance. These are habits which I hold to be unchristian and wrong ; and that the true way of finding and feeling the consolations of religion, is by progressively conquering our sins. Think of these ; contend with these ; and if you contend with sincerity and effect, which is the proof indeed of sincerity, I will answer for the comforts of religion being your portion. What is it that embitters or repairs our religious comfort, damps and checks our religious hopes, hinders us from relishing and entertaining these

ideas, from turning to them as a supply of consolation under all circumstances? What is it but our sins? Depend upon it, that it is sin, and nothing else, which spoils our religious comfort. Cleanse your heart from sin, and religion will enter in with all her train of hopes and consolations. For proof of this, we may, as before, refer to the examples of Scripture Christians. No persons enjoyed these comforts in so great perfection, as the Christians we read of in Scripture, yet no persons thought so little of their own virtues.

Think then less of your virtues; more of your sins. Do I hear any one answer, I have no sins to think upon; I have no crimes which lie upon my conscience? I reply, that this may be true with respect to some, nay, with respect to many persons, according to the idea we commonly annex to the words sins and crimes; meaning thereby acts of gross and external wickedness. But think further; enlarge your views. Is your obedience to the law of God what it ought to be, or what it might be? Upon the whole, when I hear a person say he has no sins to think upon, I conclude that he has not thought seriously concerning religion at all. Lastly, unprofitableness itself is a sin. We

need not do mischief in order to commit sin ; uselessness, when we might be useful, is enough to make us sinners before God. The fig-tree in the gospel was cut down, not because it bore sour fruit, but because it bore none. The parable of the talents is pointed expressly against the simple neglect of faculties and opportunities of doing good, as contra-distinguished from the perpetration of positive crimes. Let our omissions, deficiencies, failures, our irregularities of heart and affection, our vices of temper and disposition, our course and habit of giving into smaller offences, all those things which our consciences cannot really approve ; our slips, and inadvertences and surprises, much too frequent for a man in earnest about salvation ; let these things occupy our attention, let this be the bent and direction of our thoughts ; for they are the thoughts which will bring us evangelically to God.

For there may not be, strictly speaking, an act or deed scandalously bad : yet, the current of our imaginations, the bent of our tempers, the stream of our affections, may all, or any of them be wrong ; may be requiring at the peril of our salvation, stronger controul, a better direction.

The Millenium ; true Doctrine of.

That our Lord's dominion will not only remain unto the end of the world, but that its effects in the world will be greatly enlarged and increased, is signified very expressly in the second chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews. The Apostle in this passage applies to our Lord a quotation from the Psalms : "Thou hast put all things in subjection under his feet :"—and then draws from it a strict inference : "for in that he put all things in subjection under him, he left nothing that he did not put under him." And then he remarks as a fact, "but now we see *not yet* all things put under him : " that complete entire subjection which is here promised, hath not yet taken place. The promise must, therefore, refer to a *still future order of things*. This doctrine of a progressive increase and final completeness of our Lord's kingdom is also virtually laid own in the passage from the Corinthians already cited. "He must reign till he hath put all things under his feet." For that this subjugation of his several enemies will be successive, one after another, is strongly intimated by the expression, "the *last* enemy that shall be destroyed, is death."

Now to apprehend the probability of these things coming to pass, or rather to remove any opinion of their improbability, we ought constantly to bear in our mind, this momentous truth, that in the hands of the Deity time is nothing; that he has eternity to act in. *The Christian dispensation, nay, the world itself, may be in its infancy.* A more perfect display of the power of Christ and his religion may be in reserve, and the ages which it may endure, after the obstacles and impediments to its reception are removed, may be, beyond comparison longer than those which we have seen, in which it has been struggling with great difficulties, most especially with ignorance and prejudice. We ought not to be moved any more than the Apostles were moved with the reflection which was cast upon their mission, “that since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were.” We ought to return the answer which one of them returned: that what we call tardiness in the Deity is not so; that with him “a thousand years are as one day:” words which confound and astonish human understanding, yet strictly and metaphysically true.

Now the economy which appears to be destined for *the human creation*, I mean for that

part of it which shall be reserved to future happiness, is, that they shall live in a state of local society with one another, and under Jesus Christ as their head; experiencing a sensible connexion amongst themselves, as well as the operation of his authority, as their Lord and governor. I think it likely that our Saviour had this state of things in view, when, in his final discourse with his Apostles, he tells them, “I go to prepare a place for you. And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and receive you unto myself: that where I am, there ye may be also.”—John xiv. 2, 3. And again, in the same discourse, and referring to the same *economy*—“Father,” says he, “I will that they also whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am, that they may behold my glory which thou hast given:” for that this was spoken, not merely of the twelve who were then sitting with Jesus, and to whom his discourse was addressed, *but of his disciples in future ages of the world*, is fairly collected from his words (xvii. 20.)—“Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on me through their word.”

Now concerning this *future dispensation*, supposing it to consist as here represented, of ac-

cepted spirits, participating of happiness in a state of sensible society with each other, one train of reflection naturally arises; namely, first, that there should be many expressions of scripture which have relation to it: secondly, that such expressions must, by their nature, appear to us at present under a considerable degree of obscurity, which we may be apt to call a defect; thirdly, that the credit due to such expressions must depend upon their authority as portions of the written word of God, and not upon the probability, much less upon the clearness of what they contain; so that our comprehension of what they mean must stop at very general notions; and our belief in them rest in the deference to which they are entitled as scripture declarations. Of this kind are many, if not all of those expressions, which speak so strongly of the value, and benefit, and efficacy of the death of Christ; of its sacrificial, expiatory, and atoning nature. We may be assured that these expressions mean something real; refer to something real; though it be something which is to take place in that *future dispensation* of which we have been speaking.

There is another class of expressions, which since they professedly refer to circumstances that are to take place in this *new state*, and not be-

fore, will, it is likely, be rendered quite intelligible by our experience in that state. Of this kind are many of the passages of scripture, already noticed, as referring to the changes which will then be wrought in our mortal nature; and the *agency* of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the *intervention of his power* in producing those changes; and the nearer similitude which our changed natures, and the bodies with which we shall then be cloathed, will bear to his. We read “that he shall change our vile body, that it may be like his glorious body.” A momentous assurance, no doubt; yet in its *particular signification*, waiting to be cleared up by our experience of the event. So likewise are some other particular expressions relating to the same event, such as being “unclothed”—“clothed upon”—“the dead in Christ rising first”—“meeting the Lord in the air”—“they that are alive not preventing those that are asleep,” and the like. These are all most interesting intimations, yet to a certain degree, obscure. They answer the purpose of ministering to our hopes, and comfort, and admonition, which they do without conveying any clear ideas: and this, and not the satisfaction of our curiosity, may be the grand purpose, for the sake of which intimations

of these things were given at all. But then, in so far as they describe a *change in the order of nature*, of which change we are to be the objects, it seems to follow that we shall be furnished with experience, which will discover to us the full sense of this language.

The same remark may be *repeated* concerning the *first and second death*, which are expressly spoken of in the Revelations, xx. 6.—and, as I think, alluded to, and supposed in other passages of scripture in which they are not named.

Miracles.

A revelation cannot be made, but by miracles; consequently in whatever degree it is probable, that a revelation should be made, in the same degree it is probable miracles should be wrought. The attributes of the Deity, or the existence of a future state, are not *assumed* in order to *prove* the reality of miracles. That reality must be proved by evidence. We assert only, that in miracles adduced to the support of revelation, there is not any such antecedent improbability as no testimony can surmount. In maintaining which, we contend, that the incredibility of miracles is not greater than—1. That a future state

of existence should be destined, by God, for the human race: and, 2. That, being so destined, he should acquaint them with it. The *proof* of these propositions is not necessary; it is sufficient that they are not so violently improbable, so contradictory to the divine power and character, that either the propositions themselves, or the facts connected with them, ought to be rejected at first sight. To this length does a modern objection to miracles go, viz.—“*That no human testimony can in any case render them credible, because it is contrary to experience that a miracle should be true; but not contrary to experience that testimony should be false.*”—Strictly speaking, the narrative of a fact is *then* only contrary to experience, when the fact is related to have existed at a time and place, at which time and place, we, being present, did not perceive it to exist. The improbability arising from the *want* of experience is only equal to the probability, that, if the thing were true, such things would be *generally* experienced. Admitting that miracles were wrought upon the first promulgation of Christianity, it is not certain, or a probability approaching to certainty, that such miracles would become objects of *general* experience. The *force of experience* supposes the

course of nature *invariable*; or its *variations general*: but the course of nature may be called the agency of an intelligent being: and then it is not unreasonable to expect that such a being may, upon occasion of peculiar importance, interrupt the order which he had appointed, yet that such occasions should seldom return, and consequently be confined to the experience of a few.

It has been said, that miracles are effects without causes; as if the cure of the palsy were ascribed to the *touch*; or of blindness to the *clay*. These are merely *signs* to connect the miracle with its *end*. The effect we ascribe simply to the volition of the Deity, of whose existence and power we have previous and independent proof. According to Mr. Hume, the question is, *whether it be more improbable that the miracle should be true, or the testimony false?* Upon this state of the controversy, suppose twelve men, whose probity and good sense I had long known, should seriously and circumstantially relate an account of a miracle, wrought before their eyes, and in which it was impossible for them to be deceived; that rather than acknowledge that there existed any imposture in the case, they should suffer themselves, when

examined separately, to be racked, burned, or strangled, and that I myself was witness to the story and sufferings, by Mr. Hume's rule I am not to believe them. Now, I undertake to say, no man would disbelieve them.

The miracles were not *secret*, nor *momentary*, nor *tentative*, nor *ambiguous*, nor performed under the sanction of *authority*, with the spectators on their side, nor in affirmance of tenets already established. The evidence of these miracles was the contemporary; published on the spot; involved questions of the greatest magnitude; contradicted false prejudices; and it required from those who accepted it, principles and conduct exposed to outrage and persecution.

The Morality of the Gospel.

In stating the morality of the Gospel as an argument of its truth, I am willing to admit two points; first, that the teaching of morality was not the primary design of the mission; secondly, that morality, neither in the gospel, nor in any other book, can be a subject, properly speaking of discovery. If I were to describe in a very few words, the scope of Christianity as a

revelation. I should say, that it was to influence the conduct of human life, by establishing the proof of a future state of reward and punishment, “to bring life and immortality to light.” The direct object, therefore, of the design is, to supply motives, and not rules; sanctions, and not precepts. And these were what mankind stood most in need of. The members of civilized society can, in all ordinary cases, judge tolerably well how they ought to act: but without a future state, or, which is the same thing, without credited evidence of that state, they want a *motive* to their duty; they want at least strength of motive sufficient to bear up against the force of passion, and the temptation of present advantage. Their rules want authority. The most important service that can be rendered to human life, is to convey to the world, authorized assurances of the reality of a future existence. Morality, neither in the Gospel nor in any other book, can be a subject of discovery, properly so called: in morality, there cannot be any thing similar to what are called discoveries in the arts of life, and in some sciences; as the system of the universe, the circulation of the blood, the polarity of the magnet, the laws of gravitation, alphabetical writing, decimal arithmetic, and

some other things of the same sort ; facts or proofs, or contrivances before totally unknown or unthought of. Who, therefore, expects in reading the New Testament to be struck with discoveries in *morals*, in the manner in which his mind was affected when he first came to the knowledge of the discoveries above-mentioned, expects what the nature of the subjects render it impossible that he should meet with.

When once it is settled, no matter upon what principle, that to do good is virtue, the rest is *calculation*. But since the calculation cannot be instituted concerning each particular action, we establish intermediate rules ; by which proceeding the business of morality is much facilitated, for then it is concerning our rules alone that we need inquire, whether in their tendency they be beneficial. Concerning our actions, we have only to ask, whether they be agreeable to the rules. We refer actions to rules, and rules to public happiness. Now in the formation of these rules, there is no place for discovery, properly so called, but there is ample room for the exercise of wisdom, judgment, and prudence.

Morality ; Religious and Philosophic.

Upon the first reformation from popery, a method was very prevalent of resolving the whole of religion into *faith* ; *good works*, as they were called, or the practice of virtue holding not only a secondary but even distant place in value and esteem, being represented, indeed, as possessing no share or efficacy in the attainment of human salvation. This doctrine we have seen revived in our own times and carried to still greater lengths. And it is a theory, or rather perhaps a language, which required, while it lasted, very serious animadversion, not only because it disposed men to rest in an unproductive faith, without endeavours to render themselves useful by exertion and activity ; not only because it was naturally capable of being converted to the encouragement of licentiousness ; but because it misrepresented Christianity, as a moral institution, by making it place little stress upon the distinction of virtue and vice, and by making it require the practice of external duties, if it required them at all, only as casual, neglected, and almost unthought-of consequences, of that faith which it extolled, instead of directing men's

attention to them, as to those things which alone compose an unquestionable and effective obedience to the divine will. So long as this turn of mind prevailed we could not be too industrious in bringing together and exhibiting to our hearers those many and positive declarations of scripture which enforce, and insist upon, practical religion ; which divide mankind into those who do good and those who do evil ; which hold out to the one favour and happiness, to the other repulse and condemnation.

The danger, however, from this quarter is nearly overpast. We are, on the contrary, setting up a kind of philosophical morality, detached from religion and independent of its influence, which may be cultivated, it is said, as well without Christianity as with it ; and which, if cultivated, renders religion and religious institutions superfluous. A mode of thought so contrary to truth, and so derogatory from the value of revelation, cannot escape the vigilance of a Christian ministry. We are entitled to ask upon what foundation this morality rests. If it refer to the divine will, (and without that where will it find its sanctions, or how support its authority ?) there cannot be a conduct of the understanding more irrational, than to appeal to

those intimations of the Deity's character which the light and order of nature afford, as to the rule and measure of our duty, yet to disregard, and affect to overlook, the declarations of his pleasure which Christianity communicates. It is impossible to distinguish between the authority of natural and revealed religion. We are bound to receive the precepts of revelation for the same reason that we comply with the dictates of nature. He who despises a command which proceeds from his Maker, no matter by what means, or through what medium, instead of advancing, as he pretends to do, the authority of natural religion, disobeys the first injunctions of both. Although it be true what the apostle affirms, that "when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, they are a law unto themselves;" that is, they will be accepted together with those who are instructed in the law and obey it; yet is this truth not applicable to such as having a law, condemn it, and with the means of access to the word of God, keep themselves at a voluntary distance from it. This temper, whilst it continues, makes it necessary for us to assert the superiority of a religious principle above every other by which human conduct can be regulated:

more especially above that fashionable system, which recommends virtue only as a true and refined policy, which *policy* in effect is, and in the end commonly proves itself to be nothing else than a mere exquisite *cunning*, which, by a specious behaviour in the easy and visible concerns of life, collects a fund of reputation, in order either to cherish more securely concealed vices, or to reserve itself for some great stroke of selfishness, perfidy, and desertion, in a pressing conjuncture of fortunes.

New Birth; or Operations of the Holy Spirit.

And as in this there is a close analogy with the course of nature, as carried on under the divine government, we have every reason which scripture can give us, for believing that God frequently interposes to turn and guide the order of events in the world so as to make them execute his purpose: yet we do not so perceive these interpositions, as either always or generally to distinguish them from the natural progress of things. I do not apprehend that the doctrine of spiritual influence carries the agency of the Deity much farther than the doctrine of Providence carries it; or, however, than the doctrine

of prayer carries it. For all prayer supposes the Deity to be intimate with our minds.

But if we do not know the influence of the spirit by a distinguishing perception at the time, by what means do we know any thing of it at all? I answer, by its *effects*, and by those alone. And this I conceive to be that which our Saviour said to Nicodemus—"The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth, so is every one who is born of the spirit;" that is, thou perceivest an effect, but the cause which produces that effect operates in its own way, without thy knowing its rule or manner of operation. With regard to the cause, "thou canst not tell whence it cometh nor whither it goeth," a change or improvement in thy religious state is necessary. The agency and help of the spirit in working that change, or promoting that improvement, are likewise necessary. "Except a man be born of the spirit he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." But according to what particular manner, or according to what rule the spirit acts, is as unknown to us as the causes which regulate the blowing of the wind, the *most incalculable and unknown thing in the world*.—Its origin is unknown; its

mode is unknown ; but still it is known in its effects : and so it is with the spirit. If the change have taken place ; if the improvement be produced, and be proceeding ; if our religious affairs go on well, then have we ground for trust that the enabling assisting spirit of God is with us, though we have no other knowledge or perception of the matter than what this affords.

Occasions of doing good.

The habit and disposition of casting about for opportunities of doing good, readily seizing those which accidentally present themselves, and faithfully using those which naturally and regularly belong to our situations, appear to be sometimes checked by a notion, very natural to active spirits, and to flattered talents. They will not be content to do little things. They will either attempt mighty matters or do nothing. The small effects which the private endeavours of an individual can produce upon the mass of social good, is so lost and so unperceived in the comparison, that it neither deserves they think, nor rewards, the attention which it requires. The answer is, that the comparison, which thus discourages them, ought never to be made. The

good which their efforts can produce, may be too minute to bear any sensible proportion to the sum of public happiness, yet may be their share; may be enough for them. The proper question is not whether the good we aim at be great or little; still less, whether it be great or little in comparison with the whole; but whether it be the most which it is in our power to perform. A single action may be, as it were, nothing to the aggregate of moral good: so also may be the agent. It may still, therefore, be the proportion which is required of *him*. In all things nature works by numbers. Her greatest effects are achieved by the joint operation of multitudes of, separately considered, insignificant individuals. It is enough for each that it executes its office. It is not its concern, because it does not depend upon its will, what place that office holds in, or what proportion it bear to the general result. Let our only comparison therefore be, between our opportunities and the use which we make of them. When we would extend our views, or stretch out our hand, to distant and general good, we are commonly lost and sunk in the magnitude of the subject. Particular good, and the particular good which lies within our reach, is all we are concerned to attempt, or

to inquire about. Not the smallest effort will be forgotten ; not a particle of our virtue will fall to the ground. Whether successful or not, our endeavours will be recorded ; will be estimated, not according to the proportion which they bear to the universal interest, but according to the relation which they hold to our means and opportunities ; according to the disinterestedness, the sincerity, with which we undertook ; the pains and perseverance with which we carried them on. It may be true, and I think it is the doctrine of scripture, that the right use of great faculties or great opportunities, will be more highly rewarded, than the use of inferior faculties and less opportunities. He that with ten talents had made ten talents more, was placed over ten cities : the neglected talent was also given to him. He who, with five talents, had made five talents more, though pronounced to be a good and faithful servant, was placed only over five cities. This distinction might, without any great harshness to our moral feelings, be resolved into the will of the supreme benefactor : but we can see, perhaps, enough of the subject to perceive that it was just. The merit may reasonably be supposed to have been more in one case than the other. The danger, the acti-

vity, the care, the solicitude, were greater. Still, both received rewards, abundant beyond measure, when compared with the services, equitable and proportioned when compared with one another.

Opinion, its Differences.

If we possessed the disposition which Christianity labours, above all other qualities, to inculcate, these differences would do little harm. If that disposition be wanting, other causes, even were these absent, would continually rise up to call forth the malevolent passions into action. Differences of opinion, when accompanied with mutual charity, which Christianity forbids them to violate, are for the most part innocent, and for some purposes useful. They promote inquiry, discussion, and knowledge. They help to keep up an attention to religious subjects, and a concern about them, which might be apt to die away in the calm and silence of universal agreement. I do not know that it is in any degree true, that the influence of religion is the greatest, where there are the fewest dissenters.

Parables.

The *parables* of the New Testament are, many of them, such as would have done honour to any book in the world. I do not mean in style and diction, but in the choice of the subjects, in the structure of the narratives, in the aptness, propriety, and force of the circumstances woven into them, and in some, as that of the Good Samaritan, the Prodigal Son, the Pharisee and the Publican, in an union of pathos and simplicity, which in the best productions of human genius, is the fruit only of a much-exercised, and well-cultivated mind.

St. Paul, his Character.

Here then we have a man of liberal attainments, and in other points of sound judgment, who had addicted his life to the service of the gospel. We see him in the prosecution of his purpose, travelling from country to country, enduring every species of hardship, encountering every extremity of danger, assaulted by the populace, punished by the magistrates, scourged, beat, stoned, left for dead; expecting wherever he came, a renewal of the same treatment, and

the same dangers, yet, when driven from one city, preaching in the next: spending his whole time in the employment, sacrificing to it his pleasures, his ease his safety: persisting in this course to old age, unaltered by the experience of perverseness, ingratitude, prejudice, desertion; unsubdued by anxiety, want, labour, persecutions; unwearied by long confinement, undismayed by the prospect of death. Such was St. Paul. We have his letters in our hands; we have also a history purporting to be written by one of his fellow travellers, and appearing by a comparison with these letters, certainly to have been written by some person well acquainted with the transactions of his life. From the letters, as well as from the history, we gather not only the account which we have stated of *him*, but that he was one out of many, who acted and suffered in the same manner; and that of those who did so, several had been the companion of Christ's ministry, the ocular witnesses, or pretending to be such, of his miracles and of his resurrection. We moreover find the same person referring in his letters to his supernatural conversion, the particulars and accompanying circumstances of which, are related in the history, and which accompanying circum-

stances, if all or any of them be true, render it impossible to have been a delusion. We also find him positively, and in appropriated terms, asserting, that he himself worked miracles, strictly and properly so called, in support of the mission which he executed; the history, meanwhile, recording various passages of his ministry, which come up to the extent of this assertion. The question is, whether falsehood was ever attested by evidence like this? Falsehoods, we know, have found their way into reports, into tradition, into books—but, is an example to be met with, of a man voluntarily undertaking a life of want and pain, of incessant fatigue, of continual peril; submitting to the loss of his home and country, to stripes and stoning, to tedious imprisonment, and the constant expectation of a violent death, for the sake of carrying about a story of what was false, and of what, if false, he must have known to be so?

Pain.

Pain also itself is not without its *alleviations*. It may be violent and frequent; but it is *se* the *ge-* both violent and long continued; and its *pa* *essions* intermissions become positive pleasures. *ous in the*

church, army, navy, revenue, public offices, &c. or wherein the profits are made in large sums, by a few great concerns or fortunate adventures, in which the occupation is neither so constant, nor the activity so kept alive by immediate encouragement. For security, manual arts exceed merchandize, and such as supply the wants of mankind, are better than those which minister to their pleasures.

But a child's vices may be of that sort, and his vicious habits so incorrigible, as to afford much the same reason for believing that he will waste or misemploy the fortune put into his power as if he were mad or foolish, in which case a parent may treat him as a madman or idiot; that is, may deem it sufficient to provide for his support by an annuity equal to his wants and innocent enjoyments, and which he may be restrained from alienating.

Let not a father hope to excuse an inofficious disposition of his fortune, by alleging that "every man may do what he will with his own." All the truth which this expression contains is, that his discretion is under no controul of law; and that his will, however capricious, will be valid. This by no means absolves his conscience from the obligations of a parent,

or imports that he may neglect, without injustice, the several wants and expectations of his family, to gratify a whim or pique, or indulge a preference founded in no reasonable distinction of merit or situation.

A father of a family is bound to adjust his economy with a view to these demands upon his fortune. He is also justified in declining expensive liberality, and the desire of *laying up* should abate proportionably. The truth is, our children gain not so much as we imagine in the chance of this world's happiness, or even of its external prosperity, by setting out in it with large capitals. Of those who have died rich, a great part began with little. And in respect of *enjoyment*, there is no comparison between a fortune, which a man acquires by a well-applied industry, or by a series of successes in his business, and one found in his possession, or received from another. A principal part of a parent's duty is still behind. Parents, to do them justice, are seldom sparing of lessons of virtue and religion; in admonitions which cost little, and profit less; whilst their *example* exhibits a continual contradiction of what they teach. A father, for instance, will with much solemnity and apparent earnestness, warn his son against

idleness, excess in drinking, debauchery, and extravagance, who himself loiters about all day without employment, comes home every night drunk, is made infamous in his neighbourhood by some profligate connexion, and wastes the fortune which should support, or remain a provision for his family, in riot, luxury, or ostentation. Or he will discourse gravely before his children of the obligation and importance of revealed religion, whilst they see the most frivolous, and oftentimes feigned excuses detain him from its reasonable and solemn ordinances. Or he will set before them, perhaps, the supreme and tremendous authority of Almighty God; and the next hour, if an occasion arise to excite his anger, his mirth, or his surprize, they will hear him treat the name of the Deity with the most irreverent profanation, and sport with the terms and denunciations of the Christian religion, as if they were the language of some ridiculous and long-exploded superstition. Now even a child is not to be imposed upon by such mockery. He sees through the grimace of this counterfeited concern for virtue. And when once this opinion has taken possession of the child's mind, it has a fatal effect upon the parent's influence in all subjects; even those, in

which he himself may be sincere and convinced. Whereas a silent, but observable regard to the duties of religion in the parent's own behaviour will take a sure and gradual hold of the child's disposition, much beyond formal reproofs and chidings, which being generally prompted by some present provocation, discover more of anger than of principle. Virtue itself offends when coupled with forbidding manners. And some virtues may be urged to such excess, or brought forward so unseasonably as to discourage and repel those who observe, and are acted upon by them, instead of exciting an inclination to imitate them and adopt them. For instance, if a father's economy degenerate into a minute and teasing parsimony, it is odds but the son who has suffered under it, set out a sworn enemy to all rules of order and frugality. If a father's piety be morose, rigorous, and tinged with melancholy, perpetually breaking in upon the recreation of his family, and surfeiting them with the language of religion on all occasions, there is danger lest the son carry from home with him a settled prejudice against seriousness and religion, as inconsistent with every plan of a pleasurable life, and turn out when he mixes with the world, a character of levity or dissoluteness.

Peculiarities of the Discourses and Doctrines of Christ.

There is still another view, in which our Lord's discourses deserve to be considered ; and that is, in their *negative* character—not in what they did, but in what they did not contain. First. They exhibit no particular description of the invisible world. The future happiness of the good, and the misery of the bad, which is all we want to be assured of, is directly and positively affirmed, and is represented by metaphors and comparisons, which were plainly intended as metaphors and comparisons, and nothing more. As to the rest, a solemn reserve is maintained. The question concerning the woman who had been married to seven brothers, “Whose shall she be in the resurrection” was of a nature calculated to have drawn from Christ a more circumstantial account of the state of the human species in their future existence. He cut short, however, the inquiry by an answer, which at once rebuked intruding curiosity, and was agreeable to the best apprehensions we are able to form upon the subject ; viz. “That they who are accounted worthy of that resurrec-

tion shall be as the angels of God in heaven." I lay a stress upon this reserve, because it repels the suspicion of enthusiasm ; for enthusiasm is wont to expatiate upon the condition of the departed above all other subjects ; and with a wild particularity. It is moreover, a topic which is always listened to with greediness. The teacher therefore whose principal purpose is to draw upon himself attention is sure to be full of it. The Koran of Mahomet is half made up of it.

2. Our Lord enjoined no austerities ; he recommended none as carrying men to a higher degree of Divine favour. In this respect, compare Christianity as it came from Christ, with the same religion after it fell into other hands ; with the extravagant merit very soon ascribed to celibacy, solitude, voluntary poverty ; with the rigours of an ascetic, and the vows of a monastic life ; the hair shirt, the watchings, the midnight prayers, the obmutescence, the gloom and mortification of religious orders, and of those who aspired to religious perfection.

3. Our Saviour uttered no impassioned devotion. There was no heat in his piety, or in the language in which he expressed it ; no vehement or rapturous ejaculations, no violent urgency

in his prayers. The Lord's prayer is a model of calm devotion. His words in the garden are unaffected expressions, of a deep indeed but sober piety. He never appears to have been worked up into any thing like that elation or that emotion of spirits, which is occasionally observed in most of those to whom the name of enthusiast can in any degree be applied. I feel a respect for methodists, because I believe that there is to be found amongst them much sincere piety and availing, though not always well-informed Christianity: yet I never attended a meeting of their's, but I came away with the reflection how different what I heard was from what I read; I do not mean in doctrine but in *manner*;—how different from the calmness, the sobriety, the good sense, and I may add the strength and authority of our Lord's discourses.

Pecuniary Bounty.

They who rank pity amongst the original impulses of our nature, rightly contend, that when this principle prompts us to the relief of human misery, it indicates the Divine intention and our duty. Besides this, the poor have a claim

founded in the law of nature, which may be thus explained. No one being able to produce a charter from heaven had any better title to a particular possession than his next neighbour. There were reasons for mankind's agreeing upon a separation of this common fund ; and God for these reasons is presumed to have ratified. But this separation was made and consented to upon the expectation and condition that every one should have left a sufficiency for his subsistence, or the means of procuring it : and as no fixed laws for the regulation of property can be so contrived as to provide for the relief of every case and distress which may arise, these cases and distresses, when their right and share in the common stock were given up or taken from them, were supposed to be left to the voluntary bounty of those who might be acquainted with the exigencies of their situation, and in the way of affording assistance. And, therefore when the partition of property is rigidly maintained, against the claims of indigence, it is to be maintained in opposition to the intention of those who made it, and to *his*, who is, the Supreme Proprietor of every thing, and who has filled the world with plentuousness, for the sustenance and comfort of all whom he sends into it.

Perjury.

Perjury is a sin of great deliberation. The juror (swearer) has the thought of God and of religion upon his mind at the same time: at least there are very few that can shake them off entirely. He offends therefore, if he do offend, with a high hand in the face, that is, in defiance of the sanctions of religion. His offence implies a disbelief, or contempt of God's knowledge, power, and justice; which cannot be said of a lie, where there is nothing to carry the mind to any reflection upon the Deity, or the divine attributes at all.

2. Perjury violates a superior confidence: Mankind must trust to one another; and they have nothing better to trust to, than one another's oath. Hence legal adjudications, which govern and affect every right and interest on this side the grave, of necessity proceed, and depend upon oaths. Perjury, therefore, in its general consequence, strikes at the security of reputation, property, and even of life itself. A lie cannot do the same mischief, because the same credit is not given to it. And, when we consider what reliance is necessarily placed upon oaths, that all judical decisions proceed upon testimony; that

consequently there is not a right that a man possesses, of which false witnesses may not deprive him; that reputation, property, and life itself, lie open to the attempts of perjury; that it may often be committed without a possibility of contradiction or discovery; that the success and prevalence of this vice tend to introduce the most grievous and fatal injustice into the administration of human affairs, or such a distrust of testimony, as must create universal embarrassment and confusion, we shall be brought probably to agree that perjury in its punishment, especially that which is attempted in solemn evidence, and in the face of a court of justice, should be placed upon a level with the most flagitious frauds.

Pious Frauds.

As they are improperly called, pretended inspirations, forged books, and counterfeit miracles, are impositions of the most serious nature. It is possible that they may sometimes, though seldom, have been set up and encouraged with a design to do good:—but the good they aim at, requires that the belief of them should be perpetual, which is hardly possible; and the detection of the fraud is sure to disparage the credit of all pretensions

of the same nature. Christianity has suffered more injury from this cause, than from all other causes put together.

Prayer.

Let it well be observed, that whensoever the scripture speaks of prayer, whensoever it uses that term, or other terms equivalent to it, it means prayer, sincere and earnest, in the full and proper sense of these words, prayer proceeding from the heart and soul. It does not mean any particular form of words whatever : it does not mean any service of the lips, any utterance or pronunciation of prayer, merely as such ; but supplication actually and truly proceeding from the heart. Prayer may be solemn without being sincere. Every decency, every propriety, every visible mark and token of prayer may be present, yet the heart not engaged. This is the requisite which must make prayer availing ; this is the requisite indeed which must make it that which the scripture means whenever it speaks of prayer. Every outward act of worship, without this participation of the heart, fails ; not because men do not pray sincerely, but because in scripture sense, they do not pray at all. I fear that many under-

stand and reflect little upon what they are about, upon the exceedingly great consequence of what they are asking when they pray to God, as we do in our liturgy “to cleanse the thoughts of our hearts by the inspiration of his Holy Spirit,” “to make clean our hearts within us,” “not to take his Holy Spirit from us,” “to give us increase of grace,” “to grant that his Holy Spirit may in all things direct and rule our hearts.”

These are momentous petitions, little as we may perceive, or think, or account of them at the time. It has been truly said, that we are hardly ever certain of praying aright, except when we pray for the Spirit of God. When we pray for temporal blessings, we do not know, though God does, whether we ask what is really for our good : when we ask for the assistance and sanctification of God’s spirit in the work and warfare of religion, we ask for that which in its nature is very good, and which without our great fault will be good.

The Lord’s prayer, for a succession of solemn thoughts, for fixing the attention upon a few great points, for suitableness to every condition, for sufficiency, for conciseness without obscurity, for the weight and real importance of its petitions, is without an equal or rival.

Prayer, Repetitions in.

The spirit of devotion reconciles us to *repetitions*. In other subjects, repetition soon becomes tiresome and offensive. In devotion it is different. Deep, earnest, heart-felt devotion, naturally vents itself in repetition. Observe a person racked by excruciating bodily pain; or a person suddenly struck with the news of some dreadful calamity; or a person labouring under some cutting anguish of soul; and you will always find him breaking out into ejaculations, imploring from God, support, mercy, and relief, over and over again, uttering the same prayer in the same words. Nothing he finds suits so well the extremity of his sufferings, the urgency of his wants, as a continual recurrence to the same cries, and the same call for a divine aid. Our Lord himself, in his last agony, affords a high example of what we are saying: thrice he besought his heavenly father; and thrice he used the same words. Repetition therefore, is not only tolerable in devotion, but it is natural: it is even dictated by a sense of suffering and an acuteness of feeling. It is coldness of affection which requires to be enticed and gratified by continual novelty of idea or expression or action

The repetition of pharisaical prayers which our Lord censures, are to be understood of those prayers which run out into mere formality and into great length; no sentiment or affection of the heart accompanying, but uttered as a task from an opinion, of which our Lord justly notices the absurdity) that they should really be heard for their much speaking. Actuated by the spirit of devotion, we can never offend in this way, we can never be the object of this censure.

Prayer, Forms of.

Liturgies, or preconcerted forms of public devotion, being neither enjoined in Scripture, nor forbidden, there can be no good reason for either receiving or rejecting them, but that of expediency: which expediency is to be gathered from a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages attending upon this mode of worship, with those which usually accompany extemporary prayer. The advantages of a liturgy are these; First, That it prevents absurd, extravagant, or impious addresses to God, which in an order of men so numerous as the sacerdotal, the folly and enthusiasm of many, must always be in danger of

producing, where the conduct of the public worship is entrusted without restraint or assistance, to the discretion and abilities of the officiating minister. Secondly, It prevents the *confusion* of extemporary prayer, in which the congregation being ignorant of each petition before they hear it, and having little or no time to join in it, after they have heard it, are confounded between their attention to the minister, and to their own devotion. The devotion of the hearer is necessarily suspended until a petition be concluded ; and before he can assent to it, or properly adopt it, his attention is called off to keep pace with what succeeds. Add to this, that the mind of the hearer is held in continual expectation, and detained from its proper business by the very novelty with which it is gratified. A congregation may be pleased and affected with the prayers and devotion of their minister, without joining in them ; in like manner as an audience oftentimes are with the representation of devotion upon the stage, who nevertheless, come away, without being conscious of having exercised any act of devotion themselves. But the advantages of a liturgy are connected with two principal inconveniences : First, That forms of prayer composed in one age become unfit for another, by the unavoidable change of language, circumstances and opinions : secondly,

that the perpetual repetition of the same form of words produces weariness and inattentiveness in the congregation. However, both these inconveniences are in their nature invincible. Occasional revisions of a liturgy may obviate the first, and devotion will supply a remedy of the second: or they may both subsist in a considerable degree, and yet be outweighed by the objections which are inseparable from extemporary prayer. It would be no difficult task to contract the liturgies of most churches into half their present compass, and yet retain every distinct petition, as well as the substance of every sentiment which can be found in them. But, brevity may be studied too much. The composer of a liturgy must not sit down with the hope, that the devotion of the congregation will be uniformly sustained throughout; or that every part will be attended to by every hearer. If this could be depended upon, a very short service would be sufficient for every purpose that can be answered or designed by social worship: but seeing the attention of most men is apt to wander and return at intervals, and by starts, he will admit a certain degree of amplification and repetition; of diversity of expression upon the same subject, and variety of phrase and form, with little

addition to the sense, that the attention which has been slumbering or absent during one part of the service, may be excited and recalled by another; and the assembly kept together until it may reasonably be presumed, that the most heedless and inadvertent have performed some act of devotion, and the most desultory attention caught by some part or other of the public service. On the other hand, the too great length of church services is more unfavourable to piety, than almost any fault of composition may be. It begets in many, an early and unconquerable dislike to the public worship of their country or communion. They come to church seldom; and enter the doors under the apprehension of a tedious attendance, which they prepare for at first, or soon after relieve by composing themselves to a drowsy forgetfulness of the place and duty, or by sending abroad their thoughts in search of more amusing occupation.

The length and repetitions complained of in our liturgy, are not so much the fault of the compilers, as the uniting into *one* service what was originally distributed into *three*.

Of forms of prayer which offend not egregiously against truth and decency, that has the

most merit, which is best calculated to keep alive the devotion of the assembly. It were to be wished therefore, that every part of a liturgy were personally applicable to every individual in the congregation; and that nothing were introduced to interrupt the passion or damp the flame which it is not easy to rekindle. Upon this principle the *state prayers* in our liturgy, should be fewer and shorter. Whatever may be pretended, the people do not feel that concern in the subject of these prayers, which must be felt, or ever prayer be made to God with earnestness. The *state style* likewise seems unseasonably introduced into these prayers, as ill according with that annihilation of human greatness, of which every act that carries the mind to God, presents the idea. If sects and schisms be an evil, they are as much to be avoided by one side as the other, if *sectaries* are blamed for taking unnecessary offence, *established churches* are no less culpable for unnecessarily giving it: they are bound at least to produce a command, or a reason of equivalent utility from shutting out any from their communion, by mixing with divine worship doctrines which, whether true or false, are unconnected in their nature with devotion.

Promises.

Where the terms of a promise admit of more senses than one, the promise is to be performed “in that sense in which the promiser apprehended at the time that the promisee received it.”

It is not the sense in which the promiser actually intended it, that always governs the interpretation of an equivocal promise; because at that rate, you might excite expectations which you never meant, nor would be obliged to satisfy. Much less is it the sense in which the promisee actually received the promise; for, according to that rule, you might be drawn into engagements which you never designed to undertake. It must therefore be the sense (for there is no other remaining) in which the promiser believed the promisee accepted his promise.

Again, promises are not binding, 1st, where the performance is impossible.

2. Where the performance is unlawful.

3. Where they contradict a former promise.

4. Promises are not binding before acceptance; that is, before notice given to the promi-

see ; for, where the promise is beneficial, if notice be given, acceptance may be presumed. Until the promise be communicated to the promisee, it is the same only as a resolution in the mind of the promiser, which may be altered at pleasure. For no expectation has been excited, therefore none can be disappointed.

But suppose I declare my intention to a third person, who, without any authority from me, conveys my declaration to the promisee; is that such a notice as will be binding upon me? It certainly is not : for I have not done that which constitutes the essence of a promise—I have not *voluntarily* excited expectation.

5. Promises are not binding which are released by the promisee.

Probation.

A state totally incapable of misery, could not be a state of probation. It would not be a state in which virtue or vice could be even exercised at all : I mean that large class of virtues and vices which we comprehend under the name of social qualities. The existence of these depends upon the existence of misery, as well as of happiness.

in this world, and of different degrees of both : because their very nature and difference, consists in promoting or preventing, in augmenting or diminishing, in causing, aggravating or relieving, the wants, sufferings, and distresses of our fellow creatures. Compassion, charity, humanity, benevolence, nor even justice, could have any place in the world, if there were not human conditions to excite them ; objects and sufferings upon which they might operate ; misery as well as happiness which might be affected by them.

Few things are easier than to perceive, to feel, to acknowledge, to extol the goodness of God, the bounty of providence, and the beauties of nature, when all things go well ; when our health, our spirits, our circumstances conspire to fill our hearts with gladness, and our tongues with praise. This is easy, this is delightful. None but they who are sunk in sensuality, sottishness, and stupefaction, or whose understandings are dissipated by frivolous pursuits : none but the most giddy and insensible, can be destitute of these sentiments. But this is not the trial or the proof. It is in the chambers of sickness, under the stroke of affliction ; amidst the pinchings of want, the groans of pain, the

pressures of infirmity ; in grief, in misfortune, through gloom and horror, that it will be seen whether we hold fast our hope, our confidence, our trust in God ; whether this hope and confidence be able to produce in us resignation, acquiescence and submission. It seems therefore, to be argued with great probability, from the general economy of things around us, that our present state was méant for a state of probation ; because, positively it contains that admixture of good and evil which ought to be found in such a state to make it answer its purpose, viz, *the production, exercise, and improvement of virtue*. And because, negatively, it could not be intended either for a state of absolute happiness, or a state of absolute misery, neither of which it is. Of all views under which human life has been considered, the most reasonable then is, that which regards it as a state of probation. If the course of the world was separated from the contrivances of nature, I do not know that it would be necessary to look for any other account of it than what is contained in the answer, that events rise up by chance. But since the contrivances of nature decidedly evince *intention* ; and since the course of the world, and the contrivances of

nature, have the same author; we are, by the force of this connection led to believe that the appearance under which events take place, is reconcileable with the supposition of *design* on the part of the deity; and if it can be shown that the appearance of *disorder* is consistent with the uses of life, as a *preparatory state*, or, that it promotes these uses, then so far as this hypothesis may be accepted, the ground of the difficulty is gone away.

Of Property.

If you should see a flock of pigeons in a field of corn: and if (instead of each picking where and what it liked, taking just as much as it wanted, and no more) you should see ninety-nine of them gathering all they got into a heap; reserving nothing for themselves but the chaff and the refuse; keeping this heap for one, and that the weakest, perhaps the worst pigeon of the flock; sitting round, and looking on all the winter, whilst this one was devouring, throwing about and wasting it: and if a pigeon more hardy or hungry than the rest, touched a grain of the hoard, all the others flying upon it and tearing it to pieces; if you should see this, you

would see nothing more than what is every day practised and established among men. Among men, you see the ninety and nine toiling and scraping together a heap of superfluities for one (and this one too oftentimes the feeblest and worst of the whole set, a child, a woman, a madman, or a fool), getting nothing for themselves all the while but a little of the coarsest of the provision, which their own industry produces ; looking quietly on while they see the fruits of all their labour spent or spoiled ; and if one of the number take or touch a particle of the hoard, the others joining against him and hanging him for the theft.

But of the use of the institution of property, we may judge ; for what would be the effects of a community of right to the productions of the earth ? This will appear from the trifling specimens which we see of it at present. A cherry-tree in a hedge-row, nuts in a wood, the grass of an unstinted pasture, are seldom of any advantage to any body, because people do not wait for the proper season of reaping them. Corn, if any were sown, would never ripen ; lambs and calves, would never grow up to sheep and cows ; because the first person that met them would reflect that he had better take them

as they are than leave them for another. Property prevents contests. War and waste, tumults and confusion must be unavoidable and eternal where there is not enough for all, and where there are no rules to adjust the division. It also improves the conveniency of living; it enables mankind to divide themselves into distinct professions. Much of the advantage of civilized over savage life, depends upon this. When a man is from necessity his own tailor, tent-maker, carpenter, cook, huntsman and fisherman, it is not probable that he will be expert at any of his callings. Hence the rude habitations, furniture, clothing and implements of savages; and the tedious length of time which all their operations require. Upon these several accounts, we may venture, with a few exceptions, to pronounce, that even the poorest and worst provided in countries where property, and the consequences of property prevail, are in a better situation with respect to food, raiment, and the necessaries of life, than any are in places where most things remain in common. I do not know whether our attachment to *property* be not something more than the mere dictate of reason, or even than the mere effect of association. Property communicates a charm to whatever is the object of it. It is the

first of our abstract ideas ; it cleaves to us the closest and the longest. It endears to the child its plaything, to the peasant his cottage, to the landholder his estate. It supplies the place of prospect and scenery. Instead of coveting the beauty of distant situations, it teaches every man to find it in his own. It gives boldness and grandeur to plains and fens, tinge and colouring to clays and fallows. Money is the sweetener of human toil ; the substitute for coercion ; the reconciler of labour with liberty. It is, moreover, the stimulant of enterprise in all projects and undertakings, as well of diligence in the most beneficial arts and employments. Now did affluence, when possessed, contribute nothing to happiness, or nothing beyond the mere supply of necessities ; and the secret should come to be discovered ; we might be in danger of losing great part of the uses, which are at present derived to us through this important medium.—Not only would the tranquillity of social life be put in peril by the want of a motive to attach men to their private concerns, but the satisfaction which all men receive from success in their respective occupations, which collectively constitutes the great mass of human comfort would be done away in its very principle. It is of the

nature of property not only to be irregularly distributed, but to run into large masses. Public laws should be so constructed as to favour its diffusion as much as they can.

Inequality of property in the degree in which it exists in most countries of Europe, abstractedly considered, is an evil ; but it is an evil which flows from those rules concerning the acquisition and disposal of property, by which men are invited to industry, and by which the object of their industry is rendered secure and valuable.— If there be any great inequality unconnected with this origin, it ought to be corrected.

Property, Exclusive.

It is the general intention of God Almighty, that the produce of the earth be applied to the use of man. This appears from the constitution of nature, or, if you will, from his express declaration. Under this general donation, one man has the same right as another. You pluck an apple from a tree, or take a lamb from a flock, for your immediate use and nourishment, and I do the same; and we both plead for what we do, the general intention of the supreme proprietor. So far all is right : but you cannot claim the whole tree, or the whole flock, and

exclude me from any share in them, and plead the general intention for what you do. This plea will not serve you; you must shew something more. You must shew, by probable arguments at least, that it is God's intention that these things should be parcelled out to individuals; and that the established distribution under which you claim, should be upholden; shew me this and I am satisfied. But until this be shewn, the general intention, which is all that does appear, must prevail; and under that my title is as good as your's. Now there is but one argument that the thing cannot be enjoyed at all, or enjoyed with nearly the same advantage while it continues in common, as when appropriated. This is true, where there is not enough for all, or where the article in question requires care or labour in the production or preservation: but where no such reason obtains, and the thing is in its nature capable of being enjoyed by as many as will, it seem an arbitrary usurpation upon the rights of mankind, to confine the use of it to any. If a medicinal spring were discovered in a piece of ground, private property, copious enough for every purpose to which it could be applied, I would award a compensation to the owner of the field, and a liberal profit to the au-

thor of the discovery, especially if he had bestowed pains or expense upon the search : but I question whether any human laws would justify the owner, in prohibiting mankind from the use of the water, or setting such a price upon it as would almost amount to a prohibition. If there be fisheries, which are inexhaustible, as the cod-fishery upon the banks of Newfoundland, and the herring-fishery in the British seas, are said to be, then all those conventions by which one or two nations claim to themselves the *exclusive* enjoyment of these fisheries, are so many encroachments upon the general rights of mankind.

Upon the same principle may be determined a question, which makes a great figure in the books of natural law, *utrum mare sit liberum* ? that is, as I understand it, whether the exclusive right of navigating particular seas, or a controul over the navigation of those seas, can be claimed, consistently with the law of nature, by any nation ? What is necessary for each nation's safety, we allow ; as their own bays, creeks and harbours, the sea contiguous to, that is, within cannon-shot, or three leagues of their coast. And upon this principle of safety (if upon any principle) must be defended the claim of the Venetian State to the Adriatic ; of Den-

mark to the Baltic sea ; and of Great Britain to the seas which invest the island. But when Spain asserts a right to the Pacific Ocean, or Portugal to the Indian Seas ; or when any nation extends its pretensions much beyond the limits of its own territories, they erect a claim which *interferes* with the *benevolent designs of Providence*, and which no *human* authority can justify.

Another right, which may be called a general right, as it is incidental to every man who is in a situation to claim it, is the right of extreme necessity, by which is meant, a right to use or destroy another's property, when it is necessary for our own preservation to do so ; as a right to take, with or without the owner's leave, the first food, clothes, or shelter we meet with, when we are in danger of perishing through want of them ; a right to throw goods over-board to save the ship ; or to pull down a house in order to stop the progress of a fire ; and a few other instances of the same kind. Of which right the foundation seems to be this, that when property was first instituted, the institution was not intended to operate to the destruction or any ; therefore, when such consequences would follow, all regard to it is superseded. Restitution

however is due when in our power ; because the laws of property are to be adhered to so far as consists with safety ; and because restitution, which is one of those laws, supposes the danger to be over. But what is to be restored ? Not the full value of the property destroyed ; but what it was worth at the time of destroying it, which, considering the danger it was in of perishing, might be very little.

From reason then, or revelation, or from both together, it appears to be God Almighty's intention that the productions of the earth should be applied to the sustentation of human life.— Consequently all waste and misapplication of these productions is contrary to the divine intention and will, and therefore wrong, for the same reason that any other crime is so. Such as what is related of William the Conqueror, the converting of twenty manors into a forest for hunting ; or another act, which is not much better, letting of large tracts of land lie barren, because the owner cannot cultivate them, nor will part with them to those who can ; or destroying, or suffering to perish, great part of an article of human provision, in order to enhance the price of the remainder, which is said to have been till lately the case with fish caught upon the English

coast. To this head also may be referred, the expending of human food on superfluous dogs or horses, and lastly, the reducing the quantity, in order to alter the quality, and to alter it generally for the worse ; as the distillation of bread corn, the boiling down of solid meat for sauces, essences, &c. But it has not as yet entered into the minds of mankind to reflect that it is a *duty* to add what we can to the common stock of provision, by extracting out of our estates the most they will yield ; or that it is any sin to neglect this.

Prudence compared with Duty.

There is always understood to be a difference between an act of *prudence* and an act of *duty*. Thus if I distrusted a man who owed me a sum of money, I should reckon it an act of prudence to get another person bound with him ; but I should hardly call it an act of duty. On the other hand it would be thought a very unusual and loose kind of language, to say, that, as I had made such a promise, it was *prudent* to perform it ; or, that as my friend, when he went abroad, placed a box of jewels in my hand, it would be *prudent* in me to preserve it for

him till he returned. Now in what, you will ask, does the difference consist, inasmuch as, according to our account of the matter, both in the one case and the other, in acts of duty as well as in acts of prudence, we consider solely what we ourselves shall gain or lose by the act. The difference, and the only difference is this; that in one case we consider what we shall gain or lose in the present world; in the other case, we consider also what we shall gain or lose in the world to come.

Political Reform.

Upon questions of reform, the habit of reflection to be encouraged, is a sober comparison of the constitution under which we live, not with models of speculative perfection, but with the actual chance of obtaining a better. This turn of thought will generate a political disposition, equally removed from that puerile admiration of present establishments which sees no fault, and can endure no change, and that distempered sensibility which is alive only to perceptions of inconveniency, and is too impatient to be delivered from the uneasiness which it feels, to compute either the peril or expense of the remedy.

Reformation ; its perpetual practicability.

The danger is very great of a man, who is engaged in a course of sin, never reforming from his sin at all. Oh, let this danger be known ! let it stand like a flaming sword to turn us aside from the road to vice. Let it offer itself in its full magnitude. Let it strike, as it ought, the souls of those who are upon the brink, perhaps, of their whole future fate ; who are tempted ; and who are deliberating about entering upon some course of sin. Let also the perception and conviction of this danger sink deep into the hearts of all who are in such a situation, as that they must either reform or perish. We apprize them that their best hope is in a sudden and complete change, sincerely begun, faithfully persisted in ; broken, it is possible, by human frailty, but never changed into a different plan ; never declining to enter into a compromised, partial, gradual reform ; on the contrary, resumed with the same sincerity as that with which it set out, and with a force of resolution, and an earnestness of prayer, increased in proportion to the clearer view they have acquired of their danger and of their want.

Religious Seriousness.

A cause which has a strong tendency to destroy religious seriousness, and which almost infallibly prevents its formation and growth in young minds, is levity in conversation upon religious subjects, or upon subjects concerned with religion. Whether we regard the practice with respect to those who use it, or to those who hear it, it is highly to be blamed, and is productive of great mischief. In those who use it, it amounts almost to a proof that they are destitute of religious seriousness. The principle itself is destroyed in them, or was never formed in them. Upon those who hear, its effect is this: if they have concern about religion, and the disposition towards religion which they ought to have, and which we signify by this word *seriousness*, they will be inwardly shocked and offended by the levity with which they hear it treated. They will, as it were, resent such treatment of a subject, which by them has always been thought upon with awe, and dread, and veneration. But the pain with which they were at first affected, goes off by hearing frequently the same sort of language; and then they will be almost sure, if they examine the

state of their minds as to religion, to feel a change in themselves for the worse. This is the danger to which those are exposed, who had before imbibed serious impressions. Those who had not, will be prevented by such conversation from ever imbibing them at all ; so that its influence is in all cases pernicious.

The turn which this levity usually takes, is in jests, and raillery upon the opinions, or the peculiarities, or the persons of men of particular sects, or who bear particular names ; especially if they happen to be more serious than ourselves. And of late this loose, and I can hardly help calling it profane humour, has been directed chiefly against the followers of Methodism. But against whomsoever it happens to be pointed, it has all the bad effects both upon the speaker and hearer which we have noticed ; and, as in other instances, so in this, give me leave to say, that it is very much misplaced. In the first place, were the doctrines and sentiments of those who bear this name ever so foolish and extravagant (I do not say that they are either) this proposition I shall always maintain to be true, viz. that the wildest opinion that ever was entertained in matters of religion, is more rational than unconcern about these matters. Upon this subject

nothing is so absurd as indifference ; no folly so contemptible as thoughtlessness and levity. In the next place, do methodists deserve this treatment ? Be their particular doctrines what they may, the professors of these doctrines appear to be in earnest about them ; and a man who is in earnest in religion cannot be a bad man, still less a fit subject for derision. I am no methodist myself. In their doctrines I differ from them. But I contend, that sincere men are not for these, or indeed any doctrines to be made laughing stocks to others. I do not bring in the case of methodists for the purpose of vindicating their tenets, but for the purpose of observing (and I wish that the observation may weigh with all my readers) that the custom of treating their characters and persons, their preaching or their preachers, their meetings or worship with scorn, has the pernicious consequence of destroying our own seriousness, together with the seriousness of those who hear or join in such sort of conversation ; especially if they be young persons ; and I am, persuaded that much mischief is actually done this way.

There exists another prejudice against religious seriousness, arising from a notion very commonly entertained, viz. *that religion leads*

to gloom and melancholy. This notion, I am convinced, is a mistake. Some persons are continually subject to melancholy, which is as much a disease in them, as the ague is a disease; and it may happen that such man's melancholy shall fall upon religious ideas, as it may on any other subject which seizes their distempered imagination. But this is not religion leading to melancholy. Or it sometimes is the case that men are brought to a sense of religion by calamity and affliction, which produce at the same time depression of spirits. But neither here is religion the cause of this distress or dejection, or to be blamed for it. These cases being excepted, the very reverse of what is alleged against religion is the truth. No man's spirits were ever hurt by doing his duty. On the contrary, one good action, one temptation resisted and overcome, one sacrifice of desire or interest, purely for conscience sake, will prove a cordial for weak and low spirits, beyond what either indulgence or diversion, or company can do for them. And a succession or course of such actions and self denials, springing from a religious principle and manfully maintained, is the best possible course that can be followed as a remedy for sinkings and oppressions of this

kind. Can it then be true that religion leads to melancholy? Occasions arise to every man living, to many very severe as well as repeated occasions, in which the hopes of religion are the only stay that is left him. Godly men have that within them which cheers and comforts them in their saddest moments; ungodly men have that which strikes their heart like a dagger in its gayest moments. Godly men discover, what is very true, but what by most men is found out too late, namely, that a good conscience, and the hope of our Creator's final acceptance are the only solid happiness to be attained in this world. Experience corresponds with the reason of the thing. I take upon me to say, that religious men are generally cheerful. If this be not observed, as might be expected, supposing it to be true, it is because the cheerfulness which religion inspires does not show itself in noise, or in fits and starts of merriment, but is calm and constant. Of this, the only true and valuable kind of cheerfulness, for all other kinds are hollow and unsatisfying, religious men possess no less, but a greater share than others.

Religious Establishments.

“ A religious establishment is no part of Christianity, it is only the means of inculcating it.” Amongst the Jews, the rights and offices, the order, family and succession of the priesthood were marked out by the authority which declared the law itself. These therefore, were parts of the Jewish religion, as well as the means of transmitting it. Not so with the new institution. It cannot be proved that any form of Church government was laid down in the Christian; as it had been in the Jewish Scriptures, with a view of fixing a constitution for succeeding ages ; and which constitution, consequently, the disciples of Christianity would every where, and at all times, by the very law of their religion be obliged to adopt. Certainly no command for this purpose was delivered by Christ himself ; and if it be shewn that the apostles ordained bishops and presbyters among their first converts, it must be remembered that deacons also and deaconesses were appointed by them with functions very dissimilar to any which obtain in the church at present. The truth seems to have been that such offices were at first erected in the Christian Church, as the good order, the instruction, and the exigencies of the

society at that time required, without any intention, at least without any declared design of regulating the appointment, authority, or the distinctions of Christian ministers under future circumstances. This reserve, if we may so call it, in the Christian Legislator is sufficiently accounted for by two considerations: 1st, that no precise constitution could be framed which would suit with the condition of Christianity in its primitive state, and with that it was to assume when it should be advanced into a national religion. 2dly, that a particular designation of office or authority, amongst the ministers of the new religion, might have so interfered with the arrangements of civil policy, as to have formed in some countries a considerable obstacle to the progress and reception of the religion itself. The authority, therefore, of a Church Establishment is founded in its *utility*; and whenever, upon this principle, we deliberate concerning the form, propriety, or comparative excellency of different establishments, the single view, under which we ought to consider any of them, is that of a “scheme of instruction;” the single end we ought to propose by them is, “the preservation and communication of religious knowledge.” Every other idea, and every other end

that have been mixed with this, as the making of the church an engine or even an *ally* of the state, converting it into the means of strengthening, or of diffusing influence ; or regarding it as a support of regal, in opposition to popular forms of government, have served only to debase the institution, and to introduce into it numerous corruptions and abuses.

*The Resurrection illustrated by Natural
Objects.*

But above every other article of revealed religion, does the anterior belief of a Deity bear with the strongest force upon that grand point, which gives, indeed, interest and importance to all the rest—the resurrection of the human dead. The thing might appear hopeless, did we not see a power at work adequate to the effect, a power under the guidance of an intelligent will, and a power penetrating the inmost recesses of all substance. They who have taken up the opinion that the acts of the human mind depend upon *organization*, are supposed to find a greater difficulty than others do, in admitting a transition by death to a new state of sentient existence, because the old *organization* is apparently dis-

solved. But I do not see that the change, even upon their hypothesis, is far removed from the analogy of some other operations, which we know with certainty, that the Deity is carrying on. In the ordinary derivation of plants and animals from one another, a particle in many cases, minuter than all assignable, all conceivable dimension—an aura, an effluvium, an infinitesimal, determines the organization of a future body; does no less than fix, whether that which is about to be produced, shall be a vegetable, a merely sentient, or a rational being; an oak, a frog, or a philosopher; makes all these differences; gives to the futuré body its qualities, and nature, and species. And this particle, from which springs, and by which is determined a whole future nature, itself proceeds from, and owes its constitution to a prior body; nevertheless, which is seen in plants most decisively, the incepted organization, though formed within, and through, and by a preceding organization, is not corrupted by its corruption, or destroyed by its dissolution; but on the contrary, is sometimes extricated and developed by those very causes; survives and comes into action when the purpose for which it was prepared requires its use. Now an economy which na-

ture has adopted, when the purpose was to transfer an organization from one individual to another, may have something analogous to it, when the purpose is to transmit an organization from one state of being to another state : and they who found thought in organization, may see something in this analogy applicable to their difficulties ; for, whatever can transmit a similarity of organization, will answer their purpose, because, according even to their own theory, it may be the vehicle of consciousness, and because consciousness carries identity and individuality along with it through all changes of form, or of visible qualities. In the most general case of the derivation of plants and animals one from another, the latent organization is either itself similar to the old organization, or has the power of communicating to new matter, the old organic form. But it is not restricted to this rule ; there are other cases, especially in the progress of insect life, in which the dormant organization does not much resemble [that which encloses it, and still less suits with the situation in which the enclosing body is placed, but suits with a different situation to which it is destined. In the larva of the *libellula*, which lives constantly, and has still long to live under,

water, are descried the wings of a fly, with which two years afterwards, it is to mount into the air. Is there nothing in this analogy? It serves at least to show, that even in the observable course of nature, organizations are formed one beneath another; and amongst a thousand other instances, it shows completely, that the Deity can mould and fashion the parts of material nature so as to fulfil any purpose whatever which he is pleased to appoint.

Again, if there be those who think that the contractedness and debility of the human faculties in our present state, seem ill to accord with the high destinies which the expectations of religion point out to us, I would only ask them whether any one who saw a child two hours after its birth, could suppose that it would ever come to understand *fluxions*; or, who shall then say what farther amplification of intellectual powers, what accession of knowledge, what advance and improvement the rational faculty, be its constitution what it will, may not admit of, when placed amidst new objects, and endowed with a sensorium adapted to the perception of those substances, and of those properties of things, with which our concern may lie. Upon the whole, in every thing which respects this

awful, but we trust, glorious change, we have a wise and powerful Being, upon whom to rely for the choice and appointment of means adequate to the execution of any plan, which his goodness or his justice may have formed for the moral and accountable part of his terrestrial creation. That great office rests with *him* : be it *ours* to hope and to prepare, under a firm and settled persuasion, that, living and dying we are his ; that life is past in his constant presence, that death resigns us to his merciful disposal.

The Resurrection of Life ; Subjects of it.

You ask who shall come to the resurrection of life ? The text, John v. 28, 29, replies, *they that have done good*. Observe well, and never forget this answer. It is not the wise, the learned, the great, the honoured, the professor of this or that doctrine, the member of this church, or the maintainer of that article of faith, but *he that doeth good* ; *he* of whatever quality or condition, who strives honestly to make his life of service to those about him ; to be useful in his calling, and to his generation ; to his family, to his neighbourhood, and according to his ability, to his country and to mankind ; “ *he*

that doeth good." All the rest without this, goes for nothing, though he understand the things of religion ever so well, or believe ever so rightly : though he cry, Lord, Lord ; be he ever so constant and devout in his prayers, or talk ever so much, or ever so well, or so earnestly for religion ; unless he do good ; unless his actions and dealings and behaviour come up to his knowledge, and his discourse correspond with his outward profession and belief, it will avail him nothing ; he is not the man to whom Jesus Christ hath promised in the text, that he shall come to the resurrection of life. The issue of life and death is put upon our conduct and behaviour ; that is, made the test we are to be tried by. Here let the timorous conscience take courage. It is not any man's errors, or ignorance ; his want of understanding, or education, or ability, that will be laid to his charge at the day of judgment, or that will bring him into danger of the damnation which the gospel threatens ; it is *having done evil* ; having wilfully gone about to disobey what he knew to be the will and command of his Creator, by committing mischief, and doing wrong and injury to his fellow creatures.

Sabbatical Institutions, their use.

As an assembly cannot be collected unless the time of assembling be fixed and known beforehand, and if the design of the assembly require that it be holden frequently, it is easiest that it should return at stated intervals. This produces a necessity of appropriating set seasons to the social offices of religion. It is also highly convenient that the *same* seasons be observed throughout the country, that all may be employed, or all at leisure together ; for if the recess from worldly occupation be not general, one man's business will perpetually interfere with another man's devotion : the buyer will be calling at the shop when the seller is gone to church. This part, therefore, of the religious distinction of seasons ; namely, a general intermission of labour and business during times previously set apart for the exercise of public worship, is founded in the reasons which make public worship itself a duty. Whoever considers how much sabbatical institutions conduce to the happiness and civilization of the labouring classes of mankind, and reflects how great a majority of the human species these classes compose, will acknowledge the *utility*, what-

ever he may believe of the origin of this distinction, and will consequently perceive it to be every man's duty to uphold the observation of Sunday, when once established, let the establishment have proceeded from what authority it will. Nor is there any thing lost to the community by the intermission of public industry one day in the week. For in countries tolerably advanced in population, and in the arts of civil life, there is always enough of human labour, and to spare. The addition of the seventh day's labour to that of the other six, would have no other effect than to reduce the price. The labourer himself, who deserved and suffered most by the change, would gain nothing. Sunday, by suspending many public diversions, and the ordinary rotation of employment, leaves to men, of all ranks and professions, sufficient leisure, and not more than what is sufficient, for the external offices of Christianity, and the retired, but equally necessary duties of religious meditation and inquiry. Lastly, they whose humanity embraces the whole sensitive creation, will esteem it no inconsiderable recommendation of a weekly return of public rest, that it affords a respite to the toil of brutes. Nor can we omit to account this among the uses which the Divine founder of the Jewish sabbath, expressly appointed a law of the institution.

And since the obligation upon Christians to comply with the religious observance of Sunday arises from the public uses of the institution, and the authority of the apostolic practice, the *manner* of observing it ought to be that which best fulfils *these* uses and conforms the nearest to this practice.

Scripture, Difficulties in Understanding.

It must not be dissembled that there are many real difficulties in the Christian scriptures; whilst at the same time, more I believe, and greater, may justly be imputed to certain maxims of interpretation, which have obtained authority without reason, and are received without inquiry. One of these, as I apprehend, is the expecting to find, in the present circumstances of Christianity, a meaning for, or something answering to every appellation and expression which occurs in scripture, or in other words, the applying to the personal condition of Christians at this day, those titles, phrases, propositions and arguments which belong solely to the situation of Christianity at its first institution.

I am aware of an objection which weighs much with many serious tempers, namely, that to sup-

pose a part of scripture to be inapplicable to us, is to suppose a part of scripture to be useless ; which seems to detract from the perfection we attribute to these oracles of our salvation. To this I can only answer, that it would have been one of the strangest things in the world, if the writings of the New Testament had not, like all other books been composed for the apprehension, and consequently adapted to the circumstances, of the persons they were addressed to ; and that it would have been equally strange, if the great, and in many respects inevitable alterations which have taken place in those circumstances, did not vary the application of scripture language.

At the time the scriptures were written, none were baptized but converts, and none were converted but from conviction, and conviction produced for the most part, a corresponding reformation of life and manners. Hence baptism was only another name for conversion, and conversion was supposed to be sincere : in this sense was our Saviour's promise, " he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved," and other similar passages. Now when we come to speak of the baptism which obtains in most Christian churches at present, where no conversion is supposed or possible, it is manifest, that if these

expressions be applied at all, they must be applied with extreme qualification and reserve.

The community of Christians were at first a handful of men connected amongst themselves by the strictest union, and divided from the rest of the world by a real difference of principle and persuasion; and what was more observable, by many outward peculiarities of worship and behaviour. This society considered collectively, and as a body, were set apart from the rest of mankind for a more gracious dispensation, as well as actually distinguished by a superior purity of life and conversation. In this view, and in opposition to the unbelieving world, they were denominated in scripture by titles of great seeming dignity and import, they were "elect," "called," "saints;" they were "in Christ," they were "a chosen generation, a holy nation, a peculiar people." That is those terms were employed to distinguish the professors of Christianity from the rest of mankind in general.

The conversion of a person from Heathenism to Christianity, which is the case of conversion, commonly intended in the Epistles, was a change of which we have now no just conception, it was a new name, a new language, a new society, a new faith, a new hope; a new object of worship, a

new rule of life ; a history was disclosed full of discovery and surprize ; a prospect of futurity was unfolded, beyond imagination awful and august ; the same description applies in a great part though not entirely, to the conversion of a Jew. This accompanied as it was with the pardon of every former sin, (Romans iii. 25.) was such an æra in a man's life, so remarkable a period in his recollection, such a revolution of every thing that was most important to him, as might well admit of those strong figures and significant allusions by which it is described in scripture : it was a " regeneration," or a new birth ; it was to be " born again of God, and of the spirit ;" it was to be " dead to sin," and " alive from the dead ;" it was to be " buried with Christ in baptism and raised together with him," it was " a new creature," and " a new creation ;" it was a translation from the condition of slaves " to that of sons ;" from " strangers and foreigners to be fellow citizens with the saints, and of the household of God." It is manifest that no change equal or similar to the conversion of a heathen can be experienced by us, or by any one educated in a Christian country, and to whom the facts, precepts, and hopes, of Christianity, have been from his infancy fa-

miliar : yet we still retain the same language ; and what has been the consequence. One sort of men observing nothing in the lives of Christians corresponding to the magnificence, if I may so say, of these expressions, have been tempted to conclude, that the expressions themselves had no foundation in truth and nature, or in any thing but the enthusiasm of their authors. Others again understand these phrases to signify nothing more than that gradual amendment of life, and conversation, which reason and religion sometimes produce in particular Christians : of which interpretation it is truly said, that it degrades too much the proper force of language to apply expressions of such energy and import to an event so ordinary in its own nature, and which is common to Christianity, with every other moral institution. Lastly ; a third sort, in order to satisfy these expressions to their full extent have imagined to themselves certain perceptible impulses of the Holy Ghost, by which, in an instant, and in a manner no doubt sufficiently extraordinary, they are “ regenerate and born of the spirit,” they become “ new creatures ;” they are made the “ sons of God,” who were before the “ children of wrath ;” they are “ freed from sin,”

and “from death,” they are chosen, that is, and sealed, without a possibility of fall, into final salvation. Whilst the patrons of a more sober exposition have been often challenged, and sometimes confounded with the question—If such expressions of scripture do not mean this, what do they mean? To which we answer, nothing: nothing that is to us, nothing to be found, or sought for, in the present circumstances of Christianity.

Seduction.

This is seldom accomplished without fraud, and the fraud is by so much the more criminal than other frauds, as the injury effected by it is greater, continues longer, and less admits of reparation. The injury is threefold, to the woman, to her family, and to the public. The loss which a woman sustains by the ruin of her reputation almost exceeds computation. Every person's happiness depends in part upon the respect and reception which they meet with in the world; and it is no inconsiderable mortification, even to the firmest tempers, to be rejected from the society of their equals, or received there

with neglect and disdain. But this is not all, nor the worst. By a rule of life, which it is not easy to blame, and which is impossible to alter, a woman loses with her chastity, the chance of marrying at all, or in any manner equal to the hopes she had been accustomed to entertain. Now marriage, whatever it be to a man, is that from which every woman expects her chief happiness. And this is still more true in low life, of which condition the women are, who are most exposed to solicitations of this sort. Add to this, that where a woman's maintenance depends upon her character, as it does in a great measure with those who are to support themselves by service, little sometimes is left to the forsaken sufferer, but to starve for want of employment, or to have recourse to prostitution for food and raiment.

Upon the whole, if we pursue the effects of seduction through the complicated misery which it occasions ; and if it be right to estimate crimes by the mischief they knowingly produce, it will appear something more than mere invective to assert that not one half of the crimes for which men suffer death by the laws of England are so flagitious as this.

Sickness Considered as the Trial of Virtue.

But my present subject leads me to consider sickness, not so much as a preparation for death, as the trial of our virtue ; of virtues, the most severe, the most arduous, perhaps the best pleasing to Almighty God ; namely, trust and confidence in him under circumstances of discouragement and perplexity. To lift up the feeble hands, and the languid eye : to draw and turn with holy hope to our creator, when every comfort forsakes us, and every help fails : to feel and find in him, in his mercies, his promises, in the works of his providences, and still more in his word, and in the revelation of his designs by Jesus Christ, such rest and consolation to the soul, as to stifle our complaints, and pacify our murmurs : to beget in our hearts, tranquillity and confidence, in the place of terror and consternation, and this with simplicity and sincerity, *without having, or wishing to have one human witness to observe or know it*, is such a test and trial of faith and hope, of patience and devotion, as cannot fail of being in a very high degree well-pleasing to the author of our nature, the guardian, the inspector, and the rewarder of our virtues. It is true

in this instance, as it is true in all, that whatever tries our virtue strengthens and improves it; virtue comes out of the fire purer and brighter than it went into it. Many virtues are not only proved, but produced by trials: they have properly no existence without them, "We glory," saith St. Paul "in tribulation also, knowing that tribulation worketh patience, and patience experience, and experience hope."

Slander.

Speaking is acting, both in philosophical strictness, and as to all moral purposes; for, if the mischief and motive of our conduct be the same, the means which we use make no difference.

Malicious slander, is the relating of either *truth* or falsehood for the purpose of creating misery. I acknowledge that the truth or falsehood of what is related varies the degree of guilt considerably; and that slander, in the ordinary acceptation of the term signifies the circulation of *mischievous falsehoods*; but *truth* may be made instrumental to the success of malicious designs, as well as falsehood; and if the end be bad, the means cannot be innocent.

Sometimes the pain is intended for the person to whom we are speaking ; at other times an enmity is to be gratified by the prejudice or disquiet of a third person. To infuse suspicions, to kindle, or to continue disputes, to avert the favour and esteem of benefactors from their dependents, to render some one obnoxious in the public opinion, are all offices of slander ; of which the guilt must be measured by the intensity and extent of the misery produced.

*Splendid Situations in the Church, their
Necessity.*

These have been justly regarded as prizes held out to invite persons of good hopes and ingenuous attainments to enter into its service. The value of the prospect may be the same, but the allurements are much greater, where opulent shares are reserved to reward the success of a few, than where, by a more equal partition of the fund, all indeed are competently provided for, but no one can raise even his hopes beyond a penurious mediocrity of subsistence and situation. It is certainly of consequence that young men of promising abilities be encouraged to engage in the ministry of the church ; otherwise our pro-

fession will be composed of the refuse of every other. None will be found content to stake the fortune of their lives in this calling ; but they whom slow parts, personal defects, or a depressed condition of birth and education preclude from advancement in any other. The vocation in time comes to be thought mean and uncreditable—study languishes—sacred erudition declines—not only the order is disgraced, but religion itself disparaged under such hands. Some of the most judicious and moderate of the presbyterian clergy have been known to lament this defect in their constitution. They see and deplore the backwardness in youth of active and well-cultivated faculties to enter into the Church, and their frequent resolutions to quit it. Again, if a gradation of orders be necessary to invite candidates into the profession, it is still more so to excite diligence and emulation, to promote an attention to character and public opinion when they are in it ; especially to guard against that sloth and negligence into which men are apt to fall, who are arrived too soon at the limits of their expectations. We will not say that the race is always to the swift, or the prize to the deserving, but we have never known that

age of the church in which the advantage was not on the side of learning and decency.

Suicide.

In every question of conduct where one side is doubtful, and the other side safe, we are bound to take the safe side. This is best explained by an instance; and I know of none more to our purpose than that of suicide.

Suppose, for example's sake, that it appear doubtful to a reasoner upon the subject whether he may lawfully destroy himself. He can have no doubt but that it is lawful for him to let it alone. Here therefore is a case, in which one side is doubtful, and the other side safe. By virtue therefore of our rule, he is bound to pursue the safe side, that is, to forbear from offering violence to himself, whilst a doubt remains upon his mind concerning the lawfulness of suicide.

Secret Sins.

Serious minds are shocked with observing with what complete unconcern and indifference many forbidden things are practiced. The per-

sons who are guilty of them do not by any mark or symptom whatever, appear to feel the smallest rebuke of conscience, or to have the least sense of either guilt, or danger, or shame, in what they do; and it not only appears to be so, but it is so. They are in fact without any notice, consciousness, or compunction upon the subject. These sins therefore, if they be such, are *secret sins* to them. But are they not therefore sins? That becomes the next great question. We must allow, because fact proves it, that habit and custom can destroy the sense and perception of sin. Does the act then in that person cease to be any longer a sin? This must be asserted by those who argue, that nothing can be a sin but what is known and understood, and also felt and perceived to be so by the sinner himself at the time; and who, consequently, deny that there are any *secret sins*, in our sense of that expression. Now mark the consequences which would follow from such an opinion. It is then the timorous *beginner* in wicked courses who alone can be brought to account. Can such a doctrine be maintained? Unless therefore, we will choose to say, that a man has only to harden himself in his sins (which thing perseverance will always do for him) and that with

the *sense* he takes away the *guilt* of them ; and, that the only sinner is the conscious, trembling, affrighted, reluctant sinner ; that the confirmed sinner is no sinner at all ; unless we will advance this which affronts all principles of justice and sense, we must confess that *secret sins* are both frequent and possible things ; that with the habitual sinner, and with every man in so far as he is, and in that article in which he is an habitual sinner, this is almost sure to be the case.

How well does the scripture express the state of the habitual sinner when it calls him “*dead in trespasses and sins !*” His conscience is dead : that which ought to be the living, actuating, governing principle of the whole man, is dead within him : is extinguished by the power of sin reigning in his heart. He is incapable of perceiving his sins, while he commits them with greediness. It is evident that a vast alteration must take place in such a man before he be brought into the way of salvation.

Standing Army.

A standing army can only oppose a standing army. The discipline of a standing army will always overpower newly-levied troops ; and

though a militia with a great excess of numbers may sustain a flying war against regular troops, and though service may transform it in effect into a standing army, yet it would be necessary for almost a whole nation to go out to war to repel an invader. If the state depends upon the militia, arms must be put into the hands of the people at large; and it seems doubtful whether any government can be long secure amidst this general diffusion of the military character; for every faction will find itself at the head of an army. Nothing, perhaps, can govern a nation of armed citizens, but that which governs an army—Despotism. The standing army should be directed by the prince, for success depends upon secrecy, dispatch, and unanimity, which are almost incompatible with a popular council: but, if in governments like ours, this department were in the hands of the democratic part of the constitution, the real prerogative would be overbalanced completely. The danger of a standing army is, that the separation of the soldiery from the rest of the community, and their dependence upon the will of the prince, give them an aspect by no means favourable to liberty. To diminish this danger, officers should be taken from the principal families of the country, be encouraged

to establish in it families of their own, be admitted to seats in the senate, and to all the civil honours and privileges that are compatible with with their profession. Thus they would have such a share in the general rights of the people, that no personal views could induce them to assist in measures, which otherwise might enslave their posterity, kindred, and country.

Subscription to Articles of Religion.

Subscription to articles of religion though no more than a *declaration* of the subscriber's assent, may properly enough be considered in connexion with oaths, because it is governed by the same rule of interpretation; which rule is the *animus imponentis*. The inquiry therefore concerning subscription will be, *quis imposuit, et quo animo?* The Bishop who receives the subscription is not the imposer, any more than the cryer of a court who administers the oath to the jury and witnesses, is the person that imposes it; nor consequently, is the private opinion or the interpretation of the bishop of any signification to the subscriber, one way or the other. The compilers of the Thirty-nine Articles, are not to be considered as the imposers of subscription,

any more than the framer or drawer up of a law is the person that enacts it.

The legislature of the 13th Eliz. is the imposer, whose intention the subscriber is bound to satisfy. They who contend, that nothing less can justify subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles, than the actual belief of each and every separate proposition contained in them, must suppose, that the legislature expected the consent of ten thousand men, and that in perpetual succession—not to one controverted proposition, but to many hundreds. It is difficult to conceive how this could be expected by any who observed the incurable diversity of human opinion upon all subjects short of demonstration.

If the authors of the law did not intend this, what did they intend? They intended to exclude from offices in the church, all abettors of popery; anabaptists, who were at that time, a powerful party on the continent; the puritans, who were hostile to an episcopal constitution; and in general, the leading members of such sects, or foreign establishments, as threatened to overthrow our own.

Whoever finds himself comprehended within these subscriptions, ought not to subscribe. Nor can a subscriber to the Articles take advantage

of any latitude which our rule may seem to allow, who is not first convinced that he is truly and substantially satisfying the intention of the legislator.

During the present state of ecclesiastical patronage, in which private individuals are permitted to impose teachers upon parishes, with which they are often little, or not all connected, some limitation of the patron's choice may be necessary to prevent unedifying contentions between neighbouring teachers, or, between the teachers and their respective congregations. But this danger, if it exist, may be provided against with equal effect, by converting the articles of faith into articles of peace.

Taxes.

The sum to be raised being settled, a wise statesman will contrive his taxes principally with a view to their effect upon *population*; that is, he will so adjust them as to give the least possible obstruction to those means of subsistence by which the mass of the community is maintained. We are accustomed to an opinion that a tax, to be just, ought to be accurately proportioned to the *circumstances* of the persons who pay it.

But upon what, it might be asked, is this opinion founded; unless it could be shewn that such a proportion interferes the least with the general conveniency of subsistence? Whereas I should rather believe that a tax constructed with a view to that conveniency, ought to rise upon the different classes of the community, in a much *higher* ratio than the simple *proportion* of their incomes. The point to be regarded, is not *what* men *have*, but what they can *spare*; and it is evident that a man who possesses a thousand pounds a year, can more easily give up a hundred, than a man with a hundred pounds a year can part with ten: that is, those habits of life, which are reasonable and innocent, and upon the ability to continue which, the formation of families depends, will be much less affected by the one deduction than the other. It is still more evident that a man of a hundred pounds a year would not be so much distressed in his subsistence by a demand from him of ten pounds, as a man of ten pounds a year would be by the loss of one; to which we must add that the population of every country being replenished by the marriages of the lower ranks, their accommodation and relief become of more importance to the state than the conveniency of any

higher but less numerous order of its citizens. But whatever be the proportion which public expediency directs, it can never be attained by any *single* tax. It is only by a system and variety of taxes, mutually balancing and equalizing each other that a due proportion can be preserved. Distinctions may be framed in some taxes, which shall allow abatements or exemptions to married persons ; to the parents of a certain number of legitimate children ; to particular modes of cultivation ; to tillage in preference to pasturage ; and, in general, to that industry which is immediately *productive*, in preference to that which is only *instrumental* ; but above all, which may leave the heaviest part of the burthen upon the *methods, whatever they be*, of acquiring wealth *without industry*, or even of subsisting in idleness.

The Terrors of the Lord.

As to *the punishment of hell*, I do admit, that it is very difficult to handle this dreadful subject properly. And one cause is, that it is not for one poor sinner to denounce such appalling terrors, such tremendous consequences against another. Damnation is a word which lies

not in the mouth of man, who is a worm, towards any of his fellow creatures whatsoever ; yet it is absolutely necessary that the threatenings of Almighty God be known and published. Therefore we begin by observing that the accounts which the Scriptures contain of the punishment of hell, are, for the most part, delivered in figurative or metaphorical terms, that is to say, in terms which represent things of which we have no notion, by a comparison with things of which we have of a notion. Therefore take notice what those figures and metaphors are. They are of the most dreadful kind which words can express ; and be they understood how they may, ever so figuratively, it is plain that they convey, and were intended to convey, ideas of horrible torment. They are such as these, “ being cast into hell where the worm dieth not, and where the fire is not quenched.” It is “ burning the chaff with unquenchable fire.” It is “ going into fire everlasting, which is prepared for the devil and his angels.” These are heart apalling expressions ; and were undoubtedly intended to describe terrible endurings, positive, actual pains of the most horrible kinds. I have said, that the punishment of hell is thus represented in figurative speech, I now say, that from

the nature of things, it could hardly have been represented to us in any other. It is of the very nature of pain, that it cannot be known without being felt. It is impossible to give to any one an exact conception of it without his actually tasting it. Experience alone teaches its acuteness and intensity. For which reason, when it was necessary that the punishment of hell should be set forth in Scripture for our warning, and set forth to terrify us from our sins, it could only be done, as it has been done, by comparing it with sufferings, of which we can form a conception, and making use of terms drawn from these sufferings. When words less figurative, and more direct, but at the same time more general are adopted, they are not less strong, otherwise than as they are more general. "Indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that doeth evil." These are Saint Paul's words. It is a short sentence, but enough to make the stoutest heart tremble: for, though it unfold no particulars, it clearly designates positive torment. The day of judgment itself, so far as it respects the wicked, is expressly called "a day of wrath." "The Lord Jesus," as to them, "shall be revealed in flaming fire." How terrible a fate it must be to

find ourselves at that day of God's wrath, the objects upon whom his threats and judgments against sin are now to be executed.

Now if any one feel his heart struck with the terrors of the Lord, with the consideration of this dreadful subject, and with the declarations of Scripture relating thereto, which will all have their accomplishment; let him be entreated, let him be admonished to hold the idea, tremendous as it is, fully in his view, till it has wrought its effect, that is, till it has prevailed with him to part with his sins; and then we assure him, that to alarm, fright, and horror, will succeed peace, and hope, and comfort, and joy in the Holy Ghost. There is another way of treating the matter, and that is, to shake off the idea if we can; to drown it in intemperance: to overpower it with worldly business; to fly from it in all directions, but mostly in that which carries us to hurrying tumultuous diversions, to criminal indulgences, or into gross sensuality. But this is a way of getting rid of the matter with which even we ourselves are not satisfied. We are sensible that it is a false, treacherous, hollow way of acting towards our own souls. We have no trust in what we are doing. It leaves no peace, no hope, no comfort, no joy.

Tithes.

Agriculture is discouraged by every constitution of landed property which lets in those who have no concern in the improvement to a participation of the profit. This objection is applicable to all such customs of manors as subject the proprietor, upon the death of the lord or tenant, or the alienation of the estate, to a fine apportioned to the improved value of the land. But of all institutions which are in this way adverse to cultivation and improvement, none is so noxious as that of *tithes*. A claimant here enters into the produce who contributed no assistance whatever to the production. When years perhaps of care and toil have matured an improvement; when the husbandman sees new crops ripening to his skill and industry; the moment he is ready to put his sickle to the grain, he finds himself compelled to divide his harvest with a stranger. Tithes are a tax, not only upon industry which feeds mankind; upon that species of exertion which it is the aim of all wise laws to cherish and promote; and to uphold and excite which, composes, as we have seen, the main benefit that the community receives from the whole system of trade, and the

success of commerce. And together with the more general inconveniency that attends the exaction of tythes, there is this additional evil in the mode at least in which they are collected at present, that they operate as a bounty upon pasturage. The burthen of the tax falls with its chief, if not with its whole weight upon tillage; that is to say, upon that mode of cultivation which it is the business of the state to relieve and remunerate, in preference to every other. No measure of such extensive concern appears to me so practicable, nor any single alteration so beneficial as the conversion of tythes into corn rents. This commutation, I am convinced, might be so adjusted as to secure to the titheholder a complete and perpetual equivalent for his interest, and to leave to industry its full operation and entire reward.

Toleration.

Under the idea of religious toleration, I include the toleration of all books of *serious* argumentation; but I deem it no infringement of religious liberty to restrain the circulation of ridicule, invective, and mockery upon religious subjects; because this species of writing applies

solely to the passions, weakens the judgment, and contaminates the imagination of its readers ; has no tendency whatever so assist either the investigation or the impression of truth : on the contrary, whilst it stays not to distinguish between the authority of different religions, it destroys alike the influence of all. Concerning the admission of dissenters from the established religion to offices and employments in the public service (which is necessary to render toleration *complete*) doubts have been entertained with some appearance of reason. It is possible that such religious opinions may be holden, as are utterly incompatible with the necessary functions of civil government ; and which opinions consequently disqualify those who maintain them from exercising any share in its administration. There have been enthusiasts who held that Christianity has abolished all distinctions of property, and that she enjoins upon her followers a community of goods. With what tolerable propriety could one of this sect be appointed a judge or magistrate, whose office it is to decide upon questions of private right, and to protect men in the exclusive enjoyment of their property ? It would be equally absurd to entrust a military command to a Quaker, who believes it to be

contrary to the gospel to take up arms. This is possible ; therefore it cannot be laid down as an universal truth, that religion is not in its nature, a cause which will justify exclusion from public employments. When we examine however, the sects of Christianity which actually prevail in the world, we must confess that with the single exception of refusing to bear arms, we find no tenet in any of them which incapacitates men for the service of the state. It has indeed been asserted that discordancy of religions, even supposing each religion to be free from any errors that affect the safety or the conduct of government, is enough to render men unfit to act together in public stations. But upon what argument, or what experience, is this assertion founded.

The result of our examination of those general tendencies, by which every interference of civil government in matters of religion ought to be tried, is this : “ That a comprehensive national religion, guarded by a few articles of peace and conformity, together with a legal provision for the clergy of that religion, and with a *complete* toleration of all dissenters from the established church, without any other limitation or exception than what arises from the conjunction

of dangerous political dispositions with certain religious tenets, appears to be not only the most just and liberal, but the wisest and safest system which a state can adopt, inasmuch as it unites the several perfections which a religious constitution ought to aim at—liberty of conscience with means of instruction ; the progress of truth with the peace of society ; the right of private judgment with the care of the public safety.

Universality ; objections to the want of it in the Knowledge and Reception of Christianity, answered.

OBJECTION.—If revelation came from God, no part of the human species would remain ignorant of it ; no understanding could fail of being convinced by it.

ANSWER.—The advocates of Christianity do not pretend that their religion possesses these qualities, nor do they deny it to have been within the compass of divine power to have communicated to the world, a stronger and more extensive influence. The not having more evidence, is not, however, a sufficient reason for rejecting that which we have. If this dispensation labour under no defects, but what are com-

mon to others, we are not justified in rejecting it. Throughout *nature*, which is a system of beneficence, we are seldom able to make out a system of *optimism*. To inquire what the Deity *might* have done, is a mode of reasoning which will *not* do in *natural history*, nor in *natural religion*, and, therefore, cannot, with safety, be applied to *revelation*. The general character of the works of nature, is on the one hand, goodness and design in effect, and on the other, a liability to difficulty and objections.—Christianity participates in the same character; nevertheless the real system in both cases, may be a system of strict optimism, although the proof be hidden from us. If Christianity be compared with the state and progress of natural religion, the objector will gain nothing by the comparison. *Natural religion* is not universal; the existence of the Deity is not known to all, but it cannot be argued, that therefore he does not exist. If Christianity be regarded as an instrument for the melioration of mankind, its progress resembles that of other causes, by which human life is improved; it has put things into a *train*; it may become universal; and the world may continue in that state so long, as that its duration may bear a vast proportion to the time of its partial influence. Besides—

1. *Irresistible evidence* would restrain the voluntary power too much to answer the purpose of trial or probation.

2. It would leave no place for the admission of the *eternal* evidence, which applies itself to the knowledge, love, and practice of virtue, and which operates in proportion to the degree of those qualities which it finds in the person whom it addresses.

3. It may be questioned, whether the perfect display of a future state would not make a degree of impression upon the mind, incompatible with the duties of life.

Vows.

Vows are promises to God. The obligation cannot be made out upon the same principle as that of other promises. The violation of them, nevertheless, implies a want of reverence to the Supreme Being; which is enough to make it sinful. There appears no command or encouragement in the Christian Scriptures to make vows; much less any authority to break through them when they are made. The few instances of vows which we read of in the New Testament, were religiously observed. The rules we have laid down concerning promises, are appli-

cable to vows. Thus Jephtha's vow, taken in the sense in which that transaction is commonly understood, was not binding, because the performance in that contingency became unlawful.

Virtues.

The custom of viewing our virtues has a strong tendency to fill us with fallacious notions of our own state and condition. One almost constant deception is this, viz. that in whatever quality we have pretensions to excel, that quality we place at the head of all other virtues. If we be charitable, then "charity covereth a multitude of sins." If we be strictly honest, then strict honesty is no less than the bond which keeps society together. If we be temperate and chaste, then self-government being the hardest of all duties, is the surest test of obedience. Now every one of these propositions is true; but the misfortune is, that only one of them is thought of at the time, that which favours our own particular cost and character. Again; a man who is continually computing his riches, almost in spite of himself grows proud of his wealth. A man who accustoms himself to read and inquire, and think a great deal about his family, becomes vain of his extraction; he can hardly help becoming so.

A man who has his titles sounding in his ears, or his state much before his eyes, is lifted up by his rank. These are effects which spring from the habit of meditating upon our virtues. Now humble-mindedness is a Christian duty, if there be one. It is more than a duty ; it is a principle of our religion, and its influence is exceedingly great, not only upon our religious but our social character. They who are truly humble-minded have no quarrels, give no offence, contend with no one in wrath and bitterness ; still more impossible is it for them to *insult* any man, under any circumstances.

Passive virtues, of all others the severest and most sublime ; of all others, perhaps, the most acceptable to the Deity, would, it is evident, be excluded from a constitution in which happiness and misery regularly followed virtue and vice.—Patience and composure under distress, affliction and pain ; a steadfast keeping up of our confidence in God, and of our reliance upon his final goodness, at the time when every thing present is adverse and discouraging ; and, what is no less difficult to retain, a cordial desire for the happiness of others, even when we are deprived of our own : these dispositions, which constitute, perhaps, the perfection of our moral nature,

would not have found their proper office and object in a state of avowed retribution ; and in which, consequently, *endurance of evil* would be only submission to punishment.

Again ; one man's sufferings may be another man's trial. The family of a sick parent is a school of filial piety. The charities of domestic life, and not only these, but all the social virtues, are called out by distress. But then, misery, to be the proper object of mitigation, or of that benevolence which endeavours to relieve, must be *really* or apparently *casual*. It is upon such sufferings alone that benevolence can operate. Thus, in a religious view, privation, disappointment, and satiety, are not without the most salutary tendencies.

War.

The justifying causes of war are, deliberate invasions of right, and the necessity of maintaining such a balance of power amongst neighbouring nations as that no single state or confederacy be strong enough to overwhelm the rest. The objects of just war are precaution, defence, or reparation : every just war supposes an injury perpetrated, attempted, or feared. The insuffi-

cient causes, or unjustifiable motives of war, are the family alliances, the personal friendships, or personal quarrels of princes : the internal disputes which are carried on in other nations ; the justice of other wars, the extension of territory or of trade ; the misfortunes or accidental weakness of a neighbouring, or a rival nation. There are two lessons of rational and sober policy, which, if it were possible to inculcate them into the councils of princes, would exclude many of the motives of war, and allay that restless ambition which is constantly stirring up one part of mankind against another. The first of these lessons admonishes princes “to place their glory and their emulation, not in extent of territory, but in raising the greatest quantity of happiness out of a given territory.” The enlargement of territory by conquest, is not only not a just object in war, but in a greater part of the instances in which it is attempted, not even desirable. It is certainly not desirable where it adds nothing to the numbers, the enjoyments, or the security of the conquerors. What commonly is gained to a nation by the annexing of new dependencies, or the subjugation of other countries to its dominions, but a wider frontier to defend ; more interfering claims to vindicate ; more quarrels, more enemies, more rebellions to en-

counter; a greater force to keep up by sea and land; more services to provide for, and more establishments to pay. And to make up for the charge of keeping them, a revenue is to be extorted, or a monopoly to be enforced and watched at an expense which costs half their produce. Thus the provinces are oppressed, in order to pay for being ill-governed; and the original state is exhausted in maintaining a feeble authority over discontented subjects. No assignable portion of country is benefited by the change; and if the sovereign appear to himself to be enriched or strengthened, when every part of his dominion is made poorer and weaker than it was, it is probable that he is deceived by appearances. Or were it true that the grandeur of the prince is magnified by those exploits; the glory which is purchased, and the ambition which is gratified by the distress of one country without adding to the happiness of another, which at the same time enslaves the new and the ancient part of the empire, by whatever names it may be known or flattered, ought to be an object of universal execration: and oftentimes, not more so to the vanquished, than to the very people whose armies or whose treasures have achieved the victory.

The rule of prudence, which ought to be recommended to those who conduct the affairs of nations, is “never to pursue national *honour* as distinct from national *interest*.” This rule acknowledges that it is often necessary to assert the honour of a nation for the sake of its interest. Our rule only directs that, when points of honour become subjects of contention, they be estimated with a reference to *utility*. “The dignity of his crown”—“The honour of his flag”—“The glory of his arms”—in the mouth of a prince, are stately and imposing terms, but the ideas they inspire are insatiable. The pursuit of honour, when set loose from the admonitions of prudence, becomes in kings a wild and romantic passion; for, eager to engage, and gathering fury in its progress, it is checked by no difficulties, repelled by no dangers; it forgets or despises those considerations of safety, ease, wealth, and plenty, which in the eye of true public wisdom, compose the objects, to which the renown of arms and the fame of victory are only instrumental and subordinate. The pursuit of *interest*, on the other hand, is a sober principle; computes costs and consequences; is cautious of entering into war; stops in time: when regulated by those universal maxims of re-

lative justice, which belong to the affairs of communities as well as of private persons, it is the right principle for nations to proceed by—even when it trespasses upon these regulations, it is much less dangerous, because much more temperate than the other.

Wills.

The regard due to kindred in the disposal of our fortune, except the case of lineal kindred (which is different,) arises either from the respect we owe to the presumed intention of the ancestor from whom we received our fortunes, or from the expectations which we have encouraged. The intention of the ancestor is presumed with greater certainty, as well as entitled to more respect, the fewer degrees he is removed from us. Whoever, therefore, without cause, gives away his patrimony from his brother's or sister's family, is guilty not so much of an injury to them, as of ingratitude to his parent. There is always a reason for providing for our poor relations, in preference to others who may be equally necessitous, which is, that if we do not, no one else will : mankind by an established consent, leaving the reduced branches of good families to the bounty of their wealthy alliances.

The not making a will is a very culpable omission, where it is attended with the following effects:—where it leaves daughters, or younger children, at the mercy of the oldest son; where it distributes a personal fortune equally amongst the children, although there be no equality in their exigencies or situations; where it leaves an opening for litigation; or lastly and *principally* where it defrauds creditors: for by a defect in our laws, long and strangely overlooked, real estates are not subject to the payment of debts by simple contract, unless made so by will, although credit is, in fact, generally given to the possession of such estates; he, therefore, who neglects to make the necessary appointment for the payment of his debts, as far as his effects extends, sins in his grave: and if he omits this on purpose to defeat the demands of his creditors, he dies with a deliberate fraud in his heart.

Anciently, when any one died without a will, the bishop of the diocese took possession of his personal fortune, to dispose of it for the benefit of his soul, that is, to pious and charitable uses. It became necessary, therefore, that the bishop should be satisfied of the authenticity of the will, before he resigned the right which he had to take possession of the dead man's fortune in case of intestacy. In this way wills and controversies

relating to wills, came within the cognizance of ecclesiastical courts; under the jurisdiction of which, wills of personals (the only wills that were made formerly) still continue, though in truth, no more now a-days connected with religion than any other instruments of conveyance. This is a peculiarity in the English law.

Witnesses; their duty.

The witness swears to “speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, touching the matter in question.”

Upon which it may be observed, that the designed concealment of any truth which relates to the matter in agitation, is as much a violation of the oath, as to testify a positive falsehood; and this whether the witness be interrogated to that particular point or not. For when the person to be examined is sworn upon a *voir dire*, that is, in order to enquire whether he ought to be admitted to give evidence in the cause at all, the form runs thus: “You shall true answer make to all such questions as shall be asked you;” but, when he comes to be sworn *in chief*, he swears “to speak the whole truth,” without restraining it, as before, to the questions that

shall be asked : which difference shews, that the law intends, in this latter case, to require of the witness, that he give a complete and unreserved account of what he knows of the subject of the trial, whether the questions proposed to him reach the extent of his knowledge or not. So that if it be enquired of the witness afterwards, why he did not inform the court so and so, it is not a sufficient, though a very common answer to say, "because it was never asked me."

The Watch ; an Argument for a Superintending Providence.

In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there ; I might possibly answer that for any thing I knew to the contrary, it had lain there for ever. But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as the stone ? Why is it not as admissible in the second case as in the first ? For this reason, and for no other, viz. that, when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could

not discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, *e. g.* that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day : that if the different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, of a different size from what they are, or placed after any other manner, or in any other order than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the use that is now served by it.

Nor would it I apprehend weaken the conclusion, that we had never seen a watch made ; that we had never known an artist capable of making one ; that we were altogether incapable of executing such a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was performed ; all this being no more than what is true of some exquisite remains of ancient art, of some lost arts, and, to the generality of mankind, of the more curious productions of modern manufacture.

Neither would it invalidate our conclusion, that the watch sometimes went wrong, or that it seldom went exactly right. The purpose of the machinery, the design, and the designer,

might be evident, and in the case supposed would be evident, in whatever way we accounted for the irregularity of the movement, or whether we could account for it or not.

Nor would it bring any uncertainty into the argument, if there were a few parts in the watch, concerning which we could not discover, or had not yet discovered, in what manner they conducted to the general effect; or even some parts, concerning which we could not ascertain whether they conducted to that effect in any manner whatever. For, if by the loss, or disorder, or decay of the parts in question, the movement of the watch were found in fact to be stopped, disturbed, or retarded, no doubt would remain in our minds as to the utility or intention of these parts. Then, as to the second thing supposed, namely, that there were parts which might be spared without prejudice to the movement of the watch,—these superfluous parts, even if we were completely assured that they were such, would not vacate the reasoning which we had instituted concerning other parts.

Nor would any man in his senses think the existence of the watch with its various machinery accounted for by being told that it was one out of possible combinations of material forms; that

whatever he had found in the place where he had found the watch, must have contained some internal configuration or other; and that this configuration might be the structure now exhibited, viz. of the works of a watch, as well as a different structure.

Nor would it yield his inquiry more satisfaction to be answered, that there existed in things a principle of order, which had disposed the parts of the watch into their present form and situation. He never knew a watch made by the principle of order; nor can he even form to himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order, distinct from the intelligence of the watch-maker.

Again, he would be surprized to hear that the mechanism of the watch was no proof of contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think so.

And not less surprized to be informed that the watch in his hand was nothing more than the result of the laws of *metallic* nature. It is a perversion of language to assign any law, as the efficient, operative cause of any thing. A law presupposes an agent; for it is only the mode, according to which an agent proceeds: it implies a power, for it is the order according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without

this power, which are both distinct from itself, the *law* does nothing; is nothing. The expression, “the law of metallic nature,” may sound strange and harsh, but it seems quite as justifiable as “the law of vegetable nature,” “the law of animal nature,” or indeed as “the law of nature” in general, when assigned as the cause of phænomena, in exclusion of agency and power; or when it is substituted into the place of these.

Neither would our observer be driven out of his conclusion, or from his confidence in its truth, by being told that he knew nothing at all about the matter. He knows enough for his argument: he knows the utility of the end: he knows the subserviency and adaptation of the means to the end. These points being known, his ignorance of other points, his doubts concerning other points, affect not the certainty of his reasoning. The consciousness of knowing little, need not beget a distrust of that which he does know.

Youth and Age.

But it is not for youth alone that the great parent of creation hath provided. Happiness is found with the purring cat, no less than with the

playful kitten ; in the arm-chair of dozing age, as well as in the sprightliness of the dance, or the animation of the chase. To novelty, to acuteness of sensation, to hope, to ardour of pursuit, succeeds, what is in no inconsiderable degree, an equivalent for them all, " perception of ease." Herein is the exact difference between the young and the old. The young are not happy but when enjoying pleasure ; the old are happy when free from pain. And this constitution suits with the degrees of animal power which they respectively possess. The vigour of youth was to be stimulated to action by impatience of rest ; whilst to the imbecility of age, quietness and repose become positive gratifications. In one important respect the advantage is with the old. A state of ease is, generally speaking, more attainable than a state of pleasure. A constitution therefore, which can enjoy ease, is preferable to that which can taste only pleasure. This same perception of ease, oftentimes renders old age a condition of great comfort ; especially when riding at its anchor after a busy or tempestuous life. It is well described by Rousseau to be the interval of repose and enjoyment between the hurry and the end of life. " To the intelligent and virtuous, old age presents a scene

of tranquil enjoyments, of obedient appetites, of well-regulated affections, of maturity in knowledge, and of calm preparation for immortality. In this serene and dignified state, placed, as it were, on the confines of two worlds, the mind of a good man reviews what is past with the complacency of an approving conscience, and looks forward with humble confidence in the mercy of God, and with devout aspirations towards his eternal and ever-increasing favour."

Zeal.

The Christian religion either owes the principle of its establishment to the activity of the person who was the founder of the institution, and of those who were joined with him in the undertaking, or we are driven upon the strange supposition, that although they might lie by, others would take it up, and that other persons busied themselves in the propagation of their story. This is perfectly incredible. To me it appears little less than certain, that if the first announcing of the religion of the founder had not been followed up by the zeal and industry of his immediate disciples, the attempt must have expired in its birth. Then as to the kind and degree of

exertion which was employed, and the mode of life to which these persons submitted, we reasonably suppose it to be like that which we observe in all others who voluntarily become missionaries of a new faith. Frequent, earnest and laborious preaching, constantly conversing with religious persons upon religion ; a sequestration from the common pleasures, engagements, and varieties of life ; and an addiction to *one serious object*, compose the habits of such men. I do not say this mode of life is without enjoyment, but I say that the enjoyment springs from sincerity. With a consciousness at the bottom of hollowness and falsehood, the fatigue and restraint would become insupportable. I am apt to believe that very few hypocrites engage in these undertakings. Ordinarily speaking, nothing can overcome the indolence of mankind, the love which is natural to most tempers of cheerful society and cheerful scenes, or the desire which is common to all, of personal ease and freedom, but conviction.

The first of these is the fact that the
 system is not a simple one, but a
 complex one, involving many factors
 which are not yet fully understood.
 The second is the fact that the
 system is not a static one, but a
 dynamic one, involving many factors
 which are not yet fully understood.
 The third is the fact that the
 system is not a uniform one, but a
 non-uniform one, involving many factors
 which are not yet fully understood.
 The fourth is the fact that the
 system is not a homogeneous one, but a
 heterogeneous one, involving many factors
 which are not yet fully understood.
 The fifth is the fact that the
 system is not a continuous one, but a
 discontinuous one, involving many factors
 which are not yet fully understood.
 The sixth is the fact that the
 system is not a linear one, but a
 non-linear one, involving many factors
 which are not yet fully understood.
 The seventh is the fact that the
 system is not a deterministic one, but a
 non-deterministic one, involving many factors
 which are not yet fully understood.
 The eighth is the fact that the
 system is not a predictable one, but a
 non-predictable one, involving many factors
 which are not yet fully understood.
 The ninth is the fact that the
 system is not a controllable one, but a
 non-controllable one, involving many factors
 which are not yet fully understood.
 The tenth is the fact that the
 system is not a manageable one, but a
 non-manageable one, involving many factors
 which are not yet fully understood.

The above are the main features of the
 system, which are not yet fully understood.
 The system is a complex one, involving
 many factors which are not yet fully
 understood. The system is a dynamic one,
 involving many factors which are not yet
 fully understood. The system is a non-
 uniform one, involving many factors which
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
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